



The Ottoman Empire in World History

Author(s): Arnold Joseph Toynbee

Source: *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Jun. 15, 1955, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Jun. 15, 1955), pp. 119-126

Published by: American Philosophical Society

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/3143777>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

American Philosophical Society and American Philosophical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN WORLD HISTORY

ARNOLD JOSEPH TOYNBEE

Research Professor in International History, University of London; Director of Studies,
Royal Institute of International Affairs

(Read November 11, 1954)

THE American Philosophical Society has done me a great honor in inviting me to give this lecture at this year's meeting. I have been looking forward to this evening ever since I received the invitation last year. The year 1953 was, of course, the five-hundredth anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, and the date 1453 was then much in our minds; for 1453, like 1066, is one of those celebrated dates that play an academic "confidence trick." They have come to sound so significant that we have become accustomed to take their significance for granted without question.

What, then, let us now ask ourselves, were the true historical significance and historical consequences of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in A.D. 1453? As soon as we reconsider the question, we realize that this was not an important event in itself. By 1453, Constantinople had been, for nearly a century, nothing more than a tiny unannexed enclave within the vast domain of an Ottoman Empire that encompassed it on all sides. Since the Ottoman conquest of Thrace in A.D. 1360-1361, Constantinople had been cut off by land, not only from Western Christendom, but also from the rest of Eastern Orthodox Christendom and even from the other surviving fragments of the East Roman Empire. In 1453 the Ottoman Empire already extended north-westwards as far as the lower Danube and south-eastwards as far as the upper Euphrates; and, though the conquest of Constantinople won for the Ottoman Emperor Mehmed II, who achieved it, the privilege of being called, forever after, "the Conqueror" *par excellence*, the actual extent of his conquests was modest if measured by the achievements of, for example, his predecessors Murād I and Bayezid I, "the Thunderbolt," or his successors Selīm I, "the grim," and Suleymān I, "the Lawgiver." As a conqueror, Mehmed II merely rounded off his predecessors' work by wiping out some, though by no means all, of the outstanding enclaves of territory, within the ambit of the Ottoman Empire, which, at the date of

Mehmed's accession, were still in Greek or Frankish hands. Mehmed II conquered Constantinople, the Morea, and Trebizond from the Greeks, Galata, Caffa, and Tana from the Genoese, and Negrepoint from the Venetians. But at his death a Genoese chartered company still held Chios, the Knights of St. John still held Rhodes, and the Venetians still held Coron and Modon, in the southwest corner of the Morea, as well as the Ionian Islands. Mehmed II was nevertheless a great emperor; but he was great, not as a conqueror, but as an organizer.

Why, then, does the date 1453 still "ring a bell" today? Had it really no importance at all? No, it was and is important, not in itself, but because it was taken as symbolic by all concerned.

For the 'Osmanlis 1453 was symbolic of the virtual completion of their conquest and political reunification of the main body of Eastern Orthodox Christendom, though the decisive step in a process that took about one hundred and fifty years, from first to last, had been the Ottoman occupation of Macedonia eighty years earlier, in 1372-1373. By "the main body" of Eastern Orthodox Christendom I mean the region, astride the Straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which embraces the habitats, at that time, of the Greeks, Georgians, Bulgars, Serbs, and Romans—in fact, all the Eastern Orthodox Christian peoples except the Russians. This region comprises two peninsulas, Anatolia and the Balkan Peninsula. Macedonia, not Constantinople, is the strategic key to the rest of the Balkan Peninsula and indeed to the whole of Southeast Europe. And the center of gravity of Eastern Orthodox Christendom had shifted from Anatolia to the Balkan Peninsula in the eleventh century. In seeking their fortunes on the European side of the Straits, and pushing forward to the Danube before moving towards the Euphrates, the 'Osmanlis had given striking evidence of their political sagacity.

For the Greeks 1453 was symbolic of the end of the East Roman Empire, though the decisive

event in its breakup had been the conquest of Constantinople by the Franks in 1204, a quarter of a millennium before the conquest of the former imperial city by the 'Osmanlis. The fall of Constantinople in 1204 had been a truly historic event. It had shattered the East Roman Empire irretrievably; and, between that date and the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century, the main body of Eastern Orthodox Christendom had been in a state of anarchy. The East Roman Empire, which the Franks destroyed in 1204, was an eighth-century renaissance of the Roman Empire (which, in its central and eastern provinces, had gone to pieces at the beginning of the seventh century, after having held together here for two hundred years longer than in its outlying and backward western provinces). The original core of the East Roman Empire had been Central and Northeastern Anatolia.

The date 1453 was also symbolic for the Russians and for the Franks. For the Russians it signified that the original Rome's title to world-dominion had passed from "the Second Rome," Constantinople, to a "Third Rome," which was Moscow. As the Russians saw it, the fall of Constantinople to the 'Osmanlis in 1453 was the retribution meted out by God to the Greeks for their betrayal of Eastern Orthodox Christianity in A.D. 1439, when, at the ecclesiastical Council of Florence, their official representatives had acknowledged the supremacy of the Roman See over the Eastern Orthodox churches in the vain hope of purchasing effective Frankish military help at the price of this act of religious apostasy. For the Franks 1453 signified that Western Christendom had now become the trustee of the Ancient Greek culture, which, at this date, the Franks equated with "Culture" with a capital "C." By this time, the Franks had learned to treasure every fragment of Ancient Greek statuary and every scrap of Mediaeval Greek manuscript of any text of Ancient Greek literature, though, unfortunately, the fifteenth-century Frankish humanists' barbarous thirteenth-century ancestors had felt no interest in any Ancient Greek writer except Aristotle and had found no better use for Ancient Greek bronze statues than to chop them up and mint the pieces into petty cash.

I have mentioned that Mehmed "the Conqueror's" true greatness was as an organizer. Let us take a glimpse at the constitution of the Ottoman Empire to which Mehmed II put the fin-

ishing touches. This was a combination of three elements: the Eurasian nomad way of life, the manpower of the Eastern Orthodox Christian peoples (apart from the Russians), and the spirit and institutions of Islam. The classic Modern Western book on the subject is the work of an American scholar, A. H. Lybyer.¹

The founders of the Ottoman Empire were a tiny band of Eurasian nomad refugees, who had been driven into Southwest Asia, off the Great Eurasian Steppe, by the eruption of the Mongols in the thirteenth century. These refugee nomads had brought their nomad way of life with them into the sedentary world; and the structure of nomad society is a symbiosis between three parties: shepherds, their flocks, and their sheep-dogs. When the fathers of the 'Osmanlis were driven off the Steppe into the derelict Eastern Orthodox Christian province of the sedentary world in the northwest corner of Anatolia, they turned themselves into shepherds of men and took to training human sheep-dogs to help them in the management of human flocks. These human sheep-dogs were the members of the Ottoman Emperor's slave-household. This included both a professional civil service and a professional army. It was the instrument with which the 'Osmanlis first conquered the main body of Eastern Orthodox Christendom and then organized it and held it.

In the Ottoman Empire the Eastern Orthodox peoples played two roles which were both of capital importance. They constituted their Ottoman conquerors' human flock and at the same time they were the chief source of supply for their masters' human sheep-dogs. Man is more adaptable than his fellow-animals. It might be difficult to find any non-human animal that would be capable of performing the sheep-dog's role as well as the sheep's; but Eastern Orthodox Christian man did perform both roles effectively under the Ottoman régime. The 'Osmanlis' earliest recruits from Eastern Orthodox Christendom had been free adult voluntary converts to Islam. After the establishment of the Emperor's slave-household in the fourteenth century, the chief Eastern Orthodox Christian source of recruitment was a periodical compulsory levy of children. These child-conscripts were given an education that was intensive, competitive, and selec-

¹ Lybyer, A. H., *The government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1913.

tive, and that was intellectual and technological as well as physical; and invariably they became voluntary converts to Islam in the process. What won the conscript children's loyalty, as well as their volunteer adult predecessors', was the opportunity, opened up to them by entry into the Ottoman public service, of having an effective career. The appeal was partly to their ambition, but also partly to their moral sense; for the moral superiority of the Ottoman Muslim to the contemporary Eastern Orthodox Christian way of life was the distinctive feature that made Ottoman society effective and consequently made an Ottoman career rewarding.

Though the child-conscripts drawn from the Eastern Orthodox Christian population under Ottoman rule came to be the standard material for the recruitment of the Emperor's slave-household, there were always supplementary sources from outside the frontiers of the Empire: for example, free adult converts from Western Christendom; Western Christian prisoners of war; Western Christians captured and enslaved by Ottoman corsairs who had established themselves on the Mediterranean coast of Northwest Africa; and Russian Orthodox Christians captured and enslaved by Tatar raiders from the western corner of the Eurasian Steppe. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the *lingua franca* of the Emperor's slave-household was Serbo-Croat, while the language of command in the Ottoman Navy was Italian; and these two curiosities of linguistic history bear witness to the importance of the Western Christian element in the Ottoman public service and to the preponderance of the Serb element among the Eastern Orthodox Christian recruits.

Why did the Eastern Orthodox Christians allow themselves, as they did, to be made into instruments for the creation and maintenance of an Ottoman Empire that was depriving them of political independence? We cannot understand this without glancing back over the four hundred years of Eastern Orthodox Christian history immediately preceding the establishment of the Ottoman Empire through the occupation of Macedonia in 1372-1373. In Eastern Orthodox Christian history this span of four centuries had been an age of disintegration—military, political, social, and moral. The Eastern Orthodox Christians lent themselves to the purposes of the Ottoman empire-builders because they realized that these alien conquerors were bringing to them, at a high price,

the unity, peace, and order that had now come to be urgent necessities of life for Eastern Orthodox Christendom. The peace and order, without which a civilization cannot maintain its social health, had been lost to Eastern Orthodox Christendom through the collision between its two leading political powers, the East Roman Empire and Bulgaria, after the conversion of Bulgaria in A.D. 865. The great Romano-Bulgarian war of 977-1019 was the catastrophe that registered the Eastern Orthodox Christian Civilization's breakdown; and the momentary political unity that had been purchased at this prohibitively high cost did not survive the social, political, and military collapse which an inflated but exhausted East Roman Empire suffered before the eleventh century was over. After the Normans and the Turks had taken their bites out of the East Roman Empire, and after the Bulgars had recovered their independence from it, the Frankish conquest of Constantinople in 1204 broke up what was left of it; and the political fragmentation of Eastern Orthodox Christendom went to extremes between 1204 and 1372, before the Ottoman occupation of Macedonia registered the turn of the tide. The legacy of this age of anarchy in Eastern Orthodox Christian hearts was a hatred of the Franks and of the Roman Church which was their master passion from before the close of the twelfth century until after the opening of the seventeenth. The Franks would not undertake to give the remnant of the East Roman Empire military aid against the 'Osmanlis unless the Eastern Orthodox churches first acknowledged the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Roman See. The 'Osmanlis demanded political submission, but were willing, in return, to let their Eastern Orthodox Christian subjects retain their ecclesiastical independence and to grant them communal autonomy, within the Ottoman body politic, under the presidency of their own ecclesiastical authorities. The Eastern Orthodox Christians disliked the 'Osmanlis' terms less than they disliked the Franks' terms, and they, therefore, opted for Ottoman domination in preference to Frankish. "Better the Prophet's turban than the Pope's tiara" was the slogan that was passing from mouth to mouth within the walls of Constantinople during the siege in 1453.

The Eurasian nomad founders of the Ottoman Empire had been converted to Islam *en route* from the Steppe across Southwest Asia to the northwest corner of Anatolia; and a voluntary conversion to Islam was, as we have noticed, a

condition *sine qua non* for a career in the Ottoman Emperor's slave-household, which was the governing body of the Empire in its heyday. On the other hand, free-born Ottoman Muslims were ineligible, in the Empire's heyday, for admission into the slave-household. The only free-born men and women who were eligible were free-born ex-Christians. This at first sight paradoxical rule was the Ottoman Empire's *arcanum imperii*. The secret of the Empire's success was the thoroughness of the governing body's discipline; this total obedience could be instilled only into an élite who had been deprived of their personal freedom and been torn away from their family associations; and these penal conditions could not have been imposed by a Muslim government on freemen who were Muslims by birth.

Islam's main contribution to the structure of the Empire was a system of non-territorial communal autonomy on an ecclesiastical basis. The population of the Empire was organized in half-a-dozen ecclesiastically-governed autonomous communities—the Sunnī Muslims, the Eastern Orthodox Christians, the Gregorian Monophysite Armenians, the Jews, and so on—which were all intermingled with one another geographically and were each coextensive with the whole territory of the Empire. This system of organization in non-territorial ecclesiastical communities, known as *millet*s, had been inherited by the Ottoman Empire from the successor-states of the Arab Caliphate. It was the constitutional device through which the Islamic governments gave effect to the Prophet Muhammad's ruling, in the Qur'ān, that Jews and Christians were, like Muslims, "People of the Book" (that is to say, people to whom a holy scripture had been revealed by the same One True God who had revealed the Qur'ān to Muhammad). The corollary of this ruling was that Jews and Christians were entitled to toleration and protection from the Islamic political authorities if they agreed to be obedient subjects and to pay a surtax. This Qur'ānic ruling gave the *millet*-system its sanction under an Islamic régime; but the system itself was already a going concern before Muhammad's time. As early as the days of the Achaemenian Empire, for example, the Jewish community in Babylonia was organized as a *millet* in the subsequent Ottoman sense. In the Ottoman Empire in its heyday the *millet*-system worked effectively to keep the 'Osmanlis' conquered Eastern Orthodox Christian subjects contented and loyal. It gave them more

liberty than was enjoyed by their co-religionists under Frankish rule (*e.g.*, on the Island of Chios before the 'Osmanlis annexed it). *A fortiori*, the system won the loyalty of the refugee Castilian Jews to whom the Ottoman Imperial Government gave asylum.

The *millet* whose members were the least content with their status was the Sunnī Muslim community; for the free Muslim population of this officially Muslim empire found itself in the ironical position of being socially privileged yet at the same time politically impotent. They were, indeed, actually debarred from a possibility of sharing in the government of the Empire that was open to their non-Muslim fellow-subjects; for, as we have seen, the free-born Muslims, alone among the Emperors's subjects, were ineligible for entry into the Emperor's slave-household. In compensation, the fief-holders who provided the Empire with its feudal cavalry were recruited from the free-born Muslims; yet these free-born Muslim troopers were under the command of ex-Christian slaves, and they ranked as inferior to the professional standing army that was composed of slaves exclusively. Moreover, the Central Government was careful to keep the disposal of the fiefs in its own hands, and was also careful to uphold, against the free Muslim fief-holders, the rights of the free Christian peasants from whose dues the fief-holders derived their incomes. Considering all this, it is not surprising that the first subjects of the Empire to revolt against its classic constitution should have been, not the Christians or the Jews, but the free-born Muslims. These insisted on being allowed to enter the slave-household after the death of Suleymān I in A.D. 1566; and this Muslim revolt started the Empire on its decline and fall, because it undermined the slave-household's discipline, which was the Empire's mainstay. The Empire's Eastern Orthodox Christian subjects did not begin seriously to revolt against the Empire, for their part, till after the beginning of the nineteenth century.

This contrast between the respective reactions of the Ottoman Empire's Muslim and Christian subjects to the Empire's constitution brings out a point that is characteristic of all empires of the kind. The historical mission which an empire actually carries out, and which can be seen to have been its mission when its history is surveyed in retrospect, may prove to have been something quite different from the empire-builders' conscious intentions. The 'Osmanlis, for example,

were manifestly animated by the conscious purpose of extending the bounds of Dār-al-Islam at the expense of Christendom and incidentally reaping for themselves, or, as they might have preferred to put it, receiving at the hands of God, a suitable reward in the shape of the wealth and power that they stood to acquire through the conquest of non-Muslim territories and populations. This conscious purpose of "the Ghāzis of Rūm," as their fellow-Turk, Bābur, the Timurid invader of India, admiringly calls them, was, in fact, achieved; yet we can see now that this was not the most important result of their strenuous militancy. The immediate mission that the 'Osmanli conquerors fulfilled was to give unity, peace, and order to the main body of Eastern Orthodox Christendom in the Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia after this society had broken into fragments and fallen into anarchy; and the Ottoman Empire carried out this mission effectively for four hundred years (A.D. 1373-1768). But its unconscious and unintentional mission was not limited to this regional task.

Every empire that, like the Ottoman Empire, has been œcumenical in spirit has also been potentially world-wide. All of them—the Ottoman, the Chinese, the Roman Empire, and the rest—have been partial anticipations of that literally world-wide human commonwealth of the future which has now, at last, become a practical possibility—and also an imperative necessity—as a result of the recent "annihilation of distance" through the progress of Modern Western technology. The Ottoman Empire never had at its disposal those mechanical means of communication that the pettiest state in the world commands in our day; yet, with such antique means of locomotion as the horse and the galley, and such archaic explosive weapons as the arquebus and the muzzle-loading gun, the 'Osmanlis, in the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, came within an ace of doing for the world as a whole what they did do for the single society of Eastern Orthodox Christendom. They just failed to conquer Western Christendom's base of operations in Western Europe by retaining and expanding the bridgehead on Italian soil that Mehmed II had occupied at Otranto in A.D. 1480, at the very end of his reign, and by pushing their way up the Danube valley beyond Vienna. They also just failed—through making their naval power felt a quarter of a century too late in the western basin of the Mediterranean—to forestall Western Christen-

dom in mastering the Atlantic and the Americas (the 'Osmanlis' lively interest in the Castilian discoveries in the New World is attested by the existence of an Ottoman copy, transliterated into the Arabic alphabet, of a lost early Castilian map of the New World of which the original had been captured from a Spanish ship in a naval engagement in the Mediterranean). They were beaten by the Portuguese in a competition for the mastery of the Indian Ocean, Abyssinia, and the Indies. And they were beaten by Muscovy in a competition for the mastery of the great Eurasian Steppe (the 'Osmanlis' failure, in A.D. 1569, to dig a canal from the River Don to the River Volga and so re-open the communications with their Central Asian Sunnī Muslim co-religionists that had recently been cut by the Muscovite conquest of Qāzān and Astrakhan was as decisive an historical event as the defeat suffered on the same spot by the Germans in the autumn of A.D. 1942).

Thus, before the sixteenth century was over, the Ottoman Empire—though it now extended from Algeria to Armenia, from the Yaman to the Crimea, and from 'Irāq to the Hungarian Alföld—found itself encircled in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans by Western Christendom and on the Eurasian Steppe by Russian Orthodox Christendom; and these sixteenth-century events predestined the 'Osmanlis to lose the prize of being the direct architects of a twentieth-century or twenty-first-century world-state. Having failed, in the sixteenth century, to conquer Western and Russian Orthodox Christendom, and having also failed, simultaneously, to maintain their efficiency by keeping the entry into the imperial service confined to ex-Christian public slaves, the 'Osmanlis were worsted by the West in and after the seventeenth century, and by a Westernized Russia in and after the eighteenth century, of the Christian Era.

The seventeenth century witnessed a great revolution in the Ottoman Empire's relations both with its Western Christian adversaries and with its Eastern Orthodox Christian subjects. Before the close of this century the balance of power, in the contest between the Ottoman Empire and the West, had turned against the 'Osmanlis on the military and political plane, while, on the religious plane, Western Christendom, in revulsion from the horrors of its domestic Catholic-Protestant wars of religion, had made up its mind to become as tolerant to other "People of the Book" as Islam had always been. This change of attitude, in

Western Christendom, towards Christians of other denominations opened the way for a change of attitude towards the Western Christians on the part of the Eastern Orthodox Christians both in Muscovy and in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire's Eastern Orthodox Christian subjects now turned away from an already decadent Ottoman way of life to an already progressive Western way of life from which they were no longer alienated by Western religious fanaticism. The Greeks, who were in commercial relations with the West overseas, and the Serbs, who were the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy's neighbors overland, took the opportunity to make themselves familiar with Western manners and customs, besides learning Western languages; and this new Western knowledge of theirs gave them a new bargaining-power in their dealings with their Ottoman masters, now that the 'Osmanlis had to negotiate with Western Powers whom they could no longer simply defeat in the field. Westernizing Eastern Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, particularly Greeks and, among these, Chiots, were now taken into the Ottoman public service without having to become either members of the Emperor's slave-household or converts to Islam. The Ottoman Imperial Government had to give its subjects these more favorable terms because these subjects' newly-acquired knowledge of the West was now an asset which the Government needed to have at its disposal.

The 'Osmanlis did not like becoming dependent, for important public services, on unmetamorphosized Christian "human cattle"; but this was only the first of the unwelcome revolutionary changes that their increasing weakness was to force upon them. After the disastrous war of A.D. 1682-1699 against a coalition of Western Powers, eventually joined by a recently Westernized Russia, and, still more, after the even more disastrous, and far more humiliating, war of A.D. 1768-1774 against Russia alone (the now formidable former "poor relation" of the 'Osmanlis' own Eastern Orthodox Christian subjects), some Ottoman statesmen realized that they must either Westernize their military system or else go under. But they set about this long overdue and urgent task in a grudging, sulky spirit. For two centuries and a quarter after the turn of the military tide at the bastions of Vienna in A.D. 1683, the 'Osmanlis' policy was to do the bare minimum of Westernization necessary for their empire's political survival; and therefore, throughout this pe-

riod, they always did too little, and this too late, and paid for their obstinate dilatoriness by losing province after province to the Western Powers and to Russia. Meanwhile, they were running into still more serious trouble within their contracting frontiers; for, from the later decades of the seventeenth century onwards, the Ottoman Empire's Eastern Orthodox Christian subjects, with the Greeks and the Serbs in the van, were Westernizing, without reservations, on all planes accessible to them except the strictly ecclesiastical plane. After the outbreak and propagation of the French Revolution, they became imbued with Western nationalism, and the carving out of Serb, Greek, Ruman, and Bulgar successor-states of the Ottoman Empire began.

The Ottoman Turkish Muslims eventually followed their Eastern Orthodox Christian subjects' example in starting a national movement on Western lines, but, even then, their first attempt was not whole-hearted, and this first attempt—the "New 'Osmanli'" movement which succeeded in giving the Ottoman Empire a parliamentary constitution in A.D. 1876—was suspended for thirty years (A.D. 1877-1908) by Sultan 'Abd-al-Hamid II's reactionary attempt to do what King Canute knew to be beyond the power of even the most absolute autocrat. 'Abd-al-Hamid inevitably failed to stop the tide. But the "New 'Osmanli'" movement also failed to harvest its belated opportunity when it regained power at last in the revolution of A.D. 1908-1909. It failed because its policy fell between two stools. In A.D. 1908 the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress sought to salvage the remaining non-Turkish dominions of the Ottoman Empire by trying to turn the Empire into a multinational parliamentary state. But by this time the Eastern Orthodox Christian subject peoples' national movements had already gone much too far for them to be content with being junior partners in a dubiously liberal multinational Ottoman régime, and by this time, too, the intellectual leaders of the Empire's Arabic-speaking subjects, Muslim as well as Christian, had also become infected with Western nationalism. At the same time, the Committee of Union and Progress's concern to retain the non-Turkish territories of the Empire diverted them from concentrating their energies on a Turkish national movement. In these unpropitious circumstances, it is not surprising that the Ottoman Empire should have lost all but the

northern Kurdish parts of its still surviving non-Turkish territories in the wars of A.D. 1911–1918.

At the end of the First World War the Ottoman Turks found themselves faced with the question, not whether they could salvage a remnant of the Ottoman Empire, for almost all the non-Turkish dominions of the Empire were now already lost, but whether the Ottoman Turkish people itself could survive, and this apparently desperate crisis evoked a new national movement led by Mustafâ Kemâl Atatürk. Mustafâ Kemâl and his political associates showed their statesmanship by concentrating on two aims, both of which were practicable. They set out to salvage a Turkish national successor-state of the Ottoman Empire out of the Empire's ruins; and they determined to give this Turkish state, if they should succeed in establishing it, a fair chance of survival by Westernizing its way of life wholeheartedly and thoroughly, and no longer reluctantly or piecemeal.

This new Turkish national movement sincerely and definitively renounced any attempt to regain either the predominantly Eastern Orthodox Christian territories or the predominantly Arab territories of the former Ottoman Empire, and limited its political program to turning the predominantly Turkish part of the former Empire into a national state on contemporary Western lines. The transfer of the capital from Istanbul to Ankara was, and was meant to be, symbolic; for, though the original choice of Ankara, rather than some other Central Anatolian town, had been more or less accidental and, in so far as it had been deliberate, had been made for strategic reasons, Ankara's geographical location did aptly serve and symbolize the new Turkish revolution's purpose.

Ankara lies in the heart of Anatolia; and Anatolia, which was designed to be, and which has become, the center of gravity of the new Turkish Republic, had not played this role in the now defunct Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire has made its fortune by conquests in Eastern Orthodox Christian territories in Southeastern Europe. It was only after it had acquired strength there that it had turned in the opposite direction to conquer its fellow-Turkish states in Anatolia; and, throughout the Ottoman Empire's history, the Anatolian Turks had continued to be estranged to some extent both from the Empire and, more decidedly, from the Sunni "beaten track" which was the Empire's established form of Islam. Though they were free Muslims, they were not

members of the Ottoman "ascendancy," but were part of the subject population, like the Eastern Orthodox Christians; yet, unlike their Christian fellow-subjects, they were ineligible, till after the death of Suleymân the Lawgiver in A.D. 1566, for admission into the ranks of the "ascendancy," which were recruited, as we have seen, from converted ex-Christians. These hitherto neglected and despised Anatolian Turks were the human material out of which Atatürk and his companions proposed to create a new member of the Western family of nations; and their Westernizing revolution has been comprehensive. The two most striking single features of it have been the emancipation of women and the replacement of the Arabic alphabet by the Latin as the vehicle for conveying the Ottoman Turkish language. The outward visible symbol of the revolution has been the adoption of Western dress by women as well as by men.

The establishment of a wholeheartedly Westernizing Republic of Turkey might look like the last act in the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire; but the Ottoman Empire was a great achievement and a great experience, and such things leave legacies. In the unified world (partially anticipated in the Ottoman Empire) into which mankind is moving today, there are at least two leading Ottoman institutions from which we have much to learn: the œcumenical civil service constituted by the Ottoman Emperor's slave-household and the *millet*-system of non-territorial communal autonomy.

A disciplined and dedicated supra-national civil service is one of the administrative instruments that our technologically unified world now sorely needs; and we can try to reproduce the virtues of the Ottoman civil service (which were perhaps partly inspired by Mehmed II's reading of Plato's *Republic*) without having to reproduce its harshness. The Ottoman system of non-territorial communal autonomy is an equally valuable model for the organization of a Westernizing world in which the traditional Western institution of a patchwork of national states has become an anachronism now that distance has been "annihilated" by Western technology. The patchwork quilt, which was the standard pattern of the Western political map in the now obsolete "modern" age Western history, is being fast transformed by the aeroplane into a shot-silk robe in which all the nations of the world are being intermingled with one another, as those of Southwest

Asia and Eastern Europe were intermingled long ago by the Eurasian nomad's stampeding horse. The standard state of the future is going to be a multinational state, not a national one, and the West has no ready-made constitution for a multinational state to bring out of its cupboard, as is being demonstrated in the alarming incapacity shown by Western statesmanship in coping with the problems of such multinational states as Malaya, Kenya, the Union of South Africa, and the three departments of France in Algeria. We

can try to solve these problems by reproducing the virtues of the Ottoman system of non-territorial autonomy, without having to reproduce the injustice of the unequal relation between the Ottoman "ascendancy" and the subject communities.

Mehmed Fâtiḥ's body lies a-mouldering in the grave,
But his soul goes marching on.

A dead and buried Ottoman Empire has not yet finished its work for mankind. It may now carry it on posthumously in a world-wide field.