

CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS IN SHAPING THE BALANCE OF CIVIL AND MILITARY POWER

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Abstract

The paper highlights the contours of ideal civil-military relations and misbalancing factors leading to deterioration of working relationship between both the institutions. The civil-military relations have been the subject of scholarly discourse since antiquity. This paper examines three important variables, contributing to the divergences and frictions between the civilian political leadership and military experts. Two concepts of controlling the military i.e “objective control” and “subjective control” are highlighted by taking three case studies in the subject in order to draw conclusions for an ideal civil-military relationship

Introduction

“The republic would be better served even by foolish working than by enlightened shirking.”

(Peter D. Feaver)

The coinage of the term “Crossing the Rubicon” owes its origin to Roman separation of the civil and military spheres of influence by which they ensured distancing of the military power from the civilian political institutions. The jeremiads like prognostications of scholars like Finer and Laswell have not helped matters for an apprehension free civil-military compact. Laswell has based his concept of a “Garrison State” on the military elite’s propensity to prefer war over peace.¹ While Laswell espoused the notion of armed forces personnel as specialists conducting the military operations, Finer put forth the idea of the military as an institution prone to interventions in domestic politics because of its corporate discipline and sense of social responsibility.² The leading thinkers on civil-military relations like Huntington and Janowitz

have argued about civilian control of the military and the need to achieve an optimal balance between the civilian primacy and the military effectiveness. They have posited theories about the civilian control in their quest for the holy grail of a balanced civil-military equation.

The ideal civil-military equation is achieved with a military “strong enough to do anything, the civilians ask them to do with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.”³ The challenge that confronts the civil-military hierarchy indubitably is the attainment of an optimum-balance between the functional imperative of the military to protect the society and its societal imperative to protect its values, ideologies, and the institutions. The above balance is indeed the holy grail of the ideal civil-military equation.

The impact of the external and internal threat environment on the delicate civil- military power balance also needs some elucidation in order to understand the complexities of civil-military relations in contemporary era. As the Cold War certainties have given way to a unipolar uncertainty, the threats to national as well as international security have also metamorphosed into a complex series of non traditional and non state threats. The primacy of the political factors that was well-understood at the politico-strategic or the grand strategic level, has now transmuted into a primacy of political effects at the operational level of the war.⁴ The above reality has resulted in a renewed jostle for political control of the military by the civilian leadership. According to Feaver, there has been a simultaneous divergence and convergence between the civilian and military functions after the Cold War due to overshadowing of the traditional threats by non-traditional threats.⁵ He also believes in the absolute primacy of civilian policy and holds the belief that “the principle of military subordination means that civilians should be obeyed if they are pursuing wise policy.”⁶

What then is the ideal balance of civil-military equation and what factors impede or facilitate its fructification? The ideal civil-military relations are predicated upon a symbiosis of civilian political direction/oversight and the military effectiveness. The

optimal balance between the civilian and military functions and the concomitant efficacy of the military instrument as an element of national power is predicated upon a number of factors that include external as well as internal threats, the strength of political/civil institutions, and the ideological orientation/perceived role of the armed forces in the national polity.

The first part of research paper will focus on some theoretical underpinnings of the factors that are expected to define the civil-military power equation of a nation. The analysis of the civil-military power equilibrium of countries like United States, Israel, and Pakistan with a view to highlight the frictions in the decision-making process will be the thrust of the second part while the third part shall comprise main conclusions and recommendations about a balanced civil-military power equation that ensures a symbiosis between the military effectiveness and the civilian primacy. While the thrust of first two parts will be analysis/examination of main ideas, the third part will be prescriptive and inductive throwing fresh vignettes on the topic in the shape of recommendations.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Before examining different factors that impinge upon a smooth civil-military relationship, it is pertinent to discuss few scholarly conclusions about the civilian control of the military. First of all, why is it that the militaries need to be controlled by the civilian political leadership? The answer lies somewhat close to the piquant observation of the French statesman George Clemenceau that “the war is too important a business to be left to the generals.”⁷ According to Feaver a military must be strong enough to attain its objectives and at the same time soft enough in order not to pose a threat to the society it protects.⁸ A military can weaken a society in three primary ways i.e direct seizure of power, draining of national resources due to high expenditure on maintenance, and involvement of societies in undesirable wars.⁹

The control of the military by the civilian leadership is ideally achieved in the shape of the definition of the control proffered by Pigeau McCann according to which “the control is the structures and the processes devised by command both to support it and manage risk.”¹⁰ They go further in defining command and control as “the establishment of common intent to achieve coordinated action.”¹¹ The establishment of the common intent is both an insurance against a military encroachment of the civilian domain and the civilian propensity to exercise intrusive control. According to Huntington, the antidote to possible military defiance to the civilian leadership is the military professionalism. Two forms of civilian control ensure the reining in of the military. The first is the subjective control that coopts the military into the decision making processes of the civil government and the second is the “objective control”¹² that entails separation of the military from the civilian political structure. In attaining the objective control, the military subordinates itself politically but attains professional autonomy. The objective control in turn is dependent upon military professionalism despite its purported belief in the “Hamiltonian pessimism with respect to the human nature and the inevitability of the war by some scholars.”¹³

According to Huntington, the objective civilian control is in direct contrast to “subjective civilian control that achieves its objectives by civilianizing the military by involving it in politics.”¹⁴ Huntington believes that the objective control was always sought by the militaries while the subjective control was desired by the civilians. According to him, a unified (Tri Service) officers corps would “tend to increase its authority vis-a-vis other government institutions.”¹⁵ There was a down side to the military professionalism however, that was pointed out by Huntington as well as such scholars, Janowitz that culturally separated the military from the mainstream society. According to Huntington, the American military was not significantly different from the rest of the population prior to the Civil War. The military grows more conservative as the society grows liberal and longs for a war where it could ply its trade and remain relevant to the society.¹⁶

A sociologist whose classic work on has shaped our understanding of the civil-military relations is Morris Janowitz. He also regarded professionalism as an essential requirement for military effectiveness as well as subordination to the civilian leadership. Where he differed however from Huntington was his linkage of military effectiveness with the changes in environment. He for instance, believed that in Cold War, the US Army should adopt the attributes of a constabulary force that should be more aware of the consequences of its military actions and the primacy of the political objectives.¹⁷ He also recommends “greater legislative oversight, the extension of civilian control into the lower levels of the military organizations, and the greater civilian involvement in officers’ professional education.”¹⁸

An interesting work on the military influence on civilian decision making was done by Richard Betts in the shape of his book i.e *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*. He concludes after analyzing a large data of military recommendations and the civilian decisions that “the military professionals rarely dominated the decisions on the use of force and the military’s influence was greatest when the military professionals argued against the use of force.”¹⁹ The US military’s professionalism got a shot in the arm after the Vietnam debacle, as a consequence of a number of reforms in military structure, training, and doctrine. The apogee of military professionalism was the sterling performance in 1991 Gulf War albeit against a less adroit adversary as compared to Vietnamese. Soon after the war, however, the murmurs of discontent by the US top-military commanders about US military’s employment in nation-building and humanitarian missions were palpable.²⁰

In order to rationalize the aberrant military behaviour, Peter Feaver postulated his theory highlighting the need for an enhanced civilian monitoring of the military commanders. According to his theory, the military leadership acts as agents for its principals i.e the civilian political leadership. He states that “when military agents become professionals by internalizing their duty to serve the principals’ ends, there would be no need to devise an optimal incentive structure with some sort of contract bonus for each political objective achieved during a military campaign.”²¹ The

principal-agent model of Feaver also predicted an inherent friction between civilian principals and the military agents who display a tendency of shirking the responsibility assigned by civilian principals based upon cost of monitoring and the possibility of punishment.²² The military leadership, therefore would be required to be kept in check through a process of civilian monitoring. The concept of micromanagement and intrusive monitoring of the military through information technology was therefore introduced as a “magic bullet for ensuring civilian control.”²³ According to Feaver the “civilians are better positioned to judge the political underpinnings of military policy” and that they should have the final say in decisions even at the cost of errors.²⁴

The seminal work on the impact of external and internal threats on the civil-military equation has been done by Michael Desch enshrined in the *Civilian Control of the Military*.²⁵ The main theme of his discourse is that a combination of external and internal threats determines the nature of civilian control of the military. According to the author, “the civilian control should be best in times of high external and low internal threat and worst in times of low external threat and high internal threat.”²⁶ The application of the above theory leads to an interesting conclusion about the weakening of US political control over the military after the Cold War because of a heightened internal threat and low external threat.²⁷ According to Paul Staniland, however, the military proclivity to intervene in domestic politics under above conditions is kept in check with strong institutions and civilian legitimacy.²⁸ He argues that a high political culture (strong political institutions, high legitimacy, and effusive public participation in society) acts as a shield against the military interventions in national politics.²⁹

There are scholars like Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, who have tried to establish a relationship between the military’s effectiveness and the civil-military harmony. The authors cite Iraq’s civil-military disharmony as the main cause of Iraqi poor air defence performance as against the North Vietnamese civil-military harmony as a contributory factor towards improved use of available air defence technology.³⁰ There are scholars who have tried to establish a linkage between the military effectiveness and the characteristics

of the regimes. According to one such statistics based study, the democratic societies impart better leadership skills and initiative as compared to authoritarian regimes.³¹ On the similar lines Risa Brooks has researched on the linkage between the “highly centralized and initiative sapping command structures of Arab countries and the poor battlefield performance.”³²

Analysis of Civil Military Relations-Israel, Pakistan and United States

In case of liberal democracies of industrialized countries with stable political institutions, the danger of a direct seizure of power is remote. The tensions in the civil-military relations in such countries therefore are played out on a different turf. The force development and employment of the military, ostensibly the prerogative of the specialists, is also challenged by the civilian political leadership in its quest for oversight. The issue of political control and oversight of the military actions has assumed added importance in the post Cold War environment, where the boundaries between the political direction by the civilian principals and the action by military agents are becoming blurred. A flawed military strategy with concomitant risks might result due to the “marginalization of military advice and flawed collaborative civil-military relations.”³³

In USA, the military has the leverage to manipulate the national security decision-making through several measures. These include a delicate balancing act while presenting the policy options to the executive and the Congress. The division of powers for military control between the President and the Congress as per the US constitution gives adequate space to the military to try and influence the defence policy in its favour. According to Clotfelter, “the Congress has the constitutional power to control defence policy but it acquiesces to the military as the leading Congressmen want to tread the path set out for them by the military.”³⁴ The military’s predominant role in influencing political decision-making has been evidenced by military’s aggressive advocacy of air and ground campaign despite McNamara’s urging for restraint.³⁵ According to Myers and Kohn, “General Westmoreland adopted the

counterproductive strategy of attrition of People's army of Vietnam through a use of big battalion level sweeps through the wooded terrain."³⁶ The subliminal impact of military's clout on civilian leadership's imagination is also brought to the fore by President Lyndon Johnson's asking of General Westmoreland, if his decision not to stand again for the US Presidency might be construed by troops as an act of desertion.³⁷

Huntington defines professionalism as a "balance among expertise, responsibility, and corporateness."³⁸ If any element of above trinity is disturbed, the result would be a distortion in the civil-military relations. Colin Powell has been accused of influence-peddling during Bosnian War through his statements that criticized the concept of limited use of force i.e "As soon as they tell me it is limited they do not care whether you achieve a result or not."³⁹ Few civilian scholars have criticized him for using the expertise in the trinity of professionalism to promote the two remaining elements for the corporate benefit of the institution.⁴⁰ The Powell Weinberger doctrine about use of military force in pursuit of clear political goals that are achievable with military means, by overwhelming force, with a clear exit strategy and support of US people came in conflict with Rumsfeld doctrine of minimal use of force through agile, lean, and hitech military.⁴¹ Similar rifts occurred between Rumsfeld and Tommy Frank on the issue of force quantum and employment strategy in Afghanistan. The military influence due to adroit orchestration of its expertise, is aptly summed up by the statement of the White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan when he remarked that "the lessons from the past, including Vietnam are that we should not try to micro-manage military decisions from Washington."⁴²

The growing military propensity for independent professional decisions, however, was not left unchallenged as the civilian leadership also evolved means of controlling the military through close monitoring. The micromanagement of military planning by such US political leaders as President Kennedy has received its due share of criticism. President Kennedy's reduction of the bombing missions to Cuba during the "Bay of the Pigs" invasion and the micromanagement of the blockade have been regarded as

militarily puerile decisions by the defence establishment.⁴³ The choosing of targets for aerial bombing in Vietnam by President Lyndon Johnson was another unsuccessful example of trying to micro-manage the conduct of military operations. It was due to the fears of undue intervention by the civilian leadership that Colin Powell “clearly stipulated to the political leadership that the White House communications would extend no further than General Norman Schwarzkopf’s headquarters in Riyadh.”⁴⁴

Despite objective control of the civilians over the US military, the growing influence of the military commanders especially the Combatant Commanders has started raising few hackles in the civilian and academic circles. President Eisenhower had similarly warned about the menace of the military industrial complex in his farewell address when he held forth unequivocally against the avarice of a clique that might engender conflict as a profit motive.⁴⁵ The post Gold Water and Nicholas Act powers of the US Combatant Commanders and the increasing influence of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff in the department of defense is causing some unease in civilian decision-making echelons. The growing clout of the US Combatant Commanders has been captured well by Dana Priest in her book, “The Mission”. According to her, “US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Zinni was welcomed like a royal by hundreds of Persian Gulf officers and Shieks, and by seventy US and civilian defence officials in attendance. Officially, Zinni was outranked by six American ambassadors to the Persian Gulf countries but in any motorcade he rode in the lead car.”⁴⁶

Another example of US military’s growing self perception as the best interpreters of the political objectives of a campaign is the US military officials’ recent appeal for more flexibility in a proposed legislation that would increase aid to Pakistan. According to the Voice of America (VOA), “while stressing upon the fragility of the situation, officials urged the lawmakers “to trust the US military to hold itself and Pakistan accountable for progress, rather than set rigid conditions.”⁴⁷ The above is but a small example of US military appropriating to itself a political objective and making a strong pitch for it, ostensibly due to the primacy of its strategic

objectives in Afghanistan. The US military has recommended this policy option at a time when the political leadership is being advised caution in disbursing aid to Pakistan by media, independent advocacy groups and government's own political advisors.

Israel

The application of the Israeli example to the theories discussed above would yield interesting facts that would point towards the importance of external and internal threats, the political systems/institutions, and, the ideological orientation of the armed forces in shaping the civil-military systems. Israel is a democratic state with reasonably stable political institutions and a high external as well as internal threat. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) is one of the most heavily indoctrinated outfits in the pantheon of ideologized militaries. Israel is a country where the Huntington's theory of objective control of the armed forces seems to be merging with the subjective control. Like the US during the Cold War, the political culture of Israel has been transmuted by a heightened threat assessment and strong ideological fervour of IDF into a militaristic culture. "The gist of this militarism is that the military considerations are always defined as the national security issues and receive higher priority than political and economic considerations."⁴⁸

The involvement of IDF in national politics is evidenced by the fact that till 2006 out of 16 Israeli Chiefs of General Staffs (CGS), only three chose not to enter the active politics.⁴⁹ According to Yoram Peri, "the defense establishment has always been a major factor in determining Israel's national policy. This ascendancy was determined by the Ben Gurion at the beginning of the 1950s, when he stated that the foreign policy was to serve defense policy."⁵⁰ According to the same author the change in the geostrategic and geopolitical thinking of Israel in 90s owed itself as much to Yitzak Rabin as it did to the changed thinking of IDF that viewed peace as a better option after a cool cost-benefit analysis of all options.⁵¹ The military officers from the IDF's Policy and Planning Directorate mostly participate in the diplomatic parleys and enjoy a lot of clout in major policy formulation at national level.

The Israeli CGS is a *de-facto* permanent member of the Israeli cabinet and attends all important cabinet meetings. The senior officials of the IDF had flatly refused the Prime minister's order to force evacuation of Jewish settlers from Hebron after the massacre of Palestinians on October 25, 1994.⁵² The Israeli PM instead of punishing the defaulters, dissociated himself from the plan. All initiatives regarding comprehensive security based upon diplomacy, development, and peaceful alliances with the Arab states, have foundered on the rocks of a military-centered notion of security.⁵³

Despite wielding a disproportionate influence in national security decision making, the Israeli military has desisted from praetorianism. The conditions that contribute towards praetorianism include "ineffective and army sustained political structure, a low level of political institutionalization, weak political parties, a lack of common ideological purpose between military and civilian institutions, and a decline of professionalism."⁵⁴ In case of Israel, most of above conditions did not exist fortunately. The strong political institutions undergirded by the common ideology, a common ideological purpose, and military professionalism have resulted in a military restraint in not attempting to seize direct power.

Despite above, there are other reasons that contributed significantly towards a military proclivity to wield behind the scenes influence rather than seize power through coups. One reason is a high turn-over rate of Israeli military due to which its barrack time is minimal. The Israeli military therefore gets integrated into the civilian life with a greater regularity than a normal standing army. According to Perlmutter, "the relatively short military career open to Zahal officers militates against the formation of a rigid and conservative professional weltanschauung."⁵⁵ The military officers have been integrated easily into the bureaucratic and industrial world. Consequently, "the organizational, administrative, and human resources have been successfully exploited by Israeli society."⁵⁶ The ideal symbiosis of civil and military elites' ideological and pecuniary benefits has therefore given a strong stake to the military for the preservation of the political system without ceding control of national security decision making. The downside

to this has obviously been the adoption of military-centric notion of security by the state at the cost of a development and diplomacy-driven notion of security.

Pakistan

Pakistan has had a chequered history of civil-military relations since its independence, due to a number of reasons. The chief reason for the above has been the primacy of the military at the cost of civilian institutions due to peculiar security environment right at the beginning of the country's journey as an independent state. According to Hasan Askari a noted Pakistani scholar on civil-military relations, "Pakistan's troubled relations with India and Afghanistan's irredentist territorial claims presented a serious threat to national identity and territorial integrity which led to allocation of substantial portion of national resources to the military."⁵⁷ At independence in 1947 Pakistan inherited 30% of British Indian Army, 40% of its Navy, and 20% of its Air Force.⁵⁸ The three services expanded sedulously carefully nurtured by the respective praetorian rulers especially during their direct rule. During the decade long rule of first military dictator i.e President Ayub Khan, the defence expenditure ranged between 50-55% of the total national expenditure.⁵⁹

The military has seized power directly in coups on four occasions i.e in 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999. Overall the military dictatorship has held the reins of the country for 33 years out of 62 years of independence. For rest of the time, it wielded a disproportionate influence in the national politics with all major national security and foreign policy decisions vetted by the military leadership. The chief reasons for the military domination included weak political institutions, an ambivalent political leadership, a very high-security threat environment, and an overweening ideological orientation of the armed forces. Out of the three soldierly models propounded by Amos Perlmutter i.e praetorian, revolutionary and professional,⁶⁰ Pakistan's officer corps fits a hybrid of praetorian-professional model. The military's British traditions and insular outlook also contributed towards development of a separate identity from the civil society and political institutions.

The leadership vacuum in political leadership due to the death of the founder of Pakistan Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah within a year of the country's independence, stultified the political institutions "leaving his successors divided or confused."⁶¹ Due to infighting amongst the weak political leadership, the "country's military establishment, civilian bureaucracy and intelligence apparatus saw itself as the guardians of the new country."⁶² The military according to Askari "maintained a professional, disciplined, cohesive and task oriented profile with a strong *esprit d' corps* and was viewed as important to state survival."⁶³ According to Gavin Kennedy, at the time of the first military coup in 1958 by then Army Commander in Chief Ayub Khan, all the conditions for a military intervention were present.⁶⁴ These conditions include; a high internal and external threat environment, weak and discredited political parties and an overwhelming sense of ideological superiority over civilian institutions. According to Feaver, "Pakistan presents a classic case of military intervention in a national polity beset with domestic instability under an overhang of a high-external threat."⁶⁵ The civil society's amenability to military rule in the past has always resulted out of a deep distrust of civilian institutions and leadership. Feaver also regards the "favorability toward the military directly proportional to dissatisfaction of people especially the under privileged, with the governance and state institutions."⁶⁶

The impact of direct military interventions and indirect control of foreign and defence policy has resulted in a decision making milieu, overly dominated by the national security considerations. The disproportionate influence of military on political decision-making in Pakistan has resulted in militarization of the society where religious ideology is usually conflated with national security. Some writers have also argued about the large corporate interests of the military that have resulted in diversion of scarce national resources in the shape of subsidies to military run welfare business projects.⁶⁷ A military-centric security viewpoint coupled with obduracy of predatory neighbours, has squelched all peace initiatives based upon give and take cramping space for diplomacy. The high incidence of external threats from India and Afghanistan and internal threats from ethno-sectarian particularism

has also contributed significantly to a strengthening of military influence in national decision-making.

Major Conclusions

Some of the major conclusions extracted from the above analysis are given below:-

- The civil-military relations are a product of a country's socio-political history, threat environment, strength of civilian political institutions and the ideological self image of the military.
- The skewed civil-military relations in three kinds of states i.e USA, Israel, and Pakistan give rise to different issues. In a liberal democracy like USA, with a moderate to high risk threat environment, strong political institutions, and a professional military, the problems of undue interference from civilians might result in a sub-optimal military effectiveness. A weak political oversight contrarily raises the specter of a disproportionate recourse to the use of military instrument in pursuit of political objectives.
- The complex security threats of this era characterized with ideologically-driven insurgencies and terrorism call for an employment of political and military instruments in tandem. The notion of objective control, therefore, is dated when viewed in the context of present security milieu. The principal-agent interaction between the civilians and the military calls for a non-intrusive but effective civilian oversight of the military instrument. The present security threats call for a modified form of subjective control of the military by the civilian institutions, with a balanced fusion of both, in national security decision-making.
- In democracies like Israel that are beset with existential security threats, the strength of the political institutions and the ability of the society to absorb the military professionals in national economic mainstream on a regular basis acts as an insurance against direct military intervention. The ideological fervour of the military cohort suitably burnished by an implacable wave of

internal and external threats, however results in a disproportionate military influence in defense and foreign policies that continues to exact heavy diplomatic and economic costs.

- In unstable democracies with a checkered record of direct military interventions like Pakistan, the military develops a praetorian memory and corporate interests that leads to a praetorian-professional hybrid, the influence of which could only wane through a combination of several factors. These factors include an attenuated threat environment, an assertive civil society, narrowing of ideological gap between the military and the society and strengthened political institutions/processes.

Recommendations

In case of liberal democracies greater fusion of civilian and military institutions and structures needs to be ensured, in order to have a balanced representation of both in national security decision making process. While accomplishing the above, care should be taken, however, to eschew the propensity of over intrusive monitoring, induced due to technological advancements in command and control means.

The stable but high threat environment, democracies like Israel need to develop the civilian institutions further to enable them to make better use of diplomacy and political compromise while seeking solutions to national security problems of intractable nature. The strength of the parliament and the cabinet needs to be enhanced significantly, in order to exercise the desired level of clout over the military for attainment of the required balance in the national decision-making process.

The unstable and emerging democracies like Pakistan beset with a high threat environment need to develop strong political and civilian institutions, led by capable political leadership in order to minimize the reasons that attract military coups and praetorianism. An independent media, voluble intelligentsia, and assertive civil society need to be promoted as a societal bulwark to interventionist

proclivities of praetorian military. The negative aspects of military corporate exclusivism also need to be countered through a system that integrates the members of armed forces in national mainstream of business and government service like Israeli military. And finally, the threat environment needs to be moderated through bold diplomatic initiatives employing a human security-centric national security paradigm.

In all societies and polities, the narrowing of the *perceptual* as well as the *expertise gap* should be attempted. The perceptual gap can be narrowed by winnowing down the carapace of ideological isolationism with which the militaries surround themselves to preserve their warrior culture against the assault of enervating forces of political liberalism. This can be attempted by a regular interaction between the civilians and the military in professional as well as educational development process. In all countries in general and in high threat environment countries in particular, the balanced ethnic and geographical representation of armed forces is de rigueur. The expertise gap between civilians and the military can be minimized through greater civilian involvement in defence and security matters and the exchange tenures for on job training and acculturation between civil and military departments.

One of the best ways to achieve a *perceptual* and *expertise unity* is the common educational experience between the military and civilians. Educating the civilians in the national security aspects through programs in the military universities and the corresponding exposure of military professionals to higher civilian education will go a long way in straightening the ideological and perceptual angularities.

Greater political control of the military through a whole of the government approach in complex security and humanitarian interventions should be the key tenet of future civil-military relations. Greater involvement of political leadership and civilian experts in the planning phase of the military strategy and its linkage with the national security strategy would also foster a commonality of thought while tackling complex security challenges of contemporary era.

Conclusion

The quest for the Holy Grail of the balanced civil military relations led me to examine the three important variables contributing to the divergences and frictions between the two pillars of national security. The three variables that were examined were the threat environment, ideological fervour/self image, and the strength of the civilian political institutions. While in case of stable liberal democracies with moderate to high threat environment the need for greater integration of civil and military leadership emerged as the desired panacea, in case of democracies faced with high threat environment, the requirement to strengthen civilian political institutions was highlighted as the way ahead.

The most serious challenge however to the equilibrium of civil military relations was found in the emerging democracies with a record of military interventions. The anti dote to military interventionism under such conditions is the strong and altruistic political leadership supported by an assertive civil society, independent judiciary, and stable political institutions. The quality of leadership both civil and military would determine to a large extent the quality and character of civil military relations in such polities. According to Feaver it is the civilian leadership that bears the maximum onus of failure of civil military relations due to its putative role as the final decision making authority.⁶⁸

The growing complexities of security challenges in contemporary world continue posing new challenges to civil and military relations analysts. The notion of civilian primacy although accepted as the dominant credo in most of the modern polities would be tested to its limits especially in the complex counterinsurgency warfare environment. Since the equipoise of the civilian and the military leaders would be seriously strained under these conditions a *Modus Vivendi* needs to be evolved to deal with these complexities without a stultifying intrusiveness on part of civilians and a shirking isolationism on part of the military. A narrowing of the gap between the civil and military belief systems is the scarlet thread that promises to hold together the fabric of civil military cooperation in future as in the past.

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