

## **Picture of Muslim Politics in India before Wavell's Viceroyalty**

The Hindu-Muslim conflict in India had entered its final phase in the 1940's. The Muslim League, on the basis of the Two-Nation Theory, had been demanding a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. The movement for Pakistan was getting into full steam at the time of Wavell's arrival to India in October 1943 although it was opposed by an influential section of the Muslims.

This paper examines the Muslim politics in India and also highlights the background of their demand for a separate homeland. It analyzes the nature, programme and leadership of the leading Muslim political parties in India. It also highlights their aims and objectives for gaining an understanding of their future behaviour. Additionally, it discusses the origin and evolution of the British policy in India, with special reference to the Muslim problem. Moreover, it tries to understand whether Wavell's experiences in India, first as a soldier and then as the Commander-in-Chief, proved helpful to him in understanding the mood of the Muslim political scene in India.

### **British Policy in India**

Wavell was appointed as the Viceroy of India upon the retirement of Lord Linlithgow in October 1943. He was no stranger to India having served here on two previous occasions. His first-ever posting in India was at Ambala in 1903 and his unit moved to the NWFP in 1904 as fears mounted of a war with Russia.<sup>1</sup> His stay in the Frontier province left deep and lasting impressions on him. He had passed his Lower and Higher Urdu examinations while at Ambala so he was able to communicate with the local people.<sup>2</sup> He found the Pathans (also known as 'Pashtoon' or 'Pakhtun'), the dominant ethnic community of the province, attractive, with a good sense of humour. Another effect of Wavell's stay in the NWFP was that he realized the strategic importance of the area because of its location. He never forgot these experiences during his later assignments.

Wavell again served in India as Commander-in-Chief of India and Member for Defence and Military<sup>3</sup> of the Governor General's Council from July 1941 to April 1943. This assignment, with its manifold responsibilities, was not an easy job to handle, as expected by Churchill.<sup>4</sup> Constitutionally, he took second place to the Viceroy.<sup>5</sup> His duty on several occasions was to sit and speak in the Legislative Assembly. As head of the armed forces in India he undertook three main tasks: Firstly, he was responsible for efforts to bring about the military defeat of Japan. Secondly, he built the foundations of a new relationship with Asia in the midst of the swirling tide of war and revolution. Lastly, he initiated steps to reach some understanding with the Indian nationalist aspirations in 1942 to help in partially allaying American concerns which had come to regard India as part of their overall strategic picture of Asia centred on China.<sup>6</sup>

Besides the obvious fact that the defence of India against a Japanese conquest, because of its vast military and manpower resources, was the prime concern of the British authorities, there were other strategic factors as well which helped enhance its importance. One very important goal was to put a stop to the idea of Japanese invincibility amongst Indians and thereby prevent the rise of the idea of 'Asians as a superior group' from taking a strong hold in the minds of the Indian people. Another was to prevent the Japanese domination of the Indian Ocean which could have jeopardised the Allies' oil supply from Iran and the Middle East. Wavell, as Commander-in-Chief in India, was also responsible for the direction of military operations in Burma and at the same time for a continuous expansion and professional training of the Indian Army.<sup>7</sup>

By the end of 1943, the Japanese were still at the gates of India, but the overall situation had changed substantially. They had lost air and sea supremacy to the American forces while on the Burmese front, Britain was not only hitting back aggressively but was ready to take the offensive into Burma. Because of India's pivotal importance it could not any more be taken for granted, psychologically as well as politically. In the midst of all

these concerns of His Majesty's Government, Wavell was also plunged into a major political crisis.

### **Cripps Proposals**

On 11 March 1942 Churchill announced that he was sending Sir Stafford Cripps to Delhi with a draft declaration of British plans regarding 'self-government' for India. The main issue was the grant of the Dominion status to India after the war with the right to secede, but with the provision that the self-governing States would have the right to opt out of the union and retain their existing constitutional position vis-à-vis the British government. Cripps, who arrived on 22 March, was full of optimism but soon found that neither Jawaharlal Nehru nor Gandhi, the Congress leaders, shared this feeling. During the early stages of the talks, the greatest stumbling block was the proposed right of non-accession of the self-governing States. Britain felt that it had a moral obligation to the Princely States, which in the past had been whole-heartedly loyal to the Crown, to ensure that they should have some say in their future.

Right from the start it appeared as if the Cripps Proposals wanted to ensure the participation of the Congress at all cost. To remove the latter's reservations regarding the creation of Pakistan, Sir Sikandar Hayat, Punjab Premier, came to Delhi on the directive of the Viceroy and Cripps to give assurances to the Congress leadership that if the matter was put to vote in the Punjab Assembly, its decision would be on national and not on communal lines. After this assurance, Congress suggested that discussions should be confined to the immediate defence problem.<sup>8</sup>

Victoria Schofield has recorded, "Wavell was not directly involved in discussions regarding the future of India, but his role as Commander-in-Chief was relevant to the question of how much responsibility Indians should bear for the defence of their country."<sup>9</sup> In fact, his strong stand on defence issue brought about the failure of Cripps Proposals. Cripps had suggested that the Defence Ministry should also be transferred to the Indian political elements. But Lord Linlithgow and Wavell had different points of view.<sup>10</sup> Wavell sought a middle way and suggested creating a seat of Deputy Commander-in-Chief or Defence Coordination Member to relieve some of the main burden of administrative work and internal security.<sup>11</sup> It was proposed that the Commander-in-Chief should remain on the Viceroy's council as War Member and that there should be an Indian Member for Defence. Discussion on the demarcation of duties between the Commander-in-Chief and the Defence Member soon ran into difficulties.

Cripps personally took Nehru and Maulana Azad to Wavell to clarify and give assurances regarding the offer.<sup>12</sup> They discussed the responsibility of the Indian Member of the Council. When Wavell was asked whether the role of the Indian Member of the Council would be that of a responsible cabinet minister, he gave no direct reply. Maulana Azad writes that Wavell spoke more like a politician than a soldier and insisted that during the war, strategic considerations must take precedence over all other issues.<sup>13</sup>

In fact, the British Government could not afford to separate the British and the Indian armies at this critical juncture. On the same matter, Lord Linlithgow expressed his views in a telegram to the Prime Minister and said:

Commander-in-Chief and I feel that no very serious risks are involved in setting up and handing over to an Indian Member of Council a portfolio Defence Co-ordination including duties of present Defence Co-ordination section along with such other non-essential functions of present Defence department as Wavell thinks he can safely include in new portfolio. But we are both satisfied that in existing circumstances it is not (repeat not) possible to take away from Commander-in-Chief the substance of the defence portfolio as now held by him in order to entrust it to a representative Indian.<sup>14</sup>

Likewise, Wavell wrote to Churchill, "...I am convinced after careful consideration that it would not be possible to separate my dual functions as civil (Commander-in-Chief?) and defence member without causing a complete dislocation of machine...."<sup>15</sup> Deep differences arose and no agreement was reached between the British Government and the Congress. No clarification or assurance could change the mindset of the Congress leaders like Gandhi who believed that presence of the British in India was an invitation to Japan to invade their

country and, therefore, their withdrawal would remove the threat. He thought that a free India would be better able to cope with the invasion. Therefore, he decided to launch a 'Quit India' movement which he thought would wrap up the British rule in India.<sup>16</sup>

Jinnah and the Muslim League had no doubt that Japanese aggression had to be resisted and consequently created no trouble during the war.<sup>17</sup> The Muslim League also rejected the Cripps Proposals because they did not ensure the creation of Pakistan.

Though Wavell might be 'on the tarmac to see the delegation off'<sup>18</sup> and his stand might have provided an excuse to Congress to reject the Cripps offer but his ideas about transfer of power to Indians as early as possible to get the best results in the war began to mature. His experience in the political affairs of the country opened new realities to him. Firstly, he noticed that Cripps did not care to take into confidence either the Governor-General of India or the Commander-in-Staff of the army while dealing with the future political structure of India and the transfer of the British power to the Indians. It was unethical and authoritative rather than democratic to by-pass the crown's representatives. It also made his job more difficult, for a single person could not bring a solution to the Indian problem. Cripps' authoritative method too in dealing with the Indians and his unflinching support and leaning towards the Congress brought home to Wavell that Cripps' credibility as an honest peace-maker was doubtful as Wavell had a different mind-set.

He realized that the two leading political parties of India must be brought into government as soon as possible to help them in overcoming their differences and helping the British government to utilize all the resources of India with their kind cooperation in the war.<sup>19</sup>

### **Wavell as Supreme Commander of ABDA**

Wavell was appointed the Allied Supreme Commander of ABDA (American, British, Dutch, and Australian forces in the West Pacific). Laboriously, Wavell tried to build up a capacity, first to resist the Japanese attack and then, strike back, but short of trained troops and modern equipment and plagued by the need to maintain security in India itself, he could make little headway.<sup>20</sup>

He underrated the Japanese fighting capabilities and tried to block their military progress but he had insufficient air cover<sup>21</sup> to prevent the Japanese from overrunning Malaya. In December 1942, his troops attacked in the Arakan<sup>22</sup> without any breakthrough, because Wavell insisted on frontal assaults. When a limited offensive was begun in the Arakan Peninsula on the Burmese coast, Wavell seemed to make the same mistakes as he did in the previous campaign.

Churchill was very critical and even unpleasant about the Arakan operations, and regarded them as failures worthy of disgrace. Wavell resigned his command of ABDA.<sup>23</sup> He returned to India where he marshalled his resources to prepare an offensive on Burma. In January 1943, he was made Field Marshal.<sup>24</sup> Immediately taking the charge, Wavell on his own responsibility<sup>25</sup> supported the first Wingate expedition to recapture Burma from the Japanese.<sup>26</sup> The idea was to send Wingate's 3000 men, supported by air cover, into Burma as a kind of extended cavalry raid, accomplished by an invasion by a much larger force which later on brought victories for the Allies.<sup>27</sup> But he was called back to London in April 1943 and returned as the Viceroy of India.<sup>28</sup>

Paying tribute to Wavell's services, the editor of *The Statesman* wrote: "...there have been, throughout history men to whom Governments tend to turn when a difficult task or situation arises and Wavell was such a person." It would not be wrong to suggest that "Wavell had often been sent to do the near-impossible, owing to his potentials and achievements."<sup>29</sup>

Linlithgow was due to relinquish his viceroyalty in 1941, and almost as soon as Amery, the Secretary of State for India, took office, he began to inquire about a new

Viceroy.<sup>30</sup> He discussed the matter with Churchill<sup>31</sup> and they failed to find a suitable substitute for Linlithgow for three years, till Wavell's appointment to that post.<sup>32</sup>

### **Appointment as Viceroy**

Amery told Linlithgow, "He is excellent company and most interesting once he starts to talk. But it is not always easy to get him started."<sup>33</sup> Churchill informed Attlee from North Africa that in opinion of Brooke and Lord Ismay, Wavell had aged considerably. Churchill thought that Wavell would not be the best man to command in East Asia. In his view, Auchinleck was a better person to deal with the enlarged Indian Army.<sup>34</sup> He concluded that he would be sorry to leave Wavell unemployed, as he had just acquired a high reputation, due to his war services.<sup>35</sup> He had to be accommodated<sup>36</sup> and it was advised that an officer who had been Commander-in-Chief in India should not be employed in a subordinate position.<sup>37</sup> Hence, a suggestion that he should be made Inspector-General of the Indian army was rejected. Churchill was apprehensive about how to fit in this outstanding soldier and also find a place for Wavell and this produced a difficult problem. The solution they decided upon was to appoint Mountbatten as the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, with operational responsibility for the war against Japan; Auchinleck was restored to the post of Commander-in-Chief, India, which had been his from 1940-41.

Following a shuffling of various positions Wavell was assigned the viceroyalty of India in 1943. Wavell himself has written about rather curious circumstances under which Churchill made the decision to appoint him as the Viceroy of India; Wavell adds, he accepted it as a military officer would in time of war.<sup>38</sup> He was dissatisfied as Churchill had not written to him anything about the tenure of his appointment but only had suggested that the Government might, at the end of three years, possibly would wish to replace him by a politician but he hoped that that would not, in fact, be the case.<sup>39</sup> Wavell suggested to Churchill the name of Evan Jenkins as his private secretary and that was accepted.<sup>40</sup>

Churchill was happy that Wavell's appointment had been so well received by the people.<sup>41</sup> Wavell had certainly got a broader outlook and wider reading than most soldiers of his time. He had dealt with many political figures in the Middle East and had the advantage of having been on the Executive Council in India and of knowing the political and constitutional problems and personalities.

Lord Wavell, the Viceroy-designate, along with his wife reached Delhi on 17 October 1943. He was sworn in as the new viceroy on 20 October 1943.<sup>42</sup> Wavell was briefed by Linlithgow about political situation in India.<sup>43</sup>

### **British Administration in India**

Wavell's initiation as Viceroy coincided with the British administration beginning to lose its previously tight grip in India due to political pressures and the aftermath of war. When Wavell became Viceroy, the Governor General's Council consisted of fourteen members, of whom ten were non-official Indians and four British.<sup>44</sup> The Government of India Act 1935 had granted the provinces of India parliamentary self-government.<sup>45</sup> The need to introduce Section 93 arose shortly after the outbreak of World War II when the Congress Ministries holding office in seven of the eleven provinces resigned and no provincial government with a satisfactory majority could be formed other than in Assam and the NWFP where a non-Congress coalition governments and a government led by Sardar Aurangzeb held offices respectively.<sup>46</sup>

In Orissa, due to a change of allegiance by seven Congress members in 1941 a coalition government had been formed.<sup>47</sup> In May 1943, in the absence of Congress member of legislative assembly, the Muslim League under Sardar Aurangzeb was able to form a coalition government in the NWFP.<sup>48</sup>

Since 1858 the British Government had been governing India directly from London.<sup>49</sup> In spite of promising India a dominion status by the end of the World War II, the

British had not designed any special plans for quitting India. The Secretary of State for India, who was also a member of the Cabinet along with his Council, was responsible for Indian affairs.<sup>50</sup> World War II had turned India into a strategically sensitive country. Therefore, India Committee,<sup>51</sup> War Cabinet Committee<sup>52</sup> and the Secretary of State took keen interest in the internal and external affairs of India. They would not let any Governor-General of India act independently. Churchill presided over most of the meetings and took decisions regarding India. As they ignored the Indian government while making decisions, Linlithgow had protested against these decisions many times.<sup>53</sup>

At the outbreak of World War II, the British Government promised to grant the 'Dominion Status' to India after the end of the war, due to internal and external political pressures. The August Offer, 1940, the enlargement of the Executive Council of the Viceroy in 1941 and the Cripps Proposals of 1942 were few such steps taken in this direction. Nonetheless, they had no clear-cut plan of leaving India in the near future, nor they were clear as to how and to which party they should transfer the power in case of breakdown.<sup>54</sup>

All the leading politicians as well as a majority of the British public opinion were opposed to the demand for Pakistan. However, at the same time, they believed these could best be served in the united India. Hence, the majority of the British policy makers including Churchill, Amery, Attlee, and Cripps strongly supported the unity of India and were absolutely opposed to the idea of Pakistan.<sup>55</sup> Likewise, the British public and press were also opposed to the Pakistan demand.<sup>56</sup>

Though no stranger to India the political problem he had to encounter was complex and deeply complicated by historical forces.<sup>57</sup> The Muslim League was not only the strongest Muslim party in India but also an outspoken proponent of the demand for Pakistan although a few lesser ones were opposed to it. These parties and groups had conflicting ideas and divergent programmes. Therefore, it is essential to discuss about the nature, programme and the personalities of the main Muslim political parties to understand Muslim politics in India in a better way.

### **Muslims Politics in India: A Historical Background**

The Muslims ruled India from 712 to 1857<sup>58</sup> but their decline brought them face to face with many new problems and it ushered in a new era in the history of the Muslims of India.<sup>59</sup> Following the British conquest of India but especially after the failed attempt to oust them in 1857 the three-way relations between the Muslims, Hindus and the British passed through several stages. In all this game Muslims were the biggest losers financially, politically, educationally and socially, while, carefully nurtured by the British, the Hindus and the Sikhs were the biggest beneficiaries. This completely reversed the political situation

Muslims suffered heavily, wherever, the British took control. Deprived of property, government jobs, discrimination in language and thereby in education their position went from being the leaders of India to an existence at the lowest social level, just a notch above the 'untouchables', of India under whereas the Hindus, and later the Sikhs as well, rose to the top. The Muslim loss was Hindu gain and thereby the political situation of the two communities was totally reversed. This point is critical in understanding the dynamics of politics between the communities right up to 1947 and even afterwards.

The general policy of the East India Company towards the Muslims was of severe discrimination and to replace Muslims with Hindus wherever possible. The Hindus, on the whole, remained loyalists and benefited immensely from the situation and remained saddled to the seats of benefits. No wonder, this generated in them the sense of becoming the successor of the British and overlord of the South Asia after the departure of the British. Thus, when the Muslims were struggling for their very survival, the Hindus were dreaming for political power through the vehicle of democracy.

The British tried to introduce the institution of democracy based on the 'Westminster' model in India following 1857 aimed at enlisting the support of the loyalists amongst the Indians. As a result the Indian National Congress came into being in 1885.<sup>60</sup> Its aim was to promote the social, economic, political interests of the Indian people regardless

of their background. The dreams its founders, however, began to shatter when it fell a prey to Hindu extremist elements that began to turn it into a purely Hindu body.<sup>61</sup>

During the critical years of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) emerged as a champion for the cause of Muslims.<sup>62</sup> He found his community broken by trials and tribulations of the War of Independence, and stormy decades that succeeded it. He undertook the responsibility of bringing about a renaissance in the affairs of Muslim India. Only a full-spectrum political loyalty to the British raj, he thought, could ensure Muslim survival. The British also appreciated his efforts and realised that the Indian Muslims could not be ignored any more so they encouraged them to get a modern education and helped Syed Ahmad Khan in establishing a number of institutions in this connection.<sup>63</sup>

Syed Ahmad Khan also was the first of the Muslim leaders to consistently dwell on the 'Two-Nation Theory' and held that besides other communities the two leading ones, Muslims and Hindus, formed two distinct nations.<sup>64</sup> He predicted, after a detailed examination of the drift of the Congress, that it would eventually turn out to be predominantly a Hindu party. He called upon Muslims to abstain from politics and refrain from joining Congress. The Muslims, heeding his advice, began to pay more attention to their educational needs. As a result of his efforts, the Congress failed to attract a large number of Muslims to its fold.

Select opposition to British rule in India had begun to mount in India in the late 1870's and early 1880's. However, till the partitioning of Bengal in 1905, there was no national political movement worth the name. Congress agitation against the partition of Bengal had two immediate effects: it turned Congress into a national organization; secondly, it created the deep chasm between the Muslims and the Hindus which kept on widening till it led to the creation of Pakistan. Two other political moves of immense historical importance resulted from the anti-government Congress agitation, seen by a majority of Muslims as strongly affecting the Muslim interests as well: Muslims decided to form their first political party and called it Muslim League, in 1906; and, following the repeal of the Bengal partition in 1911 due to Hindu/Congress agitation, Muslims realised for the first time the raw power of concerted, aggressive and sustained political agitation which could even bend the might of the powerful British Empire in India.

Not only the overwhelmingly Hindu agitation against the partition of Bengal but nearly all Hindu and Congress protests besides it seemed to pose a direct threat to the Muslim interests as well. Congress' opposition to the Land Alienation Act of 1901 in Punjab and to the Muslim demand for separate electorates are good examples of such a political approach. Concerning the partition of Bengal and its effects on Muslim interests, Sikandar Hayat wrote that "even if one were to grant the argument that the partition of Bengal was a deliberate move on the part of the British Government to sow the seeds of conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims, the question still remains, why did not the Hindus put forward "an alternative scheme" to satisfy legitimate grievances of the Muslims in Bengal. After all, they were fully aware that the partition meant a great relief to many Muslims in East Bengal."<sup>65</sup> The Hindu political groups, press and professionals banded together to openly condemn, abuse and politically attack those Muslims who supported the partition of Bengal.

All of the above political activity created amongst the Muslims a sense of deprivation and loss, for the Congress could not endorse those reforms which would further Muslim development. The Muslims felt that as a community they were totally separate from the Hindus. The one-dimensional understanding of the Congress leadership towards the Muslim problems led them to denounce and reject all other political view points. They became victims to the 'conspiracy theory'. They might not have been that off the mark as they themselves were created, nurtured and promoted by the British, and believed that whatever had occurred and would occur in India, happened with the backing or prior approval of the British Government. As a result Hindus branded Sir Syed as a British loyalist, anti-nationalist and a communalist. Similarly they declared Simla Deputation of 1906 and the creation of the Muslim League in 1906 as a 'command performance'.<sup>66</sup> This kind of approach had serious implications and needed readjustment and rectification in the

light of the Muslim intellectual experience and their emerging problems in the first half of the twentieth century.

However, the new century required openness, large heartedness and political insight from the Indian leadership to drive out the British Raj from India. Unity of purpose among different communities of India could have facilitated it but they lacked the unity factor badly.

The Hindus, however, had become most politically conscious community since 1857. They had not only been aspiring for total political ascendancy in India upon the departure of the British but had also declared India 'a land only for the Aryans', and by declaring that the Muslims and the Christians had no place in their holy motherland.<sup>67</sup> Sikhs also had been forming, for a long time, their separate associations for promotion and protection of their religious and political rights. On 30 October 1902, they formed the *Chief Khalsa Diwan* by merging 29 of the Singh Sabhas.<sup>68</sup>

At this critical juncture, the Muslims at large could not afford to remain aloof from the complexities of Indian national politics. They expected, from the Muslim political elite, some bold political steps to safeguard their future destiny. Unlike the creation of the Sanskrit College, Hindu Benares University and the Indian National Congress, the Simla Deputation of October 1906 and the establishment of the Muslim League (December 1906) by the Muslim leaders was neither engineered nor sponsored or commanded by the British authorities.<sup>69</sup> This change in Muslim's political thought was the outcome of the origins of Hindu-Muslim tussles, the introduction of the democratic institutions in India and independent growth of separate nationalistic aspirations, of the Muslims of South Asia.<sup>70</sup> Although, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Waqar-ul-Maluk and Syed Ameer Ali<sup>71</sup> had founded some political associations at the national level, they failed to achieve popularity among the rank and file of the Muslims mainly because the originators of these had no intention or the capacity to extend it at a large scale. However, their main thrust remained the securing of safeguards for the Muslim in the fields of culture, education, economics and politics. The Muslim League right from its commencement demanded safeguards for Muslims in every field, and claimed itself as the representative of the Muslims only. Whether its establishment was justified or not the response of the Congress leaders to its establishment was more unfortunate. They took ten years to recognize the significance of its role for the liberation of India.

The Lucknow Pact of 1916 provided a basis for an eventual rapprochement between the Congress and the League; however it was to be of short duration. The outcome of this agreement was that it enabled them to work collectively and vigorously to achieve home-rule through the efforts of the Home Rule League (1916-1920), opposing Rowlatt Act of 1919, protesting against the tragedy of Jalianwalla Bagh 1919, and boycotting the elections in 1920 under the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. Moreover, they started the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-22) as part of the Khilafat Movement. But this honey-moon period soon came to an end and the 'accord' between the two communities struggled in the stormy politics of 1920's.<sup>72</sup> The new constitutional reforms and the inception of new Hindu religious extremist movements and organizations like Shuddhi, Sangathan and Hindu Mahasabha polluted the recently created atmosphere of Hindu-Muslim unity and exposed the mutual trust, respect and the reliance of the two political parties on each other to mutual hostilities.

Jinnah was praised for his efforts for the Hindu-Muslim unity. He, however, left the Congress in 1920, as his rational approach towards politics<sup>73</sup> did not permit an accommodation with the emotionalism of Gandhian philosophy which, he thought, would lead nowhere. Therefore, he did not endorse the philosophy and the methods adopted by the Congress under the instructions and influence of Gandhi for the Non-Cooperation Movement in the Khilafat Movement. He felt that Gandhi was taking India to a destination where everything would end in a disaster.<sup>74</sup> His prediction proved correct and not only did the Khilafat Movement end in failure but it also to communal riots which became routine afterward.

Jinnah always thought in terms of a unified approach by the two leading communities to the political problems then faced by India.<sup>75</sup> It was with this spirit that he

endorsed the Congress decision to boycott the Simon Commission in 1927 and presented the Delhi Muslim Proposals in 1927.

With a view to carrying on League-Congress concurrence and Hindu-Muslim unity, Muslim League under direction from Jinnah even showed its willingness to surrender the two principles of separate electorates and weightage in the provinces. These two constitutional provisions formed the bedrock of what they thought was essential for the preservation of their identity and interests.<sup>76</sup>

This stance soon divided not only the Muslim League but also the whole Muslim community between protagonists and proponents of the separate electorates. No doubt, according to David Page, the Unionists in the Punjab who were against the Delhi Muslim Proposals were more interested in preservation of their class interests than any communal interests.<sup>77</sup> But there were genuine reactions of the Muslims who considered it a political mistake to rely so heavily on the Congress leaders without prior assurances.<sup>78</sup> Though it could have put his political career at stake but Jinnah was ready to make an extremely courageous and risky move for the sake of Hindu-Muslim unity. In fact, the proposals were not a political mistake on the part of Jinnah, rather a calculated move masking Jinnah's political expediency.

While the Muslims were divided on this point, the Hindus had become united against the demand for separate electorates. In 1928, the All Parties Convention approved the Nehru Report drafted by the Nehru Committee.<sup>79</sup> It not only rejected the Muslim demand for separate electorates but also refused to accept the Muslim claim to one-third of seats in the Central Legislature.<sup>80</sup> Thus Nehru Report killed the spirit and substance of the Lucknow Pact of 1916. Shoaib Qureshi, a member of the Nehru Committee, disagreeing with its proposals did not sign it while the other Muslim member Ali Imam was ill and did not take part in its proceedings. The report was considered by the Muslim League as a charter of slavery for the Muslims, for it aimed at establishing the Hindu-Raj in India by Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. According to Uma Kaura, "The failure of the Convention can only be attributed to the inability of the Congress leaders to stand up firmly against the pressures of the Hindu Mahasabha."<sup>81</sup>

To Jinnah, it was a 'parting of the ways' but according to Abdul Hamid, Jinnah's brief and pointed comment at this stage was more apparent than real, as he did not lose heart and continued to seek Hindu-Muslim unity even during the Round Table Conferences.<sup>82</sup> In response to the Nehru Report Jinnah presented his 'Fourteen Points' but Allama Iqbal had a unique remedy to solve the Hindu-Muslim problem.<sup>83</sup>

### **Allama Iqbal's Allahabad Address (1930)**

Allama Iqbal had a clear vision and profound outlook regarding the future of Indian Muslims. Like Jinnah, he had also passed through stages of political evolutionary growth to arrive at the conclusion that the best alternate for Muslims was to have a separate homeland of their own. He conceptualized the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims in his presidential address of 1930 at Allahabad during the annual session of the Muslim League.

Based on the two-nation theory, his address shed light on the incongruity and divergent philosophies of the Muslims and Hindus that had persisted for centuries. He maintained that both Muslims and Hindus had failed to merge into one nation. All efforts to forge them into a single nationhood in the past through such means as the *Bhagatti Movement* and *Akbar's Deen-i-Illahi* ended in failure. He did not deem it fit for the Muslims and the Hindus to live together in an atmosphere where the practice of the basic principles of co-existence had become unimaginable due to mutual jealousies, rioting and economic and political clashes. Therefore, he proposed the division of India on communal grounds, i.e., Hindu and the Muslim zones.

Despite forceful arguments and logic of the Allahabad Address, Allama Iqbal failed to attract a large following within the Muslim League to his concept of the division of India but ended up laying the intellectual foundation of Muslim nationalism in India, which led in March 1940 to the demand for Pakistan.<sup>84</sup>

In 1933, Chaudhry Rahmat Ali, a student at Cambridge University along with his two other friends, coined the name 'Pakistan',<sup>85</sup> keeping in view those areas and provinces which were designated by Allama Iqbal as forming part of a separate Muslim 'homeland'. They also started the 'Pakistan Movement' to achieve this separate homeland as described by him. However, the movement for Pakistan could not become a popular movement till the passage of the Lahore Resolution in 1940.

### **Congress Ministries (1937-1939)**

The main feature of the Muslim politics in India in the 1930's was its shift from the provinces to the Centre. The upshot of the three Round Table Conferences held in 1930-1932 was the enactment of the Government of India Act 1935.<sup>86</sup> Although it could neither satisfy the League nor the Congress, both decided to make the best of it by agreeing to follow it.<sup>87</sup> The general elections of 1936-37 failed to prove that the Congress was the single representative body of all the communities in India. It contested only on 58 seats out of 482 seats reserved for the Muslims in the provinces and won only 24 of them. Although the Muslim League proved the largest single party of the Muslims it acquired only 104 seats. Congress secured 711 out of 1585 seats in the provincial elections.<sup>88</sup> Though it did not win a majority of seats in the general constituencies, it had enough strength, however, to give the party an absolute majority in five provinces and control in three others.

According to its critics, these unexpected results deceptively intoxicated the Congress leaders with a mistaken sense of power. Overriding and ignoring the growing intensity of the Muslim League's opposition to their anti-Muslim policies, they started believing that it was the only party with the sole right to rule India once the British departed. After occupying power at the provincial level they started thinking of capturing it at the centre as well but the onset of World War II shattered their dreams.

In fact, the Congress Ministries (1937-39) had further widened the gulf between the Muslims and the Hindus, mainly due to their irresponsible and blatantly anti-Muslim policies. The "Gentleman's Agreement", between the Governor-General and Gandhi, had put the Congress on the driving seat, for the Governor was forbidden to use his special powers. Thus, the Congress secured for itself a position in which it could disregard altogether the safeguards that the Act had provided as a brake upon the powers of the majority.<sup>89</sup> At the outset of the formation of its ministries, the Congress refused to form a coalition government with the League in the United Provinces.

Refusal of the Congress to form a coalition government with the League was their legitimate right but they exercised this right in an awkward and indecent manner. They put humiliating terms to include one minister of the League in the United Provinces (UP) government. The Muslim League leaders felt that Gandhi and his followers wished to absorb the League into the Congress.<sup>90</sup>

On failing in their aim in the U.P. the Congress launched the 'Mass Contact' movement<sup>91</sup> with great zeal and commitment to enlist Muslim voters which also proved counter-productive.<sup>92</sup> But not only it annoyed the Muslim masses and the provincial governments of Bengal, Punjab and Assam but also forced the League to counter the propaganda unleashed by the Congress.<sup>93</sup> The Muslims complained that Congress Ministries had adopted policies that aimed at making Hindu extremists happy at the cost of Muslim agony.

The League's offices all over India piled up with the letters and applications from the Muslims regarding their sufferings in the Muslim-minority provinces.<sup>94</sup> Neither the Congress nor the British Government took notice of these sufferings which emboldened the Hindu extremists who unleashed a reign of terror and started converting Muslims into Hindus through the vehicle of Rashtirya Swyamsevak Sangh, Hindu Sabha, Shuddhi and Sangathan.<sup>95</sup> The climate became ripe for the Hindu-Muslim riots which claimed the lives and properties of thousands of innocent persons.<sup>96</sup> The Muslims thought that a Hindu raj had come into full play where they had no part to play in the society.

Leading Congress leaders like Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru also did not display political wisdom and sagacity regarding Muslim's complaints. Nehru's statements such as

“there were only two parties Congress and the British in India” was enough proof for the majority of Muslims and the League to believe that as far as the Congress was concerned Muslims had no place in Indian politics.

Gandhi’s policies of educational and cultural innovations, aimed at diluting the national identity of Muslims, were probably the most serious political mistake at an inopportune time. Most unfortunate aspect of Congress’ attitude was to highly overestimate its popularity and standing among the Muslims, vis-à-vis that of the League, in the mature political culture of 1930’s. Congress continued to show a general lack of wisdom and statesmanship in the coming years as well. Mistakes committed by the Congress during this period, along with the missed opportunities rendered all the later efforts to keep the country united, worthless.

World War II provided an opportunity for the Indians to forge unity amongst themselves to pressure the British Indian government for independence but it did not happen. Penderel Moon points out, “The outbreak of war afforded a splendid opportunity of repairing the damage that had been done during their ministries. On the plea of national emergency Congress could have retraced their steps and sought to join with the League in coalition both in the provinces and at the centre. It was politically unwise to display dissent and division between them, for they could not force the British to evacuate South Asia at the crucial time of the Second World War. The Congress chose to follow the barren path of non- co-operation with both the British and the League.”<sup>97</sup>

Gandhi, like Nehru, also asserted that there were only two parties in India, namely those who support the Congress and those who do not, and then added that between the two there is no meeting ground without the one or the other surrendering its purpose.<sup>98</sup> Consequently when the Congress Ministries resigned from the provinces, Jinnah called upon Muslims to celebrate the ‘Day of Deliverance’.<sup>99</sup> Thus Jinnah, at the Patna session of the League held in 1938, declared that the Congress was a Hindu body and aimed at Hindu Raj because Vidya Mandir Scheme,<sup>100</sup> Rajkot Affairs, Hyderabad Satyagraha and the singing of Bande Matram<sup>101</sup> were enough for the Muslims to quit the Congress and despise it.<sup>102</sup>

At the end of the Congress Ministries, Jinnah, putting the blame for the fragile and tense communal situation existing in India squarely on Congress, claimed, “The Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fair-play at their hands.”<sup>103</sup> He now felt that a federal form of government for the united India, a separate electorate for the Muslims, reservation of one third seats in the centre and provincial autonomy were not enough safeguards for the Muslims of India. A feeling of despondency and helplessness prevailed amongst the Indian Muslims,<sup>104</sup> therefore, there was only one path left for them and that was the division of India into Hindu and the Muslim zones. It could save the Muslims of the Muslim-majority areas from complete annihilation at the hands of the Hindus.

Ian Stephens has recorded, “whereas in the 1920’s, Muslims were worried mainly about how dyarchy would work under the Montague-Chelmsford system, in the 1930’s their chief concern was to prevent a future Central or Federal Government from getting too strong, from obtaining powers wide enough to put Muslims permanently at a Hindu majority mercy.”<sup>105</sup>

### **The Lahore Resolution (1940)**

The Lahore Resolution of March 1940 was the result of an independent evolution of the Muslim political thought.<sup>106</sup> It was neither dictated by the British nor encouraged by Lord Linlithgow as some Congress party historians have alleged<sup>107</sup> but was a natural result of the Muslim’s aspirations, interests and ideals shaped by the evolving political situation in India.<sup>108</sup> Jinnah, like Allama Iqbal, after exploring all other avenues of Muslim survival and security in India, had reached the conclusion that the only way the Muslim could save themselves from the stranglehold of a Hindu majority government and secure their future life in line with their ideals, “religious,<sup>109</sup> spiritual, economic,<sup>110</sup> social<sup>111</sup> and political,” was to have their own homeland, territory and state. His rationale of the two-nation theory was almost on the same lines, tone and style as had been expounded by Allama Iqbal.<sup>112</sup> But he

elaborated it in a manner clearer to the Muslims at large to explain the contradictions which had existed between the Hindus and the Muslims for a long time. He tried to prove that the Muslims of India had survived with a separate identity and deserved to be considered as a separate nation, for their separate identity fulfilled every sense of the meaning of the word 'nation' prevalent in the political dictionary of the time.

It is rightly pointed out that the Muslims of India had been roaming in a political wilderness but the Lahore Resolution of March 1940 gave them a sense of identity and purpose. Some historians tend to declare the Lahore Resolution as "ambiguous" and a "bargaining counter". Although Viceroy Linlithgow, Wavell and Mountbatten frequently had used the word "bargaining counter" for the Lahore Resolution of 1940, historians like Ayesha Jalal have also reinterpreted it sensationally and characterised it as a bargaining counter.

Sikandar Hayat has pointed out, "So-called ambiguities in the Lahore Resolution were tactical in nature and put deliberately to save it from attacks from Muslim League's powerful adversaries, the British and the Congress."<sup>113</sup> The fact was that the Muslims of India responded quickly and positively to Jinnah's call and began to join the League and supported the demand for Pakistan. He deliberately left vague the whole plan although he called for establishing independent states in the North-West and North-Eastern zones for the Muslims of India. This placed Jinnah at the top in his ability to negotiate with the opponents of the demand for Pakistan during the British transfer of power to India.

As both the British and the Congress stood for the unity of India, the resolution failed to make either of them happy, due to a variety of reasons. As in earlier instances Hindus admonished the Muslims for passing such a resolution and declared that it was dicta

Instead of trying for a truer understanding of the Muslims' problems and complaints, the Congress, as a result of the Pakistan Resolution, became even more hostile towards them and adopted a strategy aimed at dividing their ranks.<sup>114</sup> They encouraged all those groups, leaders and associations whom they thought would oppose the League, Jinnah and the Lahore Resolution, by providing them economic, political and other assistance. Increased Congress opposition to the League, Jinnah and the Lahore Resolution had the reverse effect of its intended goal by increasing their popularity amongst the Muslim masses. Just like the Hindus, the British Government was also opposed to the Lahore Resolution but being the governing power it could not afford to ignore the growing influence of Jinnah and the League among the Muslims of India whose valuable military and other services were badly needed for World War II.

Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy of India (1936-1943), was concerned about the Lahore Resolution and termed it a 'silly Muslim scheme for partition' but could not ignore the Muslims as a unique community in India.<sup>115</sup> In August 1940, Linlithgow issued a declaration in which he pledged that the government would accept, at the earliest possible moment after the war, the right of India's free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth under a constitution of her own making. He also announced:

His Majesty's Government could not contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities... to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such government.<sup>116</sup>

At the same time, he invited party leaders to cooperate in the war effort by joining the Viceroy's Executive Council. Congress refused even to discuss the offer and started 'Satyagraha movement' against India's participation in the War. The Satyagraha campaign proved a complete fiasco and died out in 1941.

Muslims, in the late 1920's and early 1940's were divided into a number of groups. However, the All India Muslim League was the largest, most important and influential amongst them. Even some Muslim parties and leaders and almost all the non-Muslims of India opposed the demand for Pakistan. Despite the bitter opposition of the British, Hindus, Sikhs and even some Muslim circles, the Pakistan movement was fast gaining popularity among the Muslim masses in India.<sup>117</sup>

V. P. Menon's conclusion that the League maximized its gains from estrangement between Congress and the British<sup>118</sup> while the Congress leaders were in jail does not accord with facts.<sup>119</sup> In the by-elections from 1 January 1938 to 12 September 1942 the League

won 46 Muslim seats out of a total of 56 whereas the Congress could win only three of them.<sup>120</sup> The voting pattern remained nearly the same in the succeeding by-elections as well and all this had nothing to do with the Congress being absent from the political scene, for the Congress had yet to start the Quit India Movement.<sup>121</sup> However, between 1943 to 1945 only 11 by-elections took place of which the League won eight, the Independent Muslims three while the Congress failed to win any seat.<sup>122</sup> Therefore, by the time Wavell became viceroy, the Muslim League had emerged as the most powerful Muslim organization throughout India. It had grabbed power in Bengal,<sup>123</sup> Assam,<sup>124</sup> Sindh<sup>125</sup> and the NWFP.<sup>126</sup> The head of the Punjab government was not a member of the League but referred to himself as 'a Leaguer'.<sup>127</sup> League now controlled, directly or indirectly, the provincial governments of all the provinces that it wanted included in its proposed Pakistan. This new situation made Jinnah's claim for the establishment of Pakistan much more forceful.<sup>128</sup>

By this time, Jinnah, the driving force and moving spirit behind the Pakistan demand, had assumed the undisputed leadership of the League. He also enjoyed the full support and respect of the Muslim masses throughout India which<sup>129</sup> were solidly arrayed behind his leadership.<sup>130</sup> Subsidiary organizations of the Muslim League such as the Muslim Students Federation<sup>131</sup> and the All India Women's Organization<sup>132</sup> were playing a strong role in spreading the message of the Pakistan movement throughout India.<sup>133</sup> The Muslim League National Guard<sup>134</sup> was also a great source of strength and security for the League and its leadership. Above all, the League's allied leaders and organizations including Jamayat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, under the leadership of Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani,<sup>135</sup> Jamayat-i-Ahl-i Hadis led by Maulana Ibrahim Sialkoti<sup>136</sup> and Maulana Sanaullah Amritsari also provided great strength and solidarity to the Pakistan demand.

Besides all the above activists for the Pakistan movement, the *Sufis* also played an important role in various parts of India, particularly in Punjab and Sindh, in popularizing the Pakistan cause.<sup>137</sup> Likewise, some prominent *Ulema* and *Mushaikh*s under the leadership of Pir Jamat Ali Shah of Alipore Sudan in the Punjab<sup>138</sup> and Pir Sahib Amin-ul-Hasnat of Manki Sharif<sup>139</sup> in the NWFP were also playing an inspired role in advancing the cause of Pakistan.<sup>140</sup> A section of Muslim press was also playing a commendable role in propagating the Pakistan plan.<sup>141</sup> A number of Muslim-owned newspapers like the *Dawn* (Delhi)<sup>142</sup>, *Morning News* (Calcutta)<sup>143</sup>, *The Eastern Times* (Lahore)<sup>144</sup> and *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore)<sup>145</sup> were in the forefront of popularizing the demand for Pakistan.

In short, the Pakistan movement, which promised a homeland for Muslims in distinct zones of India in the North-West and North-East, had captured the imagination of the Muslim masses.<sup>146</sup> The demand for Pakistan had assumed serious dimensions worthy of a serious consideration by everybody, although Jinnah had yet to explicitly define the precise boundaries of the proposed homeland for the Muslims which remained a source of anxiety and debate among all the parties.<sup>147</sup> He used every opportunity to exploit the then existing Congress-British estrangement. It was expected that he would not compromise on the 'Pakistan Plan' until both the Hindus and the British had accepted it on principle. The Cripps Proposals and some Hindu leaders like Rajagopalachari indirectly had accepted the Muslims as a separate nation with right to self-determination in the Muslim majority provinces. By the time Wavell reached India, it was claimed by the Muslim League circles that the 'Pakistan Plan' had achieved a solid footing amongst the Muslim masses. Most of the Muslim's middle- and lower-middle classes supported it. By 1942, "Jinnah actually assumed a position like Gandhiji so far as Muslims were concerned and thence Pakistan dominated the political discourse."<sup>148</sup>

Jinnah claimed to be the unchallenged and undisputed leader of the Indian Muslims. But neither the British Government, nor the Congress or the Sikhs agreed with these claims. Certainly India had entered a political era which it had never experienced before. Any mishandling on the part of the British Government regarding the Muslim problem might bring a civil war in India.

### **Nationalist Muslim Parties**

Those Muslims who opposed the Muslim League programme and its Pakistan plan can be termed as 'Nationalist Muslims'.<sup>149</sup> Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, President of the

Congress (1940-46), was the leader of these Congressite and 'Nationalist' Muslims. 'Nationalists' were divided into such groups as the Unionists, the Ahrar, Khudai Khidmatgars, the Khaksars, etc., and were in the forefront of opposition to the Pakistan scheme. Azad, along with his Muslim supporters, was dead set against the idea of Pakistan and left no stone unturned to denounce Jinnah, League and the demand for Pakistan.<sup>150</sup> They believed in the 'composite' Indian nationalism<sup>151</sup> and were determined to maintain the unity of India.<sup>152</sup>

### **The Unionist Party**

Sir Fazli Husain founded The Unionist Party in 1923; besides others its membership mostly consisted of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs of Punjab.<sup>153</sup> It was a multi-communal party with a secular outlook which was committed to protecting the interests of all the communities inhabiting the Punjab. However, Fazli Husain was also a member of the Muslim League and his conflicting loyalties were tested to the hilt during the provincial elections of 1936-37.

Before the provincial elections of 1936 Jinnah demanded of Husain that his members should contest the elections on the ML platform but Husain, citing the reduced numerical strength of the League following the Communal Award, refused. He contended that since cooperation with other parties would definitely be required, he could not go along with Jinnah's request. Therefore, it was more appropriate to let the Muslim members of the Unionist party fight election on its platform. Jinnah failed to change the provincial leadership of the Punjab and Bengal.

After the death of Sir Fazli Husain, Sir Sikandar Hayat became the Unionist leader in Punjab. The League could not fare well in the elections as its leaders chose to fight them from other platforms. The Unionists won a landslide victory in the 1936-37 provincial elections.<sup>154</sup> The provincial-oriented Muslim leaders, however, soon suffered setbacks which forced them to review their political position.

Sikandar Hayat (the Unionist Premier of the Punjab, 1937-42) was forced to abandon the path treaded by Sir Fazli Husain and sought help from the Muslim League to ensure his power as it was threatened by the Congress.<sup>155</sup> It resulted in the conclusion of Sikandar-Jinnah Pact of 1937 which made the Muslim members of the Unionist Party members of the Muslim League as well.<sup>156</sup>

Sikandar took part in the proceedings of the Lahore Resolution but was opposed to the division of India.<sup>157</sup> According to Qalb-i-Abid, "Sir Sikandar did everything possible to prevent the Pakistan Scheme from establishing its roots in the Punjab, but failed owing to the rapid growth of the League during the war."<sup>158</sup> His divided loyalties led him nowhere as he needed the backing of all three leading communities, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, in the Punjab. He also had to resign<sup>159</sup> from the Viceroy's Defence Council<sup>160</sup> as per Jinnah's instructions because his 1937 pact with Jinnah had considerably reduced his manoeuvring space.<sup>161</sup> He was succeeded by Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana<sup>162</sup>, who was unwilling to work smoothly under the League's directions. When Wavell assumed Viceroyalty, the Unionist Party had been losing its support amongst the Muslim masses of the Punjab due to the rising popularity of the Pakistan demand.

### **Jamiyat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind**

Jamiyat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind (JUH),<sup>163</sup> founded in 1919, was another important party of the Muslims. It mostly consisted of religious scholars<sup>164</sup> who believed in composite nationalism and, therefore, condemned the Pakistan demand.<sup>165</sup> From the League's point of view the Jamiyat was a subordinate organization of the Congress party.<sup>166</sup> Under the leadership of Maulana Hussein Ahmad Madni (1879-1957)<sup>167</sup> and Kifayatullah (1852-1952), the group worked hard at promoting the aims of the Congress thereby hurting the League's cause. '*Jamal*'<sup>168</sup> and *Al-Jamayat* (Delhi),<sup>169</sup> the two important periodicals of Jamiyat, strongly condemned the Pakistan demand. JUH had divided into pro-Pakistan and anti-Pakistan groups such that Maulanas Ashraf-Ali Thanvi<sup>170</sup> and Shabir Ahmad Usmani<sup>171</sup> et al of the former joined the Muslim League and supported the Pakistan plan.<sup>172</sup>

As per the Jamiat Ulema Hind it was the British Government<sup>173</sup> which was chiefly responsible for creating a fear-complex in the minds of the Muslims.<sup>174</sup> They thought that Imperial England, in order to keep its hold on a rich country like India, had to have its domination over the Muslim countries in the Middle East.<sup>175</sup> The enslavement of India was the cause of the British supremacy over all lands and seas through which the strategic line of imperial communications passed. Therefore, the independence of India would mean the liberation of a vast Muslim area.<sup>176</sup>

Division amongst various Muslim leaders and parties confused the Muslim masses.<sup>177</sup> The non-League Muslim organizations responded to the Lahore Resolution by convening an Azad Muslim Conference at Delhi in April 1940 and passed resolutions or presented programmes for the religious and cultural safeguards of the Muslim community. In 1942 the Jamiat came out with its own recommendations as well in a programme known as the Jamiat Formula<sup>178</sup> which was almost identical with Jinnah's Fourteen Points.

### **Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam**

As observed by Janbaz Mirza, persuaded by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad,<sup>179</sup> some prominent Indian ulema, mostly from the Punjab, decided to establish a separate political party known as the Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam.<sup>180</sup> Maulana Syed Ataullah Shah Bokhari, Chaudhry Afzal Haqq,<sup>181</sup> Maulana Zafar Ali Khan,<sup>182</sup> and Maulana Mazhar Ali Azhar<sup>183</sup> were its founding leaders. These leaders had also been active in the Khilafat Movement.

The Khilafat Movement's leaders were divided about the Nehru Report of 1928. The Central Khilafat Committee under the presidentship of Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar<sup>184</sup> condemned the Nehru Report while some members of the Punjab Khilafat Committee were in favour of accepting the Nehru Report.<sup>185</sup> Since they believed that the principle of joint electorates was not harmful to the Muslims of the Punjab they decided to set up their own political party.

Most of the Indian ulema believed that the British rule in India was a curse and so they the Congress to be anti-raj as opposed to the All India Muslim League which was considered pro-British,<sup>186</sup> therefore, so they leaned towards the Congress. In 1929-30, after Congress had declared the achievement of complete independence as its ultimate goal it went looking for the support of the Muslim ulema,<sup>187</sup> and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was able to persuade some important ones to form their own parties.<sup>188</sup>

In the first two years of its existence, Majlis-i-Ahrar worked in close contact with the Congress taking an active part in Gandhi's Civil Disobedient Movement of 1930.<sup>189</sup> Ram Gopal stated, "Working steadily, fervently and inspiringly, the Ahrars played their noble part in the struggle."<sup>190</sup> Its active part in the pro-Muslim movements in Kashmir<sup>191</sup> and in Kapurthala State in 1931<sup>192</sup> brought it into the limelight. It was popular among the middle and the lower classes of Muslims.<sup>193</sup> Their indecisive stand on the Shahid Ganj Mosque tragedy<sup>194</sup> and, following that, a tussle with the Unionist Government lost them supporters.<sup>195</sup>

The Ahrar were pro-Congress and anti-Pakistan and via their politico-religious philosophy claimed to establish a 'Godly State' or 'States' in the world.<sup>196</sup> It lacked a clear vision of its path in politics except for their opposition to the proposed Pakistan scheme.<sup>197</sup> Although on the decline in Punjab, the Ahrar seriously challenged the British Government in 1930, 1940, and 1941 and also during the Congress rebellion of 1942.

Although, Peter Hardy's argument that "Ahrar movement co-operated politically with Congress, it stood for an India of federated, religiously-inspired radicalism, rather than for a national secular state,"<sup>198</sup> looks fair, however, the Congress was able to use them against the Muslim League.

The bitter reality for all Muslim groups like the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the Ahrar Party and the Nationalist Muslims Conference, which had been created as counters to the Muslim League, were not able to convert many Muslims to the creed which gave nationalism a place subordinate to religion.<sup>199</sup>

### **Khudai Khidmatgars of NWFP**

It was founded on 1 April 1921, as a social movement, by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988), popularly known as Bacha Khan (Badshah Khan), who named it *Anjuman-i-Islahul-Afghania* (the association for the reformation of the Afghan). Although the organization aimed primarily at countering social evils and forging unity in the *Pukhtoon* ranks, with the passage of time it assumed a definitive political character. In May 1928, Bacha Khan started the *Pukhtoon*, a monthly journal and in November 1929 organized the movement of *Khudai Khidmatgars* (the Servants of God).<sup>200</sup> The organization had numerous aims and objectives, however, the real objective of this movement was to organize the *Pashtoon*, and awaken them for the services of their country in the name of God. Its chief aim was to work for the betterment of mankind regardless of religion, sect or ethnicity.<sup>201</sup> This organization created awareness in the poor people of the province which were mostly disorganized and exploited by the vested interests including feudal Khans and Maliks. This aimed for the social uplift of the Pashtoons and opposition to British colonialism. After the firing incident in Peshawar, the movement became extremely popular with its membership growing to more than forty thousand people. It remained popular amongst the Pashtoons of the Pashto-dominated districts of NWFP.<sup>202</sup> The British and local elites were threatened by the popularity of the movement because of its demands for the end of colonialism, the redistribution of land, etc.

Deeply influenced by Gandhi's philosophy he attended the Lahore Session of the Congress<sup>203</sup> and endorsed the Congress' program of complete independence.<sup>204</sup> He took an active part in the Civil Disobedient Movement of 1930-34 launched by Congress and later on merged the *Khudai Khidmatgar* organization with Congress though retaining its separate identity. It increased the popularity of his organization to an all-India level.<sup>205</sup> Thereafter, the *Khudai Khidmatgars* and the Congress worked together till the partition.

Elections for the Provincial Legislative Assembly of NWFP were held in the first week of February 1937.<sup>206</sup> Dr. Khan Sahib, younger brother of Ghaffar Khan, took over the Congress leadership in the province because Bacha Khan was in prison but he guided his brother from his cell.<sup>207</sup>

For an assembly of fifty members Congress fielded thirty six candidates.<sup>208</sup> Following the election results Congress emerged as the single largest group while the United Muslim Nationalist Party had sixteen members, Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party had eight; four belonged to the Hazara Democratic Party, Khuda Bakhsh and Pir Bakhsh were the two independents while Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar had no political affiliation. During these 1937 elections Muslim League had practically no support in the NWFP and not even a single candidate contested on a League ticket. The Provincial Congress chose not to form the ministry so on 1 April 1937 Sir Sahibzada in alliance with Hindu-Sikh Nationalist party, the Hazara Democrats and individual Khans formed a ministry.<sup>209</sup> The Assembly held only two sessions during this period.

By autumn 1937, however, the Congress high command instructed its NWFP organization to form a new ministry. Dr. Khan Sahib was able to remove the Sahibzada ministry following a no-confidence motion on 7 September 1937 and after securing the support of some members from other groups<sup>210</sup> formed a Congress-led ministry. Sir Abdul Qayyum retired from public life and passed away three months later on 4 December 1937.<sup>211</sup> His death marked the end of any credible personality to pose a constructive opposition to the government as he was the man whom everybody looked for advice in serious political matters.

The ministry had to cope with number of internal and external problems including communal riots.<sup>212</sup> However, the ministry performed well and introduced various reforms in the province. It introduced Teri Dues Regulation Act, X of 1938,<sup>213</sup> The Prohibition Act, Act XI of 1938,<sup>214</sup> The Agricultural Produce Markets Act, XIV of 1939,<sup>215</sup> The Punjab Tenancy (NWFP) Amendment Act, Act of XX of 1939, etc.<sup>216</sup>

When Lord Linlithgow unilaterally declared war against Germany in 1939 the Congress decided to resign its ministries in the provinces (eight) held by them and the

governors took over control of the administration.<sup>217</sup> The Congress-led ministry in the NWFP also followed and resigned on 7 November 1939. This meant that Congress abandoned the 'constitutional' politics and once again plunged into politics of protest.<sup>218</sup> During the war years, Bacha Khan had endorsed the Individual Satyagrah (1940) and the 'Quit India' (1942) Movements of the Congress, however, as compared to other parts of British India NWFP remained relatively peaceful. According to Wiqar Ali Shah "The Khudai Khidmatgars were induced by those leaders who were still outside prison not to pay their revenues; government servants were asked to leave their jobs; and army men were requested to desert the army. But, contrary to the expectations of the Congressites, the general public had lost interest in civil disobedience."<sup>219</sup>

After a small time gap, on 25 May 1943, the provincial Muslim League leader, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan,<sup>220</sup> was able to form a coalition ministry with the help of the Sikhs.<sup>221</sup> When Wavell assumed office in India the popularity of the demand for Pakistan had spread deeply amongst the Muslims of the NWFP.<sup>222</sup> However, because of their longstanding political roots in certain areas of the province, the Khudai Khidmatgars, were deemed a potential threat to Mr. Jinnah's demand for Pakistan especially when he needed the Pathan support later on in his campaign in the province.<sup>223</sup>

### **Khaksar Movement**

Inspired by Hitler and with the aim of reviving the Islamic military tradition, it was founded by Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi at Lahore in April 1931.<sup>224</sup> He organised the rank and file of his party on para-military lines, with workers dressed in 'khaki' military style uniforms and parading in streets, carrying spades.<sup>225</sup>

Khaksar's first showdown took place with the UP government at a place called Bulandshaher in 1939 resulting in several deaths.<sup>226</sup> Although the UP government had banned their entry into the province they still somehow managed to defy the orders.

It was followed by an even bigger confrontation with the Unionist regime of Sir Sikandar Hayat in Lahore.<sup>227</sup> The Khaksars had asked the Punjab government for permission to open a radio station at Lahore which was declined by the government.

The Punjab government had issued an order in 1940 banning all military-style drills or processions. On 19 March 1940, despite this ban on the parade and drill, the Khaksars paraded the streets and police opened fire killing a number of Khaksar volunteers.<sup>228</sup> The government banned the Khaksar party and arrested all its leaders and locked its offices.<sup>229</sup> Jinnah's gesture of visiting the injured Khaksar workers in the hospital during his visit to Lahore for the Muslim League meeting helped ease ML-Khaksar relations from 1940-43 but an assassination attempt by a Khaksar worker on Jinnah in 1943 strained them irreparably.<sup>230</sup>

Mashraqi's political attitude proved puzzling because he was not a supporter of the Congress<sup>231</sup> but his animosity to the Muslim League and Jinnah did in end up helping the Congress.<sup>232</sup> Their leading voice in press, *Al-Islah*<sup>233</sup> of Lahore, played a major role in widening the gulf between the Khaksars and the League.

### **Jamaat-i-Islami**

It was established by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi (1901-1979)<sup>234</sup> at Lahore in 1941.<sup>235</sup> Its main objective was to establish an Islamic state in India but like other Muslim ulema, he lacked a practical political methodology to achieve his goals.<sup>236</sup> He believed in the two-nation theory, though his interpretation differed greatly from that of the League's. This difference in understanding the political situation made him critical of Jinnah and the League.<sup>237</sup> Though he had a very small following, yet he had the potential to influence the public opinion against the League and its demand for Pakistan, therefore indirectly serving the cause of the Congress.<sup>238</sup>

### **Indian National Congress**

Indian National Congress claimed to be the sole representative party of Indians of all shades of public opinion and from all religious backgrounds including the Muslims.<sup>239</sup> For this purpose they elected Maulana Abul Kalam Azad their president (1939-1946) at the

crucial time when the League had begun to demand a separate homeland on the basis of the 'two nation' theory.

Although Congress had a few Muslim and Sikh members in its fold, however, an overwhelming majority of the Muslim population had refrained from joining it ever since its establishment.<sup>240</sup> At that time Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had declared that Congress was against the Muslim interests and it would remain a Hindu party so he advised the Muslims to stay clear of it.<sup>241</sup>

The Congress agitation against the partition of Bengal, which began in 1905, fully exposed its Hindu character. Without a doubt, it could be termed as an authoritative representative body of Hindu community.<sup>242</sup> Not only was it opposed to the idea of Pakistan it also challenged the League's claim as the sole representative of the Indian Muslims.<sup>243</sup> Congress incited a rebellion in 1942 to uproot the British rule in India with the aim of taking over the full control of the government at the centre. At the time Wavell assumed charge of the highest post in the land, Congress was in deep political waters. Its leaders were in prison, and its vast organisation had been rendered ineffective following its unsuccessful rebellion of 1942. As it was in no mood to compromise with the British its leaders were being kept in jail without any contact with their followers thus leaving the field open to the League. This was a big tactical mistake which Jinnah exploited to the maximum for his party's benefit.

Amongst all the top-ranked leaders of the Congress Rajagopalachari was the only one who led a revolt from within the ranks of the Congress High Command against its rigid policies. Contrary to his counterparts he opposed the 'Quit India' movement, supported the Cripps Proposals and was in favour of granting the Muslims their demand for a separate homeland.<sup>244</sup> However, all this failed to have appreciable impact on any of his colleagues of note.

Gandhi, who was the initiator of the 1942 rebellion, still commanded great influence in the party.<sup>245</sup> He was considered a pacifist to the core, and a consummate master of evasive tactics.<sup>246</sup> For whatever motives, he wanted to avoid a negotiated settlement with the British and the League.<sup>247</sup> In this situation, for Wavell to try to build a 'constructive partnership' between the leaders of two leading political parties, the Congress and the Muslim League, would have been very difficult indeed.<sup>248</sup>

### **The Hindu Mahasabha**

This extremist Hindu party stood for a united India. It believed India to be a sacred land reserved for the Hindus only where it wanted to establish *Akhand Bharat* (Sacred and Great India).<sup>249</sup> The Hindu Mahasabha, as is obvious from its name, was entirely a Hindu organization.<sup>250/251</sup>

It was founded in 1915 in Punjab.<sup>252</sup> It became active especially after the Moplah uprising<sup>253</sup> of 1921 against the Hindu landlords.<sup>254</sup> Since its leader Dr. Moonje felt that the Hindus were weaker in comparison to the Muslims he wanted to organise them into purely Hindu forums.<sup>255</sup> The Mahasabha had been successful in the provincial elections in 1920-37 and had prevented the Congress from making inroads into urban centres, especially, of Punjab.<sup>256</sup> It experienced internal rifts during the 1940's and thereby was weakened as a political force.

The Depressed Classes<sup>257</sup> were hardly in a position to assert their weak position so they looked towards the British and the Congress to get a fair deal.<sup>258</sup>

### **The Sikhs**

The Sikhs, though numbering only about six million and concentrated mostly in the Punjab, constituted another important factor on the Indian political scene of the early 1940's. This was especially due to their valuable services for the British Indian army during the WWII and their generally proven loyalty to the British rule. The other two main religious groups of the Punjab were the Muslims and the Hindus which constituted respectively fifty-seven and twenty-five percent of the population.

Founded by Guru Nanak during the 16<sup>th</sup> century they started off as a reformist sect of the Hindus<sup>259</sup> but soon, however, branched off and assumed a separate identity.<sup>260</sup> Professionally they were concentrated in commerce, agriculture and trade. Although constituting only fourteen percent<sup>261</sup> of the total population of the Punjab they, however, wanted to politically dominate the province.<sup>262</sup>

As soldiers and peasants, the community's loyalist tradition was grounded in material advantages derived from government wages and pensions, colonists' incomes and land preferential policies of the British Indian government which had cemented a special Anglo-Sikh political union.<sup>263</sup> Though their relationship had undergone some change due to a number of reasons including the Jallianwala massacre of 1919, both, however, had continued to retain a strong affinity<sup>264</sup> for each other in the 1940's as well. Realising their important contribution as soldiers in WWII, the Sikhs, in light of the rising chorus of the demand for Pakistan by the Muslims in the 1940's had countered with their own demand for a partition of the Punjab based mainly on what they described as their 'unique position' in various districts of the province, which included some districts in which they were in a distinct minority like Lahore and some others.<sup>265</sup>

By the beginning of the 1940's Sikhs, however, had become divided into various political factions, most of them, lacking any clear-cut political agenda. Some of them had begun to demand a separate Sikh homeland, which they referred to, variously, as '*Azad Punjab, Sikhistan* or *Khalistan*.'<sup>266</sup> Lahore's important daily newspaper, *The Tribune*,<sup>267</sup> was their main supporter. Though they were deeply anti-Pakistan in their general political stance, however, as stated above, they kept pace with the popularity of the demand for Pakistan amongst the Muslims and came up with their own formulas for the partition of the Punjab in case things went as far as the creation of Pakistan. The Sikhs' anti-pakistan stance is clearly evident in the position taken by their most prominent political parties and leaders including the National Khalsa Party<sup>268</sup> and the Shiromani Akali Dal<sup>269</sup> and their prominent leaders like Master Tara Singh (1885-1967),<sup>270</sup> Giani Kartar Singh,<sup>271</sup> Yadavender Singh (1913-1973),<sup>272</sup> Maharaja of Patiala<sup>273</sup> and Baldev Singh.<sup>274</sup> All these well-known leaders were stridently against the demand for Pakistan and Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh especially were making fiery speeches against the Muslim demand for Pakistan.<sup>275</sup>

Khushwant Singh has also written on the lines that in the 1940's the Sikhs had begun to react actively to the increasing popularity of the demand for Pakistan.<sup>276</sup> All the leading Sikh political parties and their leadership, especially those referred to above, had begun to arouse virulent hatred in the majority of Sikhs' hearts and minds against the Muslims and this was the main cause of the civil war in India at the time of the British departure. These Sikh fears were fully exploited by the Hindu leaders and press as well.

### **Conclusion**

As stated earlier, Wavell became the Viceroy at a time of great political division in India. All the leading religious communities of India had come up with deeply conflicting demands which were put forth by their respective political. The most important political development was the demand by the All India Muslim League for a separate Muslim homeland. This demand was opposed by the British, Hindus, Sikhs and a small though vocal group of Muslims as well. In such an acrimonious and fractured political atmosphere Wavell had to tread carefully lest any misstep lead to a break up of India. He struggled to keep India united and floated few plans such as the Wavell Plan and the Breakdown Plan but failed in his efforts and India was partitioned into two independent and sovereign states in 1947.

### Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> K.K.Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India* (London: Heinemann), p. 188.

<sup>2</sup> John Connell, *Wavell Scholar and Soldier* (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1964), p. 48.

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- <sup>3</sup> John Connell, *Wavell: Supreme Commander* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1968), pp. 18-20.
- <sup>4</sup> John Connell, *Wavell Scholar and Soldier*, p. 125.
- <sup>5</sup> Wavell as the C-in-C was also called His Excellency
- <sup>6</sup> Halifax to Eden, 20 March 1942, L/PES/12/2315: f 237.
- <sup>7</sup> In 1939 the Army in India numbered some 50,000 British and 180,000 Indian soldiers. All these were professionals, whose main duties were defence of the North-West Frontier and police service. By the end of 1943 half a million Indian troops had served in France, Libya, Abyssinia, Italian East Africa, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Hong Kong, and other places.
- <sup>8</sup> John Connell, *Wavell: Supreme Commander*, pp. 18-20.
- <sup>9</sup> Victoria Schofield, *Wavell Soldier & Statesman* (London: John Murray 2006), p. 258.
- <sup>10</sup> Lord Linlithgow once wrote to Amery how he was sure his present Council would break up at once if they were told them that they had nothing to do with the general conduct of a campaign for the defence of India. Linlithgow to Amery, 24 March 1942, *Transfer of Power*, vol., v, p. 466.
- <sup>11</sup> Linlithgow to Amery, 20 March 1942, *Ibid.* p. 447.
- <sup>12</sup> Wavell had just returned from Burma and discussed this matter with Nehru and Azad. Victoria Schofield, *Wavell Soldier & Statesman*, p. 259.
- <sup>13</sup> Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative* (Calcutta; Orient Longmans, 1959), pp. 57-64.
- <sup>14</sup> Linlithgow to Messrs. Amery and Churchill, 6 April 1942, MSS.EUR. F.125/22, Oriental and India Office Library, London (hereafter referred to as OIOL).
- <sup>15</sup> General Wavell to Prime Minister Churchill 6 April 1942, L/PO/6/106c: f 46.
- <sup>16</sup> Gandhi, *Harijan*, 22 March 1943, p. 88; *The Indian Annual Register 1943*, vol. ii, pp. 207-241.
- <sup>17</sup> Matlubul-Hasan-Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study* (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1953), pp. 260-61.
- <sup>18</sup> Victoria Schofield, *Wavell Soldier & Statesman*, p.259.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 260-61.
- <sup>20</sup> The British troops were untrained for jungle warfare. For details see: Jeremy Black, *World War Two: A Military History* (London: Rutledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), p. 97.
- <sup>21</sup> Louis Allen, *Burma: The Longest War 1941-45* (London: Butler & Tanner Ltd, 1984), p. 106.
- <sup>22</sup> Lawrence James, *Raj: The Making of British India* (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2001), p. 548.
- <sup>23</sup> Wavell Papers, L/PO/4/25(i); L/PO/5/36(i); John Connell, *Wavell: Supreme Commander*, pp. 27; 229; 244-52; 252-256.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>25</sup> Orde Wingate, Brigadier, later Major General, was an expert in guerrilla warfare and inflicted great damage to the Japanese during his expeditions in Burma. Victoria Schofield, *Wavell Soldier & Statesman*, pp. 117-8
- <sup>26</sup> Wavell Papers, L/PO/4/25(i); L/PO/5/36(i); John Connell, *Wavell: Supreme Commander*, pp. 27; 229.
- <sup>27</sup> After the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Churchill had decided to remove Wavell. Their relations became strained and Wavell returned to England.
- <sup>28</sup> Wavell wanted to end his career with another active military command such as becoming the Supreme Commander of the Joint Command for South East Asia, instead of the viceroyalty.
- <sup>29</sup> 'Tribute to Lord Wavell', *The Statesman*, 20 March 1947.
- <sup>30</sup> Wavell, *Viceroy's Journal*, p. 2.
- <sup>31</sup> Hugh Tinker, *Viceroy: Curzon to Mountbatten* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.179-223.

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- 32 Churchill had many names in his mind. For details see, Ibid., Wavell, *Viceroy's Journal*, p.5.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Wavell, in all likelihood, prepared to get this assignment.
- 35 Hugh Tinker, *Viceroy: Curzon to Mountbatten*, pp. 179-223.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Wavell, *Viceroy's Journal*, pp. 8-9; there was a mixed reaction to appointment of Wavell as viceroy in India. Generally it was not that bad. Leo Amery, *The Empire At Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929-45*, ed., Barnes, John and David Nicholson (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1988)(hereafter referred to as Barnes, *Amery's Diaries*)
- 39 Accordingly, on Amery's suggestion Churchill accepted an amendment to the Cabinet Minutes, which made it quite clear that there was no suggestion of a three-year period but only an intimation, which would prevent a sense of disappointment if after three years the suggestion of a change was made. Ibid.
- 40 Barnes, *Amery's Diaries*, p. 895.
- 41 Churchill to Amery, 20 June 1943, Churchill Papers, chur 2/43, Churchill Centre, Cambridge, England.
- 42 At Durbar Hall of Viceroy's House, Delhi, his swearing-in-ceremony passed off without any hold-up. Linlithgow looked in remarkably good mood and greeted Wavell at the top of the great flight of steps in front of the Viceroy's House.
- 43 Linlithgow told him that before the Cripps' proposals were made, the British Government should become the Constitution-making body and should also assist in running the war. Wavell, *Viceroy's Journal*, pp. 32-4
- 44 Members of the Executive Council were as follows: Sir Auchinleck, C-in-C, Sir Reginald Maxwell, I.C.S., Home Member, Sir Jeremy Raisman, I.C.S., Finance Member, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, Member for Industry and Civil Supplies, Sir Sultan Ahmed, Member for Information and Broadcasting, Sir Firoz Khan Noon, Defence Member, Sir Edward Benthall, Member for Posts and Air, Sir Mohammad Usman, Member for War Transport, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Member for Labour, Sir J. P. Srivastva, Member for Food, Sir Jogendra Singh, Member for Education, Health, and Lands, Sir Aziz-ul-Haque, Member for Commerce, Dr. N.B. Khare(Congress Premier of Central Provinces at the time), Member for Commonwealth Relations, and Sir Asoka Roy, Law Member.
- 45 Ministers responsible to the Provincial Legislatures formed the governments of these provinces.
- 46 R.G. Coupland, *India Restatement* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 45.
- 47 In these Section 93 provinces, the Governors carried on the government with the aid of official I.C.S. advisers and constitutional government remained in abeyance. Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, p. 234.
- 48 When Wavell assumed office as Viceroy, ministries responsible to the legislatures were in office in six Provinces of Bengal, Assam, Orissa, NWFP, Sindh and the Punjab. The other five provinces of UP, CP, Bihar, Bombay and Madras were in full control of Governors under Section 93. Ibid; S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan,1970), p. 323; Anwar Khan, *The Role of NWFP In The Creation of Pakistan*, pp. 173-74..
- 49 By 1919, the British were mainly dependent on the Indian co-operation for the governance of the country. There had been strains among the European element since the beginning of the World War II because they could not find time to see their families. Another reason for this strain was that the Government had not recruited fresh European staff to share the burden of administration.
- 50 When the Government of India Act came into force in 1935, an Indian High Commissioner assumed some of the functions of the Indian Council in England.

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- <sup>51</sup> Hugh Tinker, *Experiment with Freedom* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 24.
- <sup>52</sup> R. J. Moore, *Churchill, Cripps, and India, 1939-45* (London: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 74; Hugh Tinker, *Viceroy of India: Curzon to Mountbatten*, pp. 142-178.
- <sup>53</sup> *Indian Annual Register 1943*, vol. i, p. 128.
- <sup>54</sup> H. V. Hodson, *Great Divide, Britain-India-Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 119.
- <sup>55</sup> R. J. Moore, *Escape From Empire: Attlee Government and the Indian Problem* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 69-108.
- <sup>56</sup> One thing, however, was quite obvious that they wanted to maintain the unity of India at all costs as they considered it to be their proud legacy. They also did not hesitate to express their desire to preserve and promote their political, economic and geo-strategic interests in India. K.K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp. 143-208.
- <sup>57</sup> In 1943 India's population totalled over 400 million with Muslim comprising about 100 million of that total. Princely States, scattered all over India numbered 560 of whom only few were large.
- <sup>58</sup> A number of writings deal with the Muslim rule in India such as S. M. Ikram's *Muslim Civilization of Indo-Pakistan* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1966); I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of Indo-Pakistan* (Hague: 1962)
- <sup>59</sup> The conflict amongst the British, Hindus and the Muslims originated mainly after the War of Independence of 1857 and subsequent direct rule of the British crown. Razi Wasti has recorded the Pakistani point of view in his book *Political Triangle in India* (Lahore: People's Publishing Company, 1976); the Indian point of view is well projected by Ashoka, Mehta and Patwardhan, *Communal Triangle in India* (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1942); Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided* (Lahore: Book Traders, 1978)
- <sup>60</sup> A. O. Hume, founded the Indian National Congress in 1885 with the prior approval of the Liberal Prime Minister Gladstone. For details see: P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, 2 Vol., (Bombay, 1947)
- <sup>61</sup> There are some historians in India who believe that the important role of Hindu extremists like Bal Ghangha Dhar Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai and Madan Mohan Malviya in the making and unmaking of the Congress party's policy had confused the Muslims because they could not differentiate whether it was a Hindu or a secular party. For details See: Bipen Chandra, *Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India* (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, reprinted 2004)
- <sup>62</sup> F. G. Graham's book entitled *Sir Syed: Life and Times*; and Altaf Hussain's book entitled *Hayat-i-Javaid* (Agra, 1901) are still considered as the best writings on Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.
- <sup>63</sup> For details on the Muslim Educational Conference and its activities see: Abdul Rashid Khan, *The All India Muslim Educational Conference, Its Contribution to the Cultural Development of Indian Muslims 1886-1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001)
- <sup>64</sup> Sir Syed's political views can be found in Francis Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims, The Politics of the United Provinces Muslims: 1860-1923* (London: 1974); Altaf Hussain Hali, *Hayat-i-Javaid*, (Urdu) (Lahore: National Book Foundation, reprinted, 1986)
- <sup>65</sup> Sikandar Hayat has recorded that there were other factors besides the religious which had generated the Hindu-Muslim conflict and which became formed the genesis of the Pakistan demand. He argues that it was mainly the failure of the leaders from the two communities to compromise on their interests that led inevitably to the demand for Pakistan. Sikandar Hayat, "Hindu-Muslim Communalism and its impact on Muslim Politics in British India: The Making of the Pakistan Demand", in *Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium on South Asian Studies* (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1989), pp. 969-86.

66 Razi Wasti refutes the allegation that the ‘Simla Deputation’ in 1906 was a ‘command  
 67 performance’ in his book *The Political Triangle in India*.  
 68 Sharif-ul-Mujahid, “The Hindu Revivalist Movements”, in *a History of the Freedom  
 Movement*, vol. III, Part II (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970)  
 69 Chiefly based in the Punjab, they demanded political, economic and religious rights for  
 the Sikhs. In this connection they demanded a separate electorate for the Sikhs which  
 the British Government conceded in the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919.  
 70 For details see: Razi Wasti, *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-  
 1910* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963)  
 71 Ibid.  
 Ameer Ali founded Central Mohammadan Association in Calcutta in 1877. It aimed at  
 looking after the concerns of the Indian Muslims but remained active chiefly in the  
 province of Bengal. K. K. Aziz, *Ameer Ali: His Life and Work* (Lahore: Publishers  
 United Ltd., 1968), pp. 44-56.  
 72 For details about the Muslim response to the new system of the British Government in  
 1920’s in India, see: David Page, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the  
 Imperial System of Control, 1920-1932* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982)  
 73 Sachinanda Sinha blames Jinnah’s conversion from nationalism to communalism on  
 the “Pathology of the Super-Ego”. This book is typical of Hindu mindset while dealing  
 the Muslim leadership. For details see: Sachchidananda Sinha, *Jinnah As I Knew Him*  
 (Patna: Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, second impression, 1993), pp. 1-16.  
 74 S. K. Majumdar, *Jinnah* (Patna : Khuda Bukhsh Oriental Public Library, 1996), pp. 1-  
 15.  
 75 Sharif al-Mujahid, “Jinnah’s Rise to Muslim Leadership (1906-1940)”, in Ahmad  
 Hasan Dani, ed., *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah* (Islamabad:  
 Quaid-i-Azam University, 1979), pp. 379-395.  
 76 Saeed R. Khairi, *Jinnah Reinterpreted* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.  
 201.  
 77 David Page, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of  
 Control, 1920-1932*, p. 61.  
 78 S. Qalb-i-Abid, *The Muslim Politics in Punjab 1923-1947* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1992),  
 pp. 104-110.  
 79 The Committee consisting of Motilal Nehru, M. R. Jayakar, Tej Bahadur Sapru, M. N.  
 Joshi, M. S. Aney, G. R. Pradhan, Mangal Singh, Ali Imam and Shoab Qureshi.  
 80 Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London: Faber and Faber, 1950), p. 51.  
 81 Uma Kaura, *Muslims And Indian Nationalism The Emergence of the Demand for  
 India’s Partition 1928-40* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1977), p.46.  
 82 Abdul Hamid, *On Understanding The Quaid-i-Azam* (Karachi: National Book  
 Foundation, 1977),  
 p. 22.  
 83 The Nehru Report united the Muslim League. All India Muslim Conference met at  
 Delhi in 1929 under the chairmanship of Sir Agha Khan.  
 84 Sikandar Hayat, *Aspects of the Pakistan Movement* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers,  
 1991), p.16.  
 85 In a pamphlet entitled ‘Now or Never’ Chaudhry Rahmat Ali explained the term  
 ‘Pakistan’.  
 86 For details see: A. B. Keith, *A Constitutional History of India 1600-1935* (Lahore:  
 Lawyer’s Home, Reprinted., 1961)  
 87 Farzana Sheikh, *Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in  
 Colonial India, 1860-1947* (Cambridge University Press, 1989)  
 88 K.K. Aziz, *Historical Handbook of Muslim India, 1700-1947*, vol. ii, p. 419.  
 89 Zafrullah Khan, *The Forgotten Years: Memories of Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan*,  
 ed., A.H. Batalvi, (Lahore: Vanguard Book LTD, 1991), pp. 97-98.

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- <sup>90</sup> The Congress' president put forth five conditions which aimed at annihilating the Muslim League and establishing one party system in India. Chaudhry Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore: Brothers Publishers, 1961) p. 16.
- <sup>91</sup> With its vast organizational strength, financial backing, the press and the newly found power and authority, the Congress started the Muslim Mass Contact campaign. A special department for Muslim Mass Contact was set up in the office of the All India Congress Committee.
- <sup>92</sup> The Muslim Mass Contact failed to produce any positive results, because of its negative approach. It caused severe anxiety among the ministries of Bengal, Assam and the Punjab. The Chief Ministers of these provinces felt insecure and sought help from Jinnah. Sikandar-Jinnah Pact was concluded between Sikandar, the premier of Punjab, and Jinnah, president of the Muslim League. Fazlul Haq wrote a pamphlet titled, "*Muslim Suffering Under the Congress Rule*" in December 1939.
- <sup>93</sup> The League had to counter propaganda and so became actively involved in mass politics which increased its popularity. As a result, the All India Muslim League Council also passed a resolution at New Delhi on 4 December 1938. It was decided that in order to counter the Muslim Mass Contact Movement launched by the Congress, the following measures would be adopted: Brief 'Fatwas' and manifestos should be issued on behalf of the Ulema in which the Muslims should be warned against joining the Congress. Qualified Muslims should be appointed to address Friday congregations and other Muslims gatherings as well as meetings held in rural areas on the subject of religious and secular harm which is likely to result for the Muslims by their joining the Congress. The Council of the All India Muslim League was asked to direct influential and leading members of the League to move Government Officers responsible for the maintenance of law and order to check such unlawful abuse of powers. For details see: K. K. Aziz, *Muslims Under the Congress Rule*, vol. I, pp. 165-166.
- <sup>94</sup> A number of reports, articles and books were written explaining these atrocities. For example, the Muslims constituted a special committee under the president-ship of Raja Syed Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur, which submitted its report known as *The Pirpur Report*. This gives an account of events in all the Congress provinces save the North West Frontier Province. Another important book the *Shareef Report* mainly consisted of a full description of the injustices to the Muslims done by Hindus at various places in Bihar. Another book entitled *C.P. Main Congress Raj* was written by Hakeem Israr Ahmed Kuravi, reveals the history of Congress ministries in C.P. and Berar. These reports show that Congress failed to inspire confidence in the minorities and continued to be a Hindu organization. It followed a "closed-door" policy by refusing to form coalitions with any other party in the legislature. The aim of League during and after the elections was not to wage war against other communities but to organize the Muslims and to find a solution of the political and economic problems facing India as a whole. For details documents see: Jamil-ud-din Ahmed, *Historic Documents of Muslim Freedom Movement*, (Lahore: Sh. M. Ashraf Press, 1970); Allana, G., ed., *Pakistan Movement: Historic Document* (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1977), p. 153.
- <sup>95</sup> Ishtiaq Ahmad, "Competing Religious Nationalism and the Partition of British India," *Pakistan Journal Of History & Culture*. VOL. XXVI, No.2 (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, July-December 2005), pp. 1-11.
- <sup>96</sup> R.G. Coupland writes, "The worst and most dangerous cause of disorder was, as it had always been, communal strife. The barometer of rioting and fighting, which had stood so steady for some years past began to fall again, when the Congress ministers resigned in the autumn of 1939, there had been 57 communal outbreaks in their Provinces and more than 1700 casualties of which over 130 had been fatal. By the end of 1939, it was widely believed that, if the Congress Governments had lasted much longer, communal

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- fighting would have broken out on an unprecedented scale.” R. G. Coupland, *India: A Restatement* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), p.158.
- 97 Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London: Chatto & Windus Ltd, 1961), p. 273.
- 98 *Haijan*, 15 June 1944.
- 99 Reminiscences of the Day of Deliverance (Islamabad, National Committee For the birth celebration of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 1976)
- 100 The Congress ministry in Central Provinces started a scheme for the education of children called Vidya Mandir Scheme (Primary School for boys and girls). Any institution which fulfilled certain conditions could start education in Marathi, Hindi or Urdu. Muslim children were forced to join Hindi or Marathi Vidya Mandir if they wanted to be educated. The most painful complaint for the Muslims was that the Muslim students were also ordered to worship the portrait of Gandhi, for the chairman of the chandwara issued orders officially asking for worshiping the portrait of Gandhi.
- 101 This controversial song, which later became the national anthem of India, was introduced in a Bengali novel, *Anandamath*, written by the Bengali Novelist, Bankim Chandra Chatterji and published in 1882.
- 102 Khurshid Ahmed Enver, *Life Story of Quaid-i-Azam* (Lahore: Young People Publishing Bureau, 1950), pp. 108-9.
- 103 Jamil-ud-din Ahmed, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. I (Lahore, Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), p.29.
- 104 Syed Shamsul Hassan, *Plain Mr. Jinnah* (Karachi: 1976), p. 54.
- 105 Ian Stephens, *Pakistan: Old Country, New Nation*.(London: Ernest Benn, 1967), p. 75
- 106 Hundreds of proposals had been presented by various individuals which included Hindus, British and the Muslims for the division of India into various parts. An authoritative research has been conducted by K. K. Aziz in his book, *The History of the Idea of Pakistan*, 4 volumes(Lahore, 1987)
- 107 Lord Linlithgow considered India as a natural geographical unit; therefore was against the division of Pakistan. For details see Riaz Ahmed, “Quaid-iAzam’s Pakistan Scheme And The British Government(1940-1941)” in Riaz Ahmad, *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam*, 13-30.
- 108 Sikandar Hayat, “Quaid-i-Azam and the Demand for a Separate Muslim State: Lahore Resolution Reappraised,” *Journal of Research Society of Pakistan*(Lahore: Punjab University Press), Vol. XXIV, No. 4(October 1987)
- 109 I. H. Qureshi emphasis the two-nation theory based on religion as the main factor in the establishment of Pakistan. For details see Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi., *The Struggle For Pakistan*, (Karachi: University Press, 1965); *The Muslim Community of Indo-Pakistan*, (Karachi: 1967)
- 110 For details see: Naureen Talha, *Economic Factors in the Making of Pakistan: 1921-1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000)
- 111 An interesting discussions on the intellectual and social foundations of the Pakistan demand could be found in Waheed Quraishi, *Ideological Foundation of Pakistan* (Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 1987)
- 112 Shafique Ali Khan, *Two Nation Theory*,(Hyderabad: , 1973); Hafiz Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in. India and Pakistan*,.(Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963)
- 113 Sikandar Hayat, “Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and the Demand for a separate Muslim State: Lahore resolution Reappraised,” in *Journal of the research society of Pakistan* (Lahore), VOL. XXIV, No. 4 (Oct. 1987), pp. 1-44.
- 114 The Congress encouraged those Muslims parties and leaders who could oppose the demand for Pakistan.
- 115 A rejoinder to the allegation that Lord Linlithgow played an important role in persuading Jinnah to come up with a “constructive policy” is well defended by many historians like Sikandar Hayat, Riaz Ahmed and Qalbi-i-Abid & Mussarat Abid, “ The British Response to the Lahore resolution and the British Reaction,” *Journal Of Research Humanities*, (Multan )vol. 19, ( 2002), pp. 75-108.
- 116 Attlee Collection Mss. Eur. EUR 212.

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- <sup>117</sup> For details see: Ian Talbot, *Freedom's Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and the Partition Experience in North-West India*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 81-104.
- <sup>118</sup> V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power*, (Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 336-40.
- <sup>119</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>120</sup> K Aziz, (ed.) *Historical Handbook of Muslim India, 1707-1947*, vol. ii, Vanguard Books Ltd.1995), pp. 433-37.
- <sup>121</sup> For detail results of this by-election see: R. G. Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement*(London: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 184, 242.
- <sup>122</sup> K K. Aziz, *Historical Handbook of Muslim India*, vol. ii, pp. 433-37.
- <sup>123</sup> Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din, who had been the leader of Opposition from 1941 to 1943, formed a ministry on 24 April 1943, after Fazulul Haq's resignation as Premier of Bengal.
- <sup>124</sup> S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Press, 1965), p. 294.
- <sup>125</sup> In Sindh after the dismissal of Allah-Bukhsh in September 1942, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayat-Allah joined the Muslim League and managed to hold office with League support. Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, (Karachi: Cambridge University Press 1972), p. 236.
- <sup>126</sup> Sardar Aurangzeb Khan formed ministry on May 25, 1943 in the N.W.F.P. which could be called as League-Akali coalition. Dr. Muhammad Anwar Khan, *The Role of N.W.F.P. in the Freedom Struggle* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 2000), pp. 173-74.
- <sup>127</sup> Ian Talbot, *Punjab Under the Raj, 1848-1947*, New Delhi: Manhhar Publication, 1988), pp. 170-74.
- <sup>128</sup> Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, (ed.), *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. vii (Lahore: Sh Muhammad Ashraf, 1960), p. 529.
- <sup>129</sup> Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Biography*,(Lahore: Shaikh Mohammad Ashraf, ed 2, 1953) p. 196.
- <sup>130</sup> A number of Muslim leaders like Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, Khawaja Nazimuddin and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardi, not only accepted Jinnah as undisputed leader but supported the Pakistan demand. For details see: Z. A Suleri, *My Leader*, (Lahore: S. A. Iatif, 1945), 137-174; Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza, *Muslim Students And Pakistan Movement: Selected Documents (1937-1947)*, (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, 1988)
- <sup>131</sup> For details see: Shaista Ikram-Allah, *From Purdah to Parliament* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1998), 128; Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza, *The Role Of Women in the Freedom Movement* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1981)
- <sup>132</sup> Salahuddin Khan, (ed.), *Speeches, Addresses And Statements of Madr-i-Millat Mohtarama Fatima Jinnah: 1948-1967*(Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1976), pp. 18-19.
- <sup>133</sup> Riaz Ahmad, (ed.), *Madr-I-Millat Miss Fatima Jinnah: A Chronology* (Islamabad: History Commission, 2003), p. 14.
- <sup>134</sup> Sikandar Hayat, *Some Aspects of Pakistan Movement* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1991), pp. 165-192.
- <sup>135</sup> Khalid bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948*, (Karachi: Oxford university Press, 1968), p. 203; I. H. Quersh, *Ulema in Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Karachi: The Inter Services Press, 1974), p. 221
- <sup>136</sup> H. B. Khan, *Bar-i-Sagheer Pak-O-Hind Ki Siyasat Main Ulema Ka Kirdar* (Urdu) ( Islamabad: National Institute of History and Culture, 1985), pp. 371-81.
- <sup>137</sup> S. Ansari, *The Sufis, Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sindh* (Cambridge, 1992); A. Sattar Khan, "The Role of Sindh in the Pakistan Movement," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, vol. xxx, No.1, (Lahore: Punjab University, April 1993).

- 138 Muhammad Khurshid, "The Role of Landlords and Pirs in the Punjab Politics and its After-effects", *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, vol. xxxi, No.2 (Lahore: University of the Punjab, April 1994).
- 139 Syed Mohammad Rooh-ul-Amin, "Quaid-i-Azam Aur Sooba-i-Sarhad Ke Musha'ikh" in Riaz Ahmad, (ed.) *Pakistani Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam*, pp. 439-55.
- 140 Ibid.
- 141 Ian Talbot, *Inventing the Nation: India and Pakistan*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 60-85
- 142 *Dawn* was English daily published from Delhi. Its proprietor was All India Muslim League and its first editor was Pothan Joseph; later Altaf Husain became its editor. K.K. Aziz, *Historical Handbook of Muslim India*, vol. vii, pp. 634-689.
- 143 *Morning News* English daily published from Calcutta. Its proprietors were Khawaja Nuruddin and Abdur Rahman Siddiqui.
- 144 *The Eastern Times* a daily English news paper published from Lahore was considered a spokesman of the Muslim League.
- 145 *Nawa-i-Waqt* an Urdu daily, published from Lahore. First appeared in March 1940, its editor/proprietor was Hamid Nizami.
- 146 M.R.T., *Nationalism in Conflict* (Bombay: Home Study Circle, 1943).
- 147 'Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India', September 15, 1943, L/PO/108a: ff 83-6.
- 148 V. Pala Prasad Rao, K Nirupa Rani and Dhuskara RAO, *India-Pakistan, Partition Perspective in Indo-English Novels* (New Delhi: Discovery Publishing House, 2004), p. 15.
- 149 The term 'Nationalist Muslim' was used for the first time in 1929 when some pro-Congress Muslim leaders disagreeing with League's opposition to the Nehru Report called a separate meeting of their own.
- 150 *Indian Annual Register, 1942*, vol. I,
- 151 Abul Kalam Azad, *India wins Freedom*, p. 29.
- 152 The Dyarchy was introduced in the Montague Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. It further exposed the communal tangle because ministers from different religious groups favoured their respective communities. Azim Husain, *Sir Fazli Husain: A Political Biography* (Bombay ,1946); S. Qalb-i-Abid, *The Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1921-47* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1992), pp. 30-70.
- 153 Ibid., *The Muslim Politics in the Punjab*, pp. 30-70.
- 154 In the elections of 1936, the Unionist party won 96 out of 175 seats. Ikram Ali Malik, *A Book of Reading On The History Of The Punjab, 1799-1947*, (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1970), p. 483.
- 155 The Unionists soon faced the undue interference of the Congress in the provincial administrative matters which created insecurity in the Muslim majority provinces such as Punjab, Assam and Bengal. The Congress unleashed a programme of Mass-Contact Movement which had been denouncing the policies of the Unionist Party and the Muslim League in a bid to win the Muslim voters.
- 156 Ibid., pp. 490-93.
- 157 Sikandar Hayat Khan was against the division of India and, therefore, with the official backing, presented his scheme for the Indian federation, before the Lahore Resolution, so that the idea of Pakistan should not become popular among the Muslims of India and particularly of Punjab. Lahore was chosen as the venue for the occasion but Sikandar tried his level best to postpone the meeting of the All India Muslim League which was being held to pass the historic resolution in March 1940. On failing, he took part in it.
- 158 S. Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in Punjab*, p. 235.
- 159 Aslam Ganaira, "National Defence Council, 1941 :Britain, India and the War", *Pakistan Vision*, Volume 1, No. 2 (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, 2000)

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- <sup>160</sup> In 1941 Government of India established the National Defence Council in order to get more active cooperation of the Indians in the World War 2. The four Muslim Prime Ministers of Punjab, Bengal, Assam and the NWFP were nominated for the Council. These ministers accepted the invitation without consulting the president of the League and Jinnah as the president of the Muslim League directed them to resign which they had to resign. This sent a strong message to the British that no way they could bypass Jinnah.
- <sup>161</sup> The Pakistan demand had sharply divided the pro-Pakistan and anti-Pakistan groups in the Unionist Party which continuously threatened the position of Sir Sikandar Hayat. Iftikhar Haider Malik, *Sir Sikandar Hayat :A Political Biography* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical And Cultural Research, 1985).
- <sup>162</sup> Ian Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India* (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 34.
- <sup>163</sup> Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963), p. 2.
- <sup>164</sup> The establishment of a separate political party of the ulema had synchronized with the Khilafat Movement 1919-22. The majority of Jamiyat's members consisted of the Ulema of Deoband. Darul Aloom Deoband was founded in 1866 in U.P, India. It became the most important religious institution in the Muslim World after the al-Alzhar of Egypt. S.M. Ikram, *Mauj-i-Kausar*, (Urdu), (Lahore:Feroz Sons, 1966), 219-239.
- <sup>165</sup> Mushirul Haq, "The Ulema and the Indian Politics," in *Islam in South Asia*, (eds.) Rashid Jallandhri and Muhammad Afzal Qarshi, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1986), pp. 75-96.
- <sup>166</sup> I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan* ( Karachi: University of Karachi, 1987), pp. 184-94.
- <sup>167</sup> Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni propounded his theory of "composite nationalism" in a treatise, "Muttahidah Qaumiyat aur Islam", at a time when the Muslims were fast becoming conscious of their separate identity. This brought an instant reaction from Allama Iqbal and became the subject of a lengthy controversy. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-58* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), p. 33.
- <sup>168</sup> *Ajmal*, an Urdu daily published from Bombay, was a pro-Congress newspaper.
- <sup>169</sup> *Al-Jamiat*, published from Delhi, was an organ of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind. See, Ahmad Saeed, "Muslim Sah' aft Aur Jado Jehd-i-Azadi," *Journal Of the Research Society of Pakistan* ( Lahore: University of the Punjab) vol. xviii, No.1, January 1981, pp. 85-127.
- <sup>170</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>171</sup> Shabir Usmani, *Hamara Pakistan* (Urdu), (Lahore, n.d.), pp. 65-66.
- <sup>172</sup> The party was organized with the exclusive purpose of safeguarding the Shariah and giving the Muslim community religious and political guidance according to Islamic principles and commandments. This rigid and orthodox stand of theirs was bound to create a rift, as it actually did, in the communal life of the Muslims, who, in course of time, were led to depend more upon the leadership of their western-educated intelligentsia. The Ulema were in favour of unconditional co-operation with the Congress so far as the cause of freedom was concerned. They claimed that once the British regime was dissolved, the Hindus would come to terms with the Muslims who formed a strong minority and could not be deprived of their legitimate rights.
- <sup>173</sup> Rashid Jallandhari, *Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband* (Urdu) (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1989) pp. 193-208.
- <sup>174</sup> Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 59.
- <sup>175</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>176</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>177</sup> The Jamiyat and the Muslim League showed an occasional unity as in the Khilafat Movement and its opposition to the Nehru Report. They always disagreed with each

- other after 1940 and there was a complete parting of ways. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, *Middle Phase of Muslim Political Movement* (Lahore: Publisher United Ltd, 1969), pp. 42-57.
- 178 Janbaz Mirza, *Caravan-i-Ahrar* (Urdu), vol. i, (Lahore: Maktaba Tabsara, 1975), pp. 81-84.
- 179 The Majlis-i- Ahrar-i- Islam was founded in December 1929 in Lahore during the Congress session of 1929-30 in which the Congress adopted the resolution for complete independence of India.
- 180 Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 64.
- 181 Afzal Haq (1895-1942) was the founder of the Majlis-i-Ahrar. Ahmad Saeed, *Muslim India (1858-1947) A Political Biography* (Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 1997), p. 54.
- 182 Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (1873-1956), was a journalist, poet, writer and politician.
- 183 Afzal Iqbal, *Life and Times of Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Analysis of the Hopes, Fears and Aspirations of Muslim India from 1878 to 1931* (Lahore: Islamic Research Institute, 1974), p. 3.
- 184 For details see: K.K. Aziz, *All India Khilafat Conference, 1928-1933: A Documentary Record* (Karachi: National Publishing, 1972).
- 185 Afzal Haque, *Tarikh-i-Ahrar* (Lahore, 1968), p. 10.
- 186 K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: a Study in Nationalism*, (Islamabad, 1977), pp. 41-43; Syed Noor Ahmed, *Marshal Law Say Marshal Law Tak* (Lahore: Malik Deen & Sons, 1967), pp. 79-88
- 187 Janbaz Mirza, *Caravan-i-Ahrar*, pp. 81-84.
- 188 Chaudhry Afzal Haq, *Tehreek-i- Ahrar*, p. 19.
- 189 Partha Sarathi Gupta, *Power, Politics and the People: Studies in British Imperialism and Indian Nationalism* (London: Anthem press, 2002), pp. 96-97.
- 190 Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims A Political History (1858-1947)* (Lahore: Book Traders, 1976), p. 224.
- 191 Mohammad Iqbal Chawla, "The Role of Majlis-i-Ahrar in Kashmir Movement of 1931," *Sanger Maal*, (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 2001), pp. 7-38.
- 192 Janbaz Mirza, *Caravan-i-Ahrar: Tareekh-i-Azadi-i-Bar-i-sigher*, 7 vol. (Lahore: Maktaba-i-Tabsara, 1975)
- 193 Samina Awan, "Subaltern Studies or Regional History : Explorations in Nationalist Movement with Special Reference to the Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam," in *Pakistan Journal Of History & Culture* (Islamabad) Vol. XXVI, No. 2. July-December 2005, pp. 41-54.
- 194 Ian Talbot, *Punjab Under the Raj*, p. 94.
- 195 Ikram Ali Malik, *A Book of Reading, 1799-1947*, pp. 489-90.
- 196 *The Indian Annual Register 1943*, vol. i.,
- 197 Afzal Haque, *Tarikh-i-Ahrar*, p. 18.
- 198 Peter Hardy, *Muslims of British India*, p. 216.
- 199 Ram Gopal, *The Indian Muslims: A Political History* (Lahore: Book Traders, 1976), p. 227.
- 200 In September of 1929 Bacha Khan decided to set up an army of Pashtoons, fierce soldiers, but with no weapons. They would be soldiers for non-violence, drilled and disciplined, with uniforms, a flag and officers. They would fight not with guns but resist oppression with their lives. He named it Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God). When the Congress started Satyagrah movement, the Khudai Khidmatgar also took part in it.
- 201 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 29-30.
- 202 Ibid.
- 203 Ibid.
- 204 Ibid.

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- 205 On 23 April 1930, the British killed at least 200 unarmed volunteers off Congress, Khilafat Committee and Khidmatgars members in Qissa Khani Bazar, Peshawar.
- 206 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism*. p.53.
- 207 Ibid. p. 54.
- 208 Ibid., p. 57.
- 209 Ibid., p. 92.
- 210 Ibid., p. 95.
- 211 S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, p. 13.
- 212 Communal riots erupted in Dera Ismail Khan in January 1939 in which eight persons were killed; twenty one injured and 150 shops were gutted resulting in loss of over rupees two lacs to the public.
- 213 The Nawab of Teri used to collect house tax, grazing tax, feudal royalty (haqi taluqdari) etc, which were abolished with the passage of this bill.
- 214 The possession and sale of liquor and drugs was prohibited in Dera Ismail Khan and certain restrictions were imposed on possession in other districts. This had a negative effect on its possession in other districts.
- 215 The agricultural produce markets Act, XIV of 1939. This bill opened the way to the agriculturists to take their produce direct to the market instead of depending up the middleman.
- 216 The Punjab tenancy (NWFP) Amendment Act, Act of XX of 1939 enforced Shariat in inheritance of occupancy tenants.
- 217 For details see: Wiqar Ali Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*
- 218 Ibid., p. 83.
- 219 Ibid., p.136
- 220 Ian Talbot, *Pakistan A Modern History*(Lahore: Vanguard Book, 1999), p. 83.
- 221 Tara Chand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, vol.4, (Lahore: book Trader, 1972), p. 262
- 222 The results of the by-elections which took place from 1937-43 witnessed that the Muslim League was becoming popular particularly after the Lahore Resolution in 1940. For details see: Wiqar Ali Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, pp. 95-114.
- 223 Ibid.
- 224 A. D. Muztar, *Khaksar Tehreek Aur Azadi-i-Hind*, vol.7 (Islamabad: National institute of History and culture, 1995), p. 1; *The Daily Jang* (Urdu), Lahore, 13 May 1983.
- 225 Mr. Aslam Malik has discussed the life and work of Allama Mashriqi in very interesting manner. His chapter 'Mashriqi and the All-India Muslim League' gives a good insight about Khaksar's relations with the League. He has shed a new light on the personality of Jinnah and maintains that the British created hurdle for Jinnah by its efforts to bring Khaksar and Ahrar close to the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan. For details see: Muhammad Aslam Malik, *Allama Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi: A Political Biography* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- 226 Iftikhar Haider Malik, *Sir Sikandar Hayat*, pp. 64-74.
- 227 *India Annual Register 1939*, Vol. II, p. 80.
- 228 Abid, *Muslim Politics in Punjab*, 232-4.
- 229 *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, 20 March 1940.
- 230 Statement of Quaid-i-Azam and his secretary on the deadly attack made on the life of the Quid. See Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, vol. I., pp. 523-24
- 231 Safdar Salimi, *Khaksar-i-Azam aur Khaksar Tehreek* (Lahore, 1957), p. 32
- 232 Agha Bashir, *The Khaksar Movement, Past and Present: An Appraisal*, (Lahore, n.d.), p. 6

- 233 *Al-Islah*, a newspaper which was a mouthpiece of Khaksar movement. It published from Lahore and was popular among the lower-middle class of the Punjab and the N.W.F.P.; Safdar Salimi, *Khaksar Tehreek Ki Sola Sala Jadojehad*, p. 45.
- 234 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 39-41.
- 235 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 141-46
- 236 Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 22-40
- 237 Mohammad Iqbal Chawla, *Islamic Writings in Pakistan: A Case Study of Allama Ghulam Ahmad Parwez* (Lahore: Al-Noor Printing Press, 1991),
- 238 Rafiuddin Ahmed, "Redefining Muslim Identity in South Asia: The Transformation of the Jama'at-i-Islami," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, (eds.) *Accounting for Fundamentalism: the Dynamic Character of Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 669-705.
- 239 Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York; The John Day Company, 1946), pp. 237-38.
- 240 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad remained President of the All India National Congress 1940-46. Quaid-i-Azam called him 'showman' of the Congress.
- 241 Sir Syed's predictions became reality in his lifetime when Congress made a number of demands, which were viewed against the interests of Muslims. For instance Congress's opposition to Punjab Land Alienation Act 1900 and movement against the 1905 Partition of Bengal were viewed as anti-Muslim stands. The Nehru Report of 1928 and the Congress Ministries 1937-39 were sheer proof of their being a Hindu party.
- 242 See results of the 1936-37 elections. It could hardly secure 20 odd Muslim seats.
- 243 Congress-League accord in 1916 was first and the last effort on the part of the Congress to accept ground realities. The bitter reality was this that the League represented the Muslim aspirations. Instead of accepting it Congress encouraged other small and unimportant groups to counter balance, the League.
- 244 Mohammad Iqbal Chawla, "Quaid-i-Azam and Rajagopalachari Formula", (Lahore) *South Asian Studies* vol. 17, No.1 9 (January 2002), pp. 1-16.
- 245 'Memorandum by The Viceroy-Designate 15 September, 1943, *Transfer of Power*, vol. iv, p. 261
- 246 Wavell, *Viceroy's Journal*, p. 17.
- 247 The Marquis of Linlithgow to Mr. Amery 6 September 1943, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. V, p. 212.
- 248 Memorandum by The Viceroy-Designate 15 September, 1943, *Transfer of Power*, vol .v, p. 261.
- 249 Ian Talbot, *Inventing the Nation : India & Pakistan*, pp. 4952.
- 250 Peter Robb, *A History Of India*, (London: Palgrave, 2002), p. 201.
- 251 For detail see *The Indian Annual Register*, 1940 - 1947.
- 252 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, *Middle Phase of Muslim Political Movement*, pp. 42-57.
- 253 Ian Talbot, *Inventing the Nation: India & Pakistan*, p. 122.
- 254 Romila Thapar, "Religion as History in the making of South Asian Identities", in S.M. Naseem and Khalid Nadvi, (eds.) *The Post-Colonial State and Social Transformation in India and Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford university press, 2002), pp. 283-312.
- 255 Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography*, (Bombay: Longman & Green company, 1946), pp. 243-65.
- 256 It claimed to represent the Hindus and denied the Congress claim of representing the whole India.
- 257 For detail see: B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India* (Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1946)
- 258 Peter Robb, *A History of India*, pp. 228-29.

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- <sup>259</sup> A. Sattar Khan, "Punjab's Role in the Pakistan Movement," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* (Lahore: University of the Punjab), vol. xxxii, No.1 January 1995, pp. 29-50.
- <sup>260</sup> Muhammad Munawwar, *Dimensions of Pakistan Movement* (Lahore: Pap-Board Ltd, 1987), pp. 159-71.
- <sup>261</sup> Darshan Singh Tatla, *The Sikh Diaspora: The Search For Statehood* (London: UCL, 1990), p. 18.
- <sup>262</sup> Ian Talbot, *Inventing the Nation: India & Pakistan*, pp. 69-71.
- <sup>263</sup> Darshan Singh Tatla, *Sikh Diaspora*, p. 18.
- <sup>264</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>265</sup> Peter Robb, *A History Of India*, p. 236.
- <sup>266</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>267</sup> Ian Talbot, *Inventing the Nation: India & Pakistan*, 69-71; See Punjab Native Newspapers Reports 1937-47; Punjab Police Secret Reports for the years 1940-43.
- <sup>268</sup> Darshan Singh Tatla, *Sikh Diaspora*, pp. 18-19.
- <sup>269</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>270</sup> Tara Singh (1885-1967) was a Khatri Sikh who got prominence in the Akali Dal, due to its role in the Gurdwara Reform movement.
- <sup>271</sup> He was a Jat Sikh leader from the Lyallpur (Faisalabad) district.
- <sup>272</sup> Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of Punjab* (Patiala: Punjab University, 1972), p. 16.
- <sup>273</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>274</sup> Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in the Punjab*, pp. 250-55.
- <sup>275</sup> Michael Edwardes, *The Last Years of British India* (London: Cassel, 1963), p. 176.
- <sup>276</sup> Khushwant Singh, *Train to Pakistan* (London:1965), p. 19.