

Muhammad Iqbal Chawla

### REVISITING THE MOUNTBATTEN'S VICEROYALTY

*This paper deals with the Pakistani historians perceptions of Mountbatten's actions more than sixty-seven years following his declaration of 'Mission Accomplished' on 15 August 1947. Pakistani historians, in common amongst their professional colleagues across the border, though for different reasons, have generally characterized him as 'highly unjust' to the new state of Pakistan. Their conclusions have been based on the following actions of Mountbatten: The Radcliffe Award, division of Punjab and Bengal, his actions concerning the Princely State of J & K, Hyderabad, etc. This paper will review and analyze the writings of Pakistani historians on the decisions of Lord Mountbatten as the Governor General of British India and later the independent India. For this purpose the author has utilized Mountbatten Papers and Jinnah Papers as his primary sources because in his view nothing would be more credible in proving his thesis. While the criticisms levelled at Mountbatten have their merit but there were some actions taken by Lord Mountbatten, which in the author's opinion favored Pakistan and which have been totally overlooked and improperly analyzed by historians in Pakistan who have written about him. Therefore, this study will help in filling an important gap in our existing historical literature and would help in revising the existing views about Mountbatten's proper role in dealing with the due rights of the two states which emerged from the division of colonial India.*

**Keywords:** Mountbatten, Jinnah, Pakistan, Riots, Sikhs, Radcliffe Award, Kashmir.

Mountbatten reached India in March 1947 as the last British viceroy with a clear mandate to transfer colonial power to Indian hands by June 1948, in a peaceful manner so that life and property of the masses of India in addition to the long-term political and economic interests of the British Commonwealth would be safeguarded.<sup>1</sup> But because of fears of a wide-ranging civil turmoil as Hindu-Muslim riots began to spread, especially in North India so he brought forward the date of British departure from India to August 15, 1947.<sup>2</sup> In his words, "I arrived out there to find this terrible pendulum of massacres and reprisals swinging wider and wider; if it was not stopped there was no telling where India

might end”<sup>3</sup>. His brief also included the need to ‘obtain if possible a unitary Government for all India, through the medium of the Constituent Assembly, set up and run in accordance with the Cabinet Mission Plan. He was also advised to do ‘utmost to safeguard the interests of the minorities’<sup>4</sup>.

Mountbatten believed, despite lack of support from either the Congress or the Muslim League, that the best solution to the Indian problem was the enforcement of the Cabinet Mission Plan in its true letter and spirit. Opposition to his beliefs was evident as the Congress and the Sikhs had demanded the partition of the Punjab just a few days before his arrival. After meeting a wide range of Indian politicians by the end of April 1947, however, Mountbatten concluded that the only proposal upon which the three main religious communities/political groups, viz., Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, could be brought into some kind of agreement, was the partition of India at the central level besides partitioning of Punjab and Bengal at the provincial level. Regarding Punjab he concluded that its division was a logical corollary of Jinnah’s two-nation theory.

Muslim demand for the partition of India into two states had grown louder with the passage of time. In fact, the Rajagopalachari Formula (1944)<sup>5</sup> and the Gandhi-Jinnah talks (1944) were not the bargaining chips for the preservation of India as one political unit, but overtly aimed at India’s division into those lines if the demand for Pakistan becomes inevitable. Finally, in March 1947, the Congress passed a resolution and demanded the division of the Punjab in any case, regardless of the partition of India.<sup>6</sup> They believed that non-Muslims would be under a severe threat of Muslim domination if Punjab were not divided. The Sikhs, also, unanimously endorsed the Congress demand for the partition of the Punjab on a communal basis.<sup>7</sup>

### **Introduction**

India’s partition plan was based on the basis of such a demand by the Muslims, however, it satisfied none of the three main protagonists. The Muslims considered Mountbatten’s partition plan, the June 3 Plan, as favoring the other communities. As a result Pakistani historians have, till now, levelled severe criticism for his actions as the Governor-General of British India. It is time now, more than sixty-seven years since the emergence of Pakistan, to review his role in the light of those official documents which either were not available to Pakistani historians earlier or were not consulted thoroughly by them. Quite possibly, because Pakistan was embroiled in tremendous

challenges right at its inception, the 'historians gaze' was limited to those urgent problems and finding a 'culprit' for them. Thus they were blindsided by the tragedies the nation faced in the beginning and this colored and sometimes even distorted their vision of pre-partition events and the personalities which shaped them. In such circumstances it was difficult for them to remain neutral so they easily overlooked other dimensions of these historical but highly tragic events.<sup>8</sup>

It is interesting to note that Pakistani historians when examining Mountbatten's role regarding the June 3 Plan, Radcliffe Award and the Kashmir issue, generally overlook his other actions as the Governor-General of both British India and the independent India, which were neither against the creation of Pakistan but in many instances favored the Muslims position.

Mountbatten's role as viceroy is highlighted in a few newspaper columns, essays, articles in the research journals and chapters in the books which do not give complete picture of his thoughts and actions in the last days of the British raj. However, S. Hashim Raza,<sup>9</sup> Zahid Lodhi<sup>10</sup> and Sher Muhammad Garewal<sup>11</sup> have penned accounts about the Mountbatten's viceroyalty which can be catograzed as truly representative of Pakistani viewpoints on Mountbatten's viceroyalty. But despite their meritorious effort they did not care to undertake a minute reading of the Mountbatten Papers housed in Southampton University and other official documents available in various libraries in England. This hampered their objectivity as historian and as a result they painted only one side of the picture.

Anyhow, writings about Mountbatten's pre- and post-partition actions are clearly divided into two opposite camps. One group comprising of mostly Pakistani historians and including Latif Hashim Raza<sup>12</sup>, Sher Muhammad Garewal<sup>13</sup>, Ishtiaq Ahmed<sup>14</sup>, and Akbar S. Ahmad,<sup>15</sup> along with a few from the West such as Stanley Wolpert<sup>16</sup> and Leonard Mosley<sup>17</sup>, are highly critical of him. All of them believe that Mountbatten's decision of an early termination of the British Raj in fact was the major cause of the bloody events of 1947 and the resultant mass migration.<sup>18</sup> And it has also been alleged that he failed to detain the main leadership of the Sikhs, which was not only instigating its followers for violence but also hatching conspiracies against the Muslim leadership, and thus failed to prevent the bloodshed at a far greater scale than would have occurred otherwise. In addition, there are some other critics who believe that the delay in the announcement of the Radcliffe Award till August 17, 1947, resulted in an uncertainty that

further intensified the ongoing violence. Broadly speaking, Pakistani historians analyze Mountbatten's Viceroyalty with great suspicion and try to paint him as if his appointment as Viceroy, His wife, Edvina's close relations with Nehru,<sup>19</sup> and acting on the advice of V. P. Menon regarding partition of India, are ample proof that Mountbatten worked against the demand for Pakistan and damaged the cause of Pakistan. He, therefore, directly is held responsible for sowing the seeds of India-Pakistan animosity by changing the June 3 Plan and fixing the Radcliffe Award in India's favour.<sup>20</sup>

However, this paper argues that no single party can be assigned sole responsibility for the division of India and the way it was implemented because it was result of a negotiated settlement. Similarly other allegations against Mountbatten need to be re-examined with the help of other available evidences.

Partition of India had become inevitable and the violence in the Punjab was result of manifold factors because individuals and groups were bent on violence only moved into full gear only after August 15, 1947, precisely because the final British restraints on their activities were removed. Mountbatten's hurried decision was not premeditated because its true origins lay in the politico-communal estrangement<sup>21</sup> which pre-existed the relinquishment of the final British authority amongst the Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus.<sup>22</sup>

Zahid Lodhi, states in "Mountbatten Changed the Original Boundary Award," that 'Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was divided on the basis of two-nation theory. The cardinal principle on account of which the subcontinent was to be carved into two independent states - Pakistan and Bharat - was the Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas. The provinces with the Muslim majority of the population were to form Pakistan whereas with the non-Muslim population as Bharat. Had the yardstick of this principle strictly applied by the British, the Punjab and Bengal would not have been partitioned. However, to the astonishment of the Pakistanis, both these Muslim majority provinces were partitioned by Mountbatten.

### **Undue Partition of India**

Various authors like Sikandar Hayat<sup>23</sup>, Sher Muhammad Garewal<sup>24</sup>, Muhammad Ali Chaudhry,<sup>25</sup> and I. H Qureshi<sup>26</sup> *et al* accuse Mountbatten for not showing a sense of justice to the Muslims of India. Akbar S. Ahmad<sup>27</sup>, I. H. Qureshi<sup>28</sup>, Sher Muhammad Garewal, and others believe that the 'raw deal' which Pakistan received stemmed from the Edwina-Nehru-Mountbatten 'triangle'. According to the

above-mentioned historians the principle of two-nation theory was ignored because the boundaries of the new nation of Pakistan were to be based on the principle of Muslim-majority provinces being merged together but Mountbatten violated this principle even after its approval by the British Government. Nehru objected and V. P. Menon and Mountbatten's wife, Edvina Mountbatten, compelled him to change the original plan in order to appease Congress.<sup>29</sup>

Under these circumstances, Mountbatten then assumed the obligation to bring about a negotiated settlement, which he successfully did in the shape of the 3 June Plan. Bringing the three main communities to agree on a mutually acceptable solution, India was to be partitioned along with the Muslim-majority provinces of Bengal and the Punjab. The principles of the plan were accepted by all the communities, though its main loophole was the demarcation of the boundaries between Muslim and non-Muslim areas. Ambiguity here caused a major dent between Muslims and non-Muslims and thus opened a space for Sikh leaders to claim, more vigorously, the establishment of a Sikh state covering a large area of the Punjab. While their demand was not a new one, in Mountbatten's eyes, it seemed to contradict the principle on which the 3 June Plan had been based. Seemingly losing battle in the political arena, the Sikhs resorted to violence to achieve their goal of establishing a Sikh state.<sup>30</sup>

Contrary to the above the June 3 Plan was in fact the result of a negotiated settlement between the League and the Congress, in which the British could not ignore the Sikhs. Sikandar Hayat has written that for Jinnah and the League it was a 'compromise'.<sup>31</sup> As a result Jinnah and League honored it and consequently the Muslim-majority provinces opted to join Pakistan.

### **Hindu-Muslim Riots in Punjab**

Under the viceroyalty of Lord Mountbatten, the British transferred power to India and Pakistan in 1947, a move that was followed by bloodshed and catastrophe, especially, in the Punjab, on a wider scale.<sup>32</sup> But the violence and the turmoil that occurred during the partition of British India was actually the result of many factors. Though in some cases the carnage was spontaneous, often it was executed by well-trained and well-prepared militant organizations with clear objectives.<sup>33</sup> Hence, partition and its violence left an enduring legacy of hatred between India and Pakistan.<sup>34</sup> There were clear indications that on the eve of the final transfer of power there would be a civil war but very few in India or in the United Kingdom had

appraised its true dimensions. Immediately after the 3 June announcement regarding the termination of British paramountcy in India, the situation began to turn ugly and very soon it became so wild and violent that some critics have called it 'genocide', while others have labelled it 'ethnic cleansing'. No wonder Mountbatten's period as the Viceroy of India also came under criticism regarding his failure to 'nip [this] evil in the bud'. He also asked Gandhi that how to stop the rampant killing and Gandhi asked him to invite Jinnah to form a government of his choice at the centre and to present his Pakistan plan before the transfer of power. The congress could give its half hearted support to the Jinnah's government and Mountbatten was staggered by Gandhi's suggestion but when he asked Nehru about this Jawaharlal's response was quite negative because he trusted and liked Nehru more than Jinnah<sup>35</sup>.

As per this point of view Mountbatten tended to overlook the growing violence in India.<sup>36</sup> Many historians like Ishtiaq Ahmad<sup>37</sup>, Ayesha Jalal<sup>38</sup>, Mussarat Abid, , Muhammad Raza Kazmi<sup>39</sup> and Shahid Hamid<sup>40</sup> opines that Mountbatten had prepared partition Plan hastily and therefore, overlooked the after affects of this partition and as a result violence continued to grow and same opinion is given by Moulana Abu-al-Kalam Azad<sup>41</sup> and Mosley<sup>42</sup> who held Mountbatten responsible for misery of people of Punjab. Mountbatten tried to manage but failed to eradicate it, the same point of view is from Indian writers such as H. M. Seervai.<sup>43</sup> Communal riots did not start during the Mountbatten era rather it had started from Direct Action Day celebrated by the Muslim League on 16 august 1946 and since then the Hindu Muslim riots continued to grow.<sup>44</sup> Lord Wavell after receiving Intelligence reports about the intentions of the military wings of political parties had sent a number of reports to His Majesty's Government.<sup>45</sup> He informed them that the Sikhs are preparing for war on eve of independence of India, In order to avoid a civil war he prepared a phased withdrawal from India and that is known as the "breakdown plan."

### **Mountbatten's Refusal to Arrest the Sikh Leadership**

Reports of full-scale Sikh preparations for aggression and violence against the Muslims on the eve of the announcement of the Boundary Award, continued to pour in.<sup>46</sup> Credible information was received about a plan of Master Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders to sabotage the whole partition process,<sup>47</sup> and to assassinate Jinnah as well and both Jinnah and Nehru insisted on his arrest.<sup>48</sup>

Various Pakistani scholars like Farooq Ahmad Dar<sup>49</sup>, Sher Muhammad Garewal<sup>50</sup> and some foreign scholars like Stanley Wolpert,<sup>51</sup> Ian Stephen<sup>52</sup> and Leonard Mosley<sup>53</sup> believe that Mountbatten should have arrested the Sikh leadership when he came to know about their conspiracy to kill Jinnah in Karachi.

Sir Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan and leader of the country's delegation to the Security Council, said that as the viceroy Mountbatten knew about the Sikh leadership's plans but still failed to arrest them. He also failed to use force to crush the trouble-makers.<sup>54</sup>

Francis Mudie, then Governor of the Punjab, wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, on 21 September, 1948, that "there is little doubt that the massacre of Muslims in East Punjab and their expulsion to Pakistan was planned and carried out with the knowledge and approval of at least two of the present Indian Ministers Sardar Baldev Singh and Sardar Patel."<sup>55</sup>

Mountbatten was advised by Evan Jenkins and Sardar Baldev Singh that it will further complicate communal issue if the Sikh leaders including Master Tara Singh were to be arrested on 9<sup>th</sup> August. Not a single author has held Evan Jenkins and Sardar Baldev responsible for the communal riots and why should not their advice be taken into account as well instead of totally blaming Mountbatten for the Punjab disturbances. Altaf Hussain writes about the Indian political situation on the arrival of Mountbatten in the following words:

"He {Mountbatten} found himself facing a highly explosive situation. Indeed a civil war was already going on in the shape of deadly communal violence all over the subcontinent."<sup>56</sup>

Mountbatten avoided taking such an action as it was disapproved by Jenkins, along with the governor-designates of future East and West Punjab.<sup>57</sup> He accepted the latter's opinion as it was quite possible that Tara Singh's arrest would have led to even more serious trouble with the Sikhs which the British had been trying to avoid for a long time.<sup>58</sup>

### **Unjust Radcliffe Award: Altered and Delayed**

Radcliffe Award, according to Altaf Hussain, editor of the *Daily Dawn*, "come for Pakistan like bombshell from blue".<sup>59</sup> The Radcliffe award not only slashed the territorial areas of the two provinces, but also handed over some Muslim-majority districts and tehsils to Bharat (India) by altering the original Radcliffe Boundary

Award.<sup>60</sup> It had aroused immediate suspicion of outside interference because it provided a land-route for India to Kashmir. Kashmir emerged as a bone of contention between India and Pakistan and in this way bad blood was created between both the states. Although Quaid-i-Azam protested vehemently to Mountbatten it was all in vain.<sup>61</sup> An ADC to Lord Mountbatten has also same point of view that Mountbatten reached out to the maharaja time and again at the time of India's independence and his companion Lord Ismay also applied pressure on maharaja.<sup>62</sup> There is also muddiness that whether Indian troops were sent in the Kashmir before the instrument of accession was signed or delivered as original is seemed to have disappeared from Indian archives so it is still a question that when the maharaja signed the instrument.<sup>63</sup> Therefore, it is common perception of the Pakistani historians including Hashim Raza,<sup>64</sup> Shariful Mujahid<sup>65</sup>, K.K Aziz<sup>66</sup>, Akbar S. Ahmed<sup>67</sup>, Sher Muhammad Grewal<sup>68</sup>, Ishtiaq Ahmed<sup>69</sup> and others that Mountbatten changed the Radcliffe Award.<sup>70</sup> They also have pointed out that the date of announcement of Radcliffe Award was changed from 9 to 17 August 1947.

These historians have made no proper effort to understand that the date of announcement was changed to ensure peaceful transfer of power because Mountbatten knew it would be a controversial document. Nonetheless, both the Congress and the League had already agreed with Mountbatten that they would accept the award without reservation and objection. But the present author would like to remind the students of history that the Radcliffe Award was in line with the Rajagopalachari Formula, the Gandhi-Jinnah Talks, and lastly, Wavell's Breakdown Plan.<sup>71</sup> It is also a bitter fact that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, had showed hardly any reservations on the Radcliffe Award, and probably preferred to accept it without any controversy. Whereas Sardar Patel initially showed reservation about it the Congress, however, also accepted the Award. But Radcliffe Award disturbed the Sikhs who turned more violent after it was announced because none of their major demands were accepted especially about Lahore district along with Nankana Sahib to be included in the East Punjab.

Altaf Hussain in his editorial titled "Pakistan Zindabad" of 13 July appreciates the contributions of Lord Mountbatten for the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. In his another editorial entitled "Freedom And After", on 27 October 1947, though he declares

Radcliffe Award as “Territorial Murder” but holds Sir Syril Radcliffe responsible for the unjust award. He writes:

To describe the three reports which Sir Syril Radcliffe has submitted as judicial award is to insult the very name of justice. Even a cursory glance at them shows that these reports have been drafted in the most cleverer fashion and do not possess essential characteristic of legal justice.<sup>72</sup>

### **1. Accession of Princely States and the Kashmir Issue**

It is the Kashmir issue which has made Mountbatten extremely controversial in the eyes of the Pakistani historians. This very issue has since 1947 caused three wars between India and Pakistan. If it remains unresolved it may produce a nuclear war between them. Mr. and Mrs. Lord Mountbatten took keen interest in persuading the princely states to become a part of either India or Pakistan. He did not discourage V.P. Menon's all out efforts to absorb princely states which were apparently falling into the Indian zones but he did not show great zeal in the matters of those Princely states which had to become a part of Pakistan. For Mountbatten future of the Kashmir State was a special case of test of his impartiality and neutrality because Jawaharlal Nehru, a Kashmiri born Pandit, wanted it at all costs to become a part of India. Here Mountbatten seemed tilting towards the Indian interest and sided with Nehru. His every meeting is recorded but there is no record in the Mountbatten Papers about his 5-day visit to Kashmir. As a result no clear picture about his meetings with Kashmir's Dogra Raja, Hari Singh, about the future of Kashmir state is drawn. This caused further draughts in the eyes of the Pakistani historians. Anyhow, Mountbatten was not alone in complicating the Kashmir issue, as Pakistan also weakened its case. According to S. Akbar Ahmad,

Mountbatten's game was to keep chipping down original idea of Pakistan, down from two full provinces, two half provinces, to cut out Calcutta, to remove district of Gurdaspur and Ferozpur from the Pakistan borders to ensure that Kashmir and Hyderabad would fall in the lap of India.<sup>73</sup>

However, most of the Pakistani historians applaud Pakistan's decision to accept the request of some princely States including Hyderabad State, Junagadh<sup>74</sup> and Manavadar. But in fact, Kashmir issue was weakened when the Hyderabad State along with Junagadh and Manavadar States acceded to Pakistan.<sup>75</sup>

### **Common-Governor-General Issue**

The desire of Mountbatten to become a common Governor-General of the newly independent states of India and Pakistan caused sensation and complication. In fact a request was furnished by the Congress High Command to Mountbatten to serve as the Governor General of India after independence. This offer enticed Mountbatten to remain in office even after the independence to serve both the countries for some times to execute the June 3 Plan so that peaceful transfer of power can take place. Therefore, in order to remain impartial and to work judiciously he thought it would be a good idea if he became the common Governor-General of both India and Pakistan. But Jinnah first delayed the decision then sent his party's refusal to such an idea. It was a turning point which parted ways between Mountbatten and Jinnah.

Ayesha Jalal *et al.*, write that Jinnah's refusal to accept Lord Mountbatten as the common Governor-General of India and Pakistan, turned the latter into a reactionary. According to Ayesha "Mountbatten got outraged and concluded that "Jinnah had either gone 'mad' or was suffering from megalomania."<sup>76</sup>

Mountbatten's hatred against Jinnah, Muslims and the Pakistan demand was quite obvious and as a result in eyes of the Muslim leadership he was not trustworthy. Mountbatten felt it quite low a position to accept Jinnah's offer to act as a super Governor General of both India and Pakistan<sup>77</sup>. According to I. H. Qureshi, "Once in a position of vantage, to demonstrate to the world that Pakistan could not be made a workable proposition. His identification with India was so complete that on Independence Day in New Delhi people shouted "Pandit Mountbatten ki jay"<sup>78</sup>. This led to him doing his best to damage Pakistan's interests through his interference in the Radcliffe Award and complication of the Kashmir issue.

The whole episode can be viewed from different angles. The present author believes that it was an error of judgment not to accept Mountbatten as the common Governor-General of both India and Pakistan because it would have put him in an awkward position in which he could not have helped Pakistan either legally or morally. In his new position as a constitutional head of the Indian Government, he had to act upon the instructions of the Indian Prime Minister, therefore, Mountbatten failed to stop Nehru from sending armies to Kashmir in October 1947 and Hyderabad in September 1948.

## **Conclusion**

Mountbatten's task to transfer power to the Indians was a huge challenge as both the Congress and the Muslim League had reached a point of no-return. Mountbatten's stated goal and task of transferring power to the Indians in a peaceful manner with few resources was an ambitious project. He thought that if the process was not accelerated, there would be a real possibility of even greater bloodshed and loss of life in India. Therefore, he brought forward the date to August 15, 1947, in order to avoid a greater civil war. He brought about a negotiated settlement between the two parties and presented his plan for India's independence in the shape of the June 3 (1947) plan. In the meantime he started the process of transfer of power to both new entities by setting provisional governments of India and Pakistan in the centre and in provinces so that a peaceful transfer of power could take place.

Jinnah refused to accept him as the common Governor-General obviously which was an unacceptable decision as it put him in an awkward position about his neutrality, and undoubtedly some of Mountbatten's steps were controversial especially after assuming power as the Governor-General of India. These have been viewed by the Pakistani historians as contrary to the impartial spirit of the partition process. Pakistani historians have pointed out that some of his actions like his approval of sending the Indian army to Kashmir and his encouragement to annex the states of Hyderabad and Junagadh made him more controversial in the eyes of Pakistani historians. No wonder, Pakistani historians make Pakistani feel as if they were cheated by Mountbatten, therefore, justice was not done to them because the British neither gave Pakistan what it deserved.<sup>79</sup>

In nutshell, Mountbatten executed the June 3 Plan, agreed to by all major political players in India, as fairly as was possible in the tension-filled and threatening atmosphere prevailing in the country at that time. On top of it, Mountbatten's other steps like using the instrument of referendum in Sylhet, Balochistan and the KPK (formerly NWFP),<sup>80</sup> which led to their becoming a part of Pakistan, and preventing a partition of Sindh along communal lines, were directly in support of the new Muslim nation. These are extremely important points and are generally overlooked by Pakistani historians.

- <sup>1</sup> Mountbatten was fully conscious of the seriousness of the situation in India and wanted everyone to show responsibility. In his first address on his swearing-in Ceremony he said "Every one of us must do what he can to avoid any word or action which might lead to further bitterness or add to the toll of innocent victims". Speech at the Swearing in Ceremony 24 March 1947, Mountbatten Papers MBI/M6.
- <sup>2</sup> Lord Ismay while explanation to the Prime Minister Clement Attlee about the winding up so quickly the British rule in India said, "I felt quite sure in my own mind that we had no option but to do what had done, and that as for rushing things too much, we would have probably been in a worse mess than we are now if we had delayed matters, with essential difference that we would be responsible for clearing up the mess without any means of doing so." Ismay to Lord Mountbatten, 9 October 1947, Mountbatten papers MBI/D196/ 2.
- <sup>3</sup> Mountbatten of Burma, "Transfer of Power", *Royal Empire Society*, Vol. XXXIX. No. 6 (1948): 271-6.
- <sup>4</sup> Mountbatten's accepted this position after great pressure from His Majesty's Government and his term was fixed for only fifteen months. Prime Minister to Lord Mountbatten, 8 February 1947, MBI/D92/14.
- <sup>5</sup> Muhammad Iqbal Chawla, "Quaid-i-Azam and the Rajagopalchari Formula", *South Asian Studies* vol. 17, No. 1(2002): 1-16.
- <sup>6</sup> Text of the Resolution passed by All India Congress Committee, 6 January 1947, R/3/129:ff 123-4.
- <sup>7</sup> Khushwant Singh, *Train to Pakistan* (New Delhi: Ravi Dayal,1956), 19.
- <sup>8</sup> According to Judith Brown, "It is hardly surprising that controversy surrounds the complex bargaining of these final months of British rule, partly because British participants, Congressmen and the founders of the new Pakistan all wished to throw blame for partition on one another party, because history became part of self-imagining of both India and Pakistan." See Judith M. Brown, *Nehru: Profiles in Power* (Essex: Pearson Education Asia, 1999), 70.
- <sup>9</sup> See the overall details about the Mountbatten quoted in S. Hashim Raza, ed., *Mountbatten and Pakistan* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1997), 35-44.
- <sup>10</sup> Zahid Khan Lodhi "Mountbatten Change the original Boundary Award" *Journal of Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, (1995): 55-61; Zahid Khan Lodhi, *Mountbatten Facts About The Partition* (Lahore: Annoor Printer & Publishers, n.d.), 83
- <sup>11</sup> Sher Muhammad Garewal, *Mountbatten's Viceroyalty and the creation of Pakistan* (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, 2011), 335-380.
- <sup>12</sup> S. Hashim Raza 's book is collection of articles about Lord Mountbatten's viceroyalty. The author also tried to obtain Lord Mountbatten's viewpoints through conducting interviews and getting questionnaires filled on controversial issues. It is a balanced book reflecting both Pakistani and the British points of views., S. Hashim Raza, , 65-75.

- <sup>13</sup> Recapitulating the whole discussion, now we can say conclude that Mountbatten's Viceroyalty was really most crucial rather abnormal one. It was really replete with hectic developments and traumatic episodes. But Mountbatten could not cope with critical rather abnormal circumstances or his Viceroyalty. As Viceroy, he absolutely failed. He could not solve any problem adequately. He totally failed in maintaining law and order in the country. The country did experience complete lawlessness, anarchy, bloodshed and holocaust of worst kind. He could not understand India political deadlock. He committed mistakes after mistakes. Indeed he badly failed in his mission of transferring power justly and properly. As mediator, moderator or arbitrator in dividing India on the basis of Hindu India and Muslim India, he did play seditious role, by making sacred deals with congress leaders. The fact is that with all the injustice done to Pakistan by the British and the Hindus, with all opposition of Sikhs and Muslim nationalists and such other groups, above all, with all its deprivations and weaknesses, Pakistan. Sher Muhammad Grewal, *Mountbatten's Viceroyalty and the Creation of Pakistan*, 376-377.
- <sup>14</sup> Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Punjab Blooded, Partitioned and Cleansed* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 537.
- <sup>15</sup> Akbar S. Ahmad, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, The Search for Saladin* (London: Routledge, 1997)
- <sup>16</sup> Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010)
- <sup>17</sup> Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1960), 245-247.
- <sup>18</sup> Mountbatten is also believed to have influenced the process of boundary demarcation in Punjab, thereby giving India a land access to Kashmir.
- <sup>19</sup> Akbar S. Ahmad believes that 'raw deal' which Pakistan received stemmed was in fact from Edwina-Nehru-Mountbatten 'triangle.' Akbar S. Ahmad, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, The Search for Saladin*, 143-55.
- <sup>20</sup> Ian Stephens has recorded, "Lord Mountbatten all his encourage somehow influenced Sir Radcliffe towards finalizing his Punjab Boundary award detrimentally to Pakistan, then it follows that award might have been different had he had the time been Governor General designate of both dominions." Ian Stephens, *Pakistan* (London: Ernest Benn, 1963), 177; Mountbatten with Redcliff vivisected this great land of such great diversity. Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah, India, Partition, Independence*, 439.
- <sup>21</sup> As Yasmin Khan has observed, "From 1946 different types of brutality were starting to occur in UP. These types of violence could clearly be crudely characterized as random stabbings and street fights, train attacks, and pogroms". Yasmin Khan, 'Out of Control? Partition Violence and the State in Uttar Pradesh', in Ian Talbot, ed., *Deadly Embrace Religion, Politics, and Violence in India and Pakistan 1947-2002* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 40.
- <sup>22</sup> Gandhi urged Mountbatten 'whatever happened to have courage to see the truth and act by it, even though correct solution might mean grievous loss

- of life on our departure on an unprecedented scale.’ Record of Viceroy’s Interview with Gandhi No 19, Meeting with Gandhi on 31 March 1947.MBI/D283.
- <sup>23</sup> Sikandar Hayat, *The Charismatic Leader: Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan* (Karachi: OUP, 2014), 408-9 .
- <sup>24</sup> Sher Muhammad Grewal, *Mountbatten’s Viceroyalty and the Creation of Pakistan*, 234.
- <sup>25</sup> In short Mountbatten did everything in his power to secure the accession of states to the Indian dominion. Muhammad Ali Chahudhary, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1988), 234-5.
- <sup>26</sup> Mountbatten did everything in his power to injure the interest of Pakistan. I. H Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi: University of the Karachi, 1974), 299.
- <sup>27</sup> Akbar S. Ahmad, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, The Search for Saladin*, , 124.
- <sup>28</sup> It was truncated and moth-eaten which was more or less flung into the face of the Muslims in the hope that they could either rejected it or after accepting it, would find it impossible to keep it alive. I. H. Qureshi, . H Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 310-311.
- <sup>29</sup> Zahid Khan Lodhi, “Mountbatten Changed the Original Boundary Award” Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was divided on the basis of two-nation theory. The cardinal principle on account of which the subcontinent was to be carved into two independent states - Pakistan and Bharat - was the Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas. The provinces with the Muslim majority of the population were to form Pakistan whereas with the non-Muslim population as Bharat. Had the yardstick of this principle strictly applied by the British, the Punjab and Bengal would not have been partitioned. *However*, to the astonishment of the Pakistanis, both these Muslim majority provinces were partitioned by Mountbatten. “Mountbatten Change the original Boundary Award” *Journal of Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XXXII, No. 1(1995): 55-61.
- <sup>30</sup> Viceroy’s Conference Report No. 46, 29 April 1947, Viceroy’s Personal report no 6, MBI/D283/6.
- <sup>31</sup> Sikandar Hayat, *The Charismatic Leader Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan*, 389.
- <sup>32</sup> The Sikhs suggested the terms of reference whereof should be demarcating the Provincial boundaries keeping in view: - Population, Landed Property, Land Revenue, Historical places and traditions, of the various communities. Akali Dal further demands that faculties be provided for exchange of population and property and those special arrangements be made for the protection, honour, integrity and sanctity of the historically religious places. Akali Dal also appealed to all Panthic organizations and workers to unite and solidly stand behind this demand. Resolution No IX adopted by the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akal Dal, Amritsar in its meeting on 16 April 1947, Mountbatten Papers, MBI/D259, 99.

- <sup>33</sup> More than two million people were killed, and almost fifteen million were forced to migrate from their homes. However, there is no exact estimate of the number of people killed in India at the time of partition but it ranges from 200,000 to three million. For details see: Ishtiaq Ahmad, *Punjab Partitioned, Bloodied And Cleansed*, xxxvii; P. Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960), 283; Leonard. Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, 279.
- <sup>34</sup> It is a common understanding in the world that it is the state which plays an important role in eradicating the violence in the society but the British authorities remained incapable of stamping out the communal riots in the Punjab during the transfer of power. No wonder, the British government, including its last Viceroy in India, Mountbatten, were held responsible for it. For details see Anders Bjorn Hansen, *Partiton and Genocide Manifestation of Violence in Punjab: 1937-1947* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2002), 195-97.
- <sup>35</sup> Stanley wolpert, *Gandhi's Passion: The life and Legacy of Mahatama Gandhi* (New York: OUP, 2001), 232.
- <sup>36</sup> Massarat Sohail writes "The appalling communal disturbance in the Indian sub-Continent in 1947, created a general feeling in Pakistan, the Muslim population of which was most affected by these riots, that the British Government had transferred had been to advance the date for the transfer of power from June 1948 to August 1947". Massarat Sohail, *Partition And Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-51* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991), 106.
- <sup>37</sup> Ishtiaq Ahmad, *Punjab Blooded Partitioned and Cleansed*, introduction.
- <sup>38</sup> Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Lahore: Sang-E-Meel, 1999), 293.
- <sup>39</sup> Reza Kazmi, 252-83
- <sup>40</sup> Major-General Shahid Hamid, *Disastrous Twilight, A Personal Record of the Partition of India* (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), 249-51.
- <sup>41</sup> The whole world knows what was the sequel to Lord Mountbatten's brave declaration. When partition actually took place, rivers of flood flowed in large parts of the country. Innocent men, women and children were massacred. The Indian army was divided and nothing effective was done to stop the murder of innocent Hindus and Muslims. Abu al Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1959), 190.
- <sup>42</sup> In the years to come, only those who had lived and worked in India, and loved her would regard that the final days of British Raj were smeared with so much unnecessary blood. Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of British Raj*, 286.
- <sup>43</sup> Atlee's cabinet gave full support to Mountbatten Plan to suppress violence by the use of force, including use of Tanks and Air Crafts, the cabinet accepted a Government's elementary duty to protect the life, liberty and property of His Majesty's Subjects- no matter what odium the discharge of that duty may bring. Altee and his cabinet would have wish that the last days of the British Raj should be branded with infamy and be stained with the needless

- spilling of blood. H. M. Seervai, *Partition of India: Legend and reality* (Karachi: OUP, 2005), 169.
- <sup>44</sup> Yunus Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 113-114.
- <sup>45</sup> Jenkins reported, "In the Punjab all parties are seriously preparing for civil war, and of these by far the most businesslike and serious are the Sikhs, who already have a plan to seize the main irrigation centre in order to exercise physical control over the whole of the Punjab." Jenkins to Viceroy, 2 April 1947, Jenkins Papers, MSS/EUR/
- <sup>46</sup> Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 192-198.
- <sup>47</sup> According to S. M Ikram, "Mountbatten received on 27 July which gave information from a reliable source to effect that Sikhs intend to act on or about 7 August". S. M . Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1997), 414; Syed Shameem Hussain Kadri, *Creation of Pakistan* (Rawalpindi: Army Book Club, 1983), 395.
- <sup>48</sup> Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, 245-246.
- <sup>49</sup> Farooq Ahmad Dar, *Jinnah's Pakistan Formation and Challenges of a State* (Karachi Oxford University Press, 2014), 46-49.
- <sup>50</sup> Sher Muhammad Grewal, *Mountbatten's Viceroyalty and the Creation of Pakistan*, 341-342.
- <sup>51</sup> Stanley Walport, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (Karachi: OUP, 2003), 166.
- <sup>52</sup> Ian Stephens, *Pakistan*
- <sup>53</sup> Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, 246.
- <sup>54</sup> Chaudhi Muhammad Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 301-2.
- <sup>55</sup> Quoted in Zahid Khan Lodhi, *Mountbatten Facts About The Partition* (Lahore: Annoor Printer & Publishers, n.d.), 83; Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, 264-266.
- <sup>56</sup> Zeba Zubair, ed., "Mountbatten Final Showdown", *From Mutiny to Mountbatten* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996), 59-64.
- <sup>57</sup> Ilyas Chattha, *Partition And Locality, Violence, Migration, and Development in Gujranwala and Sialkot, 1947-1961* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 84.
- <sup>58</sup> Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, 245.
- <sup>59</sup> Zeba Zubair, *From Mutiny to Mountbatten*, 69.
- <sup>60</sup> Zahid Lodhi, "Mountbatten Change the original Boundary Award" *Journal of Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XXXII, No. 1(1995): 55-61.
- <sup>61</sup> "The Government of Pakistan maintained that there was an original award, and that, before publication, it was amended in circumstances which remains obscure. The basis of this belief is that a " sketch-map" was found by Sir Francis Muddies, who became the Governor of the Punjab on the setting of Pakistan, in a chest of drawers in Government House. It has been left behind by his predecessor, Sir Evan Jenkins, and Sir Francis Muddie showed it to Mr. Jinnah. This map showed a partition line between the two countries different to that eventually followed." M. Aslam Qureshi, *Anglo-*

- 
- Pakistan Relations 1947-1976* (Lahore : Research Society of Pakistan, 1976), 61.
- <sup>62</sup> Narendra Singh Sarila, *The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition* (New Dehli: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005), 345.
- <sup>63</sup> Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer: The Secret History of The End of An Empire* (New York: Henry Holt, 2007), 249.
- <sup>64</sup> S. Hashim Raza, 35-44.
- <sup>65</sup> Shariful Mujahid, 65-75.
- <sup>66</sup> K.K. Aziz, *A History of the Idea of Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1997), 530.
- <sup>67</sup> Akbar S. Ahmad, *Jinnah Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin*, 124.
- <sup>68</sup> Sher Muhammad Grewal , *Mountbatten's Viceroyalty and the Creation of Pakistan*, 306, 348-49.
- <sup>69</sup> Ishtiaq Ahmed, *Punjab Blooded*, 274.
- <sup>70</sup> "A grave injury was inflicted on Pakistan by the way in which the Radcliffe divided district Gurdaspur" In fact, it enabled India to have land route to Kashmir" Chaudhri Muhmmad Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 213-16.
- <sup>71</sup> Muhammad Iqbal Chawla, "Wavell's Breakdown Plan,1945-1947", *Journal of Punjab Studies*, vol. 16 No. 2 (University of California, USA, Spring 2009): 219-234
- <sup>72</sup> Zeba Zubair, *From Mutiny too Mountbatten*, 69-70.
- <sup>73</sup> Akbar S . Ahmad, *Jinnah Pakistan and the Islamic Identity*, 120.
- <sup>74</sup> Reza Kazmi, *Liaquat Ali Khan: His Life and Times* (Karachi: OUP, 2004), 314.
- <sup>75</sup> Bantva Manavadar, known as the Asia's third centre for cotton ginning, was a princely state of British India. Founded in 1733, it became a British protectorate in 1818. On 25 September 1947, it acceded to the newly formed Pakistan. However, Indian forces entered the area on the grounds that the state was a vassal of the Junagadh state, which was itself a vassal of the Baroda state that had acceded to India. Subsequently, after a successful plebiscite, the state was absorbed into the Union of India on 15 February 1948.
- <sup>76</sup> Ayesha Jalal, 292.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid, 191.
- <sup>78</sup> I. H. Qureshi, *Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1974), 312.
- <sup>79</sup> Akbar S Ahmad, *Jinnah Pakistan and Islamic Identity*, 142.
- <sup>80</sup> Muhammad Iqbal Chawla, "Mountbatten and the NWFP Referendum: Revisited", *Journal Of Research Society of Pakistan* Vol.48,No. 1(2011): 1-57.