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Punjab Politics and the Wavell Plan: A Note of Critical Reappraisal

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This paper analyses the 'Wavell Plan' which called for establishing an Executive Council of leaders of the main political parties of India during the World War II to help towards the peaceful transfer of power. It meant establishing an Interim Government. Except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, the Executive Council was proposed to include purely Indian members and would exercise all powers including Finance, Home and External Affairs. Besides carrying on war with the Axis powers, it would help form the Constituent Assembly and negotiate with the British Government a treaty for the transfer of power. Wavell intended to adopt the principle of parity between Caste Hindus and the Muslims. However, Wavell's plan failed primarily because the ruling Unionist Party of the Punjab could not secure positions on the proposed Executive Council of India which put him in a difficult position. He could neither ignore Punjab as a province nor by-pass the Unionist Party in his proposed plan. The paper examines the extent to which the Punjab factor affected the whole scheme and brought about the failure of the Simla Conference.

Wavell formulated a sketch, called the 'Wavell Plan' to establish an Executive Council of the leaders of the main political parties of India during the World War II so that smooth running of the Government and peaceful transfer of power could be attained. He wanted to set up an Interim Government, on the principles of the 1942 Cripps proposal, to assure the Indians that His Majesty's Government intended to grant them freedom after the war. Except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, the Executive Council would consist purely of Indian members. It would exercise all powers including Finance, Home and External Affairs. Establishment of such a Government, it was expected, could solve the administrative, political and constitutional problems of India. Besides carrying on war with the Axis powers, it would consider the formation of the Constituent Assembly which would draw up a constitution for India's independence and negotiate with the British Government a treaty for the transfer of power. He intended to adopt the principle of parity between Caste Hindus and the Muslims. He also wished to establish popular government in all the provinces of British India.

Wavell's plan failed primarily because the ruling Unionist Party of the Punjab could not secure positions on the proposed Executive Council of India. Thus Wavell was faced with a very difficult situation. He could neither ignore Punjab as a province nor by-pass the Unionist Party in his proposed plan. This paper examines the extent to which the Punjab factor affected the whole scheme and brought about the failure of the Simla Conference.

A number of writers¹ have focused on the politics of India and the Punjab in the 1940s. Three major themes dominate the writings on the failure of the Wavell Plan and the Simla Conference. First, Wavell's efforts to form a coalition government consisting of two major political parties of India failed chiefly because of intransigence of Jinnah.² Secondly, differences between the main parties and the inflexible attitude of their leaders brought about its failure. Finally, Wavell himself has been blamed for its failure because he lacked political insight and training. The present paper challenges all these three positions.

On his appointment as Viceroy of India, Lord Wavell (1943-1947) not only was keen to enlist the support of political leaders of India in his war efforts but also to ensure the transfer of power in a peaceful manner. But His Majesty's Government did not allow him to take such bold steps. Rather it advised him to wait for the proper time. Henceforth, Wavell kept on updating London about the political situation in India and always stressed the need to break the political deadlock. He took a keen interest in the Rajagopalachari Formula³, Gandhi-Jinnah Talks⁴ and Desai-Liaquat Pact⁵ which aimed at settling the Hindu-Muslim problem. But these produced no results and failed to open the door for a political settlement. With the World War II entering into its last phase, a realization emerged amongst the British policy makers that a new initiative to break the political impasse in India was needed. Wavell was allowed to carry on with his plan.

On June 14, 1945, Wavell in his broadcast speech to the Indian people announced his decision to convene a Round Table Conference of political leaders of India at Simla. He proposed to invite Indian political leaders to take counsel with him with a view to the formation of a new Executive Council, comprising representatives of organized political opinion, including an equal number of Caste Hindus⁶ and Muslims. Except for the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, it would be an entirely Indian Council, and for the first time the Home, Finance and Foreign Affairs portfolios would be in Indian hands.⁷ It was proposed that the Council would work within the framework of the existing constitution namely the Government of India Act 1935. But the Council could consider the means by which an agreement could be arrived for framing a new constitution. It was hoped that it would also make possible for formation of coalition governments of the main political parties in the provinces.⁸

Wavell invited Indian political leaders⁹ to take council with him at Simla. More or less all-political circles of India hailed the Viceroy's speech save Khizar Hayat Tiwana the Premier of the Punjab (1942-47).¹⁰ Expressing his fears to Glancy, Governor of the Punjab, Khizar said that it was a premature step and should have been taken after the end of the war. He feared a Congress-League coalition at the Centre would destabilize the Unionist Ministry in Punjab and there would be chaos in the province.¹¹ Again on 27th June, he told Evan Jenkins, Private Secretary to Lord Wavell, 'he feared bargain between Congress and League which would include substitution of Congress-League ministry for

Unionist Ministry in Punjab.¹² He threatened that the Punjab ministry might resign, if a Punjabi Muslim Unionist was not included.¹³

Wavell was fully aware of the geo-strategic situation and political importance of the Punjab. He had to consider all the provinces as well as parties. To his mind, Punjab was very important due to the role it had played during the Bengal famine. The Punjab was also the main army recruitment centre. This was of immense importance in the War years. Therefore, he wished to include at least one Punjabi Muslim in the new Council.¹⁴ According to Jinnah, Punjab was the key to Pakistan, but Khizar's concern was not to endanger in any way communal harmony or the territorial integrity of Punjab. Writing to the Punjab Governor Glancy on 8 June, Lord Wavell stated:

Please explain my proposals to him in confidence and tell him I have no (repeat no) intention of handing over Central Government to any one party. If the Conference comes off I shall hope for Khizar's advice and help. An Interim Government of the kind proposed might prove useful step towards inducing Muslims to abandon the Pakistan objective. At any rate Khizar knows me well enough to understand that I have the interest of the Punjab and its soldiers at heart.¹⁵

Wavell held the Simla Conference on 25 June-14 July 1945. It was attended by 22 leaders representing a broad spectrum of Indian political opinion including the Congress and the League. At the first stage, interviews between the Viceroy and political leaders took place which helped Wavell understand the point of view of various leaders and parties and also to explain his own views to them.

An agreement was reached between the parties on the representation of minorities, support for the war and continuance of the Executive Council under the existing constitution. It became obvious that the Congress would accept the parity formula, but it would not agree to be confined to a communal organization. However, the League reluctantly accepted the principle of parity because it thought that parity between the Muslims and Caste-Hindus would adversely affect the Muslims; they would be in a minority in the new Council, as the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes, would always vote against the Muslims. They also feared that in these circumstances the Viceroy would be reluctant to exercise his veto.

Jinnah, at the beginning of the Conference, said that the Wavell Plan in no way affected the Congress's stand for independence, or the Muslim League's stand for Pakistan.¹⁶ He asked the Viceroy to give a fair share of the key portfolios to the League, which Wavell promised to uphold.¹⁷ When Wavell proposed to include a Muslim member of the Unionist Party in the Council, Jinnah strongly objected to it. He referred to his 'Tentative Proposal' in which he had demanded that the proposed Executive Council must recognize parity between the League and the Congress as representative of Muslim and Hindus respectively.¹⁸ He thought that in lieu of his co-operation with the government, the League would get parity in the Executive Council and in the proposed War

Council.¹⁹ He said that the by-election results were sufficient evidence to prove that the League was the sole representative of the Muslims. He claimed that 'he really commanded the allegiance of practically all the Muslims in the Punjab.'²⁰ Wavell, however rejected his demand of parity. He did not make any pledge to Jinnah that the Muslim League would nominate all the Muslims on the Executive Council.

The Conference floundered on the issue of claims of the League to be the sole representative of the Muslims to nominate all the Muslims to the proposed Executive Council. Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, a member of the Working Committee of the Congress was nominated to negotiate with Jinnah. But these private talks on the matter failed. The Congress rejected the League's claim to be the sole representative of Muslims. It pointed out that there were ministries in NWFP, Bengal, Assam and Punjab, run by non-League Muslims. The Congress also claimed that since it was the largest national and secular party of India it had the right to nominate two Muslims out of the quota of five.²¹

Wavell wanted the Conference to succeed but it was fast becoming obvious that it would run into sand. The Conference re-opened on the morning of 26 June but dispersed before lunch so that the delegates could discuss among themselves. The next session was held the following day. Jinnah informed the Conference that his discussions with Pant had been inconclusive. Wavell suggested further private meetings involving all of the delegates in which he would also be involved. He also proposed a Committee of the leaders, including those not belonging to the major parties, to bring about an agreement between the Congress and the League. He promised to do everything possible to facilitate an agreement.²²

Maulana Azad claims in his book that 'Mr. Jinnah had expressed a wish to have an informal discussion with the Congress. I nominated for the purpose Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, who, I thought, would be the right person to negotiate with Mr. Jinnah.'²³ According to Wavell's version Maulana Azad, who was indignant at Jinnah's refusal to see him, raised the question of Pant's status and asked whether Jinnah would prefer to deal with a properly authorized representative of the Congress. Jinnah had informed his party leaders and supporters about the failure of the talks, but Pant had apparently not informed the Congress Working Committee or Maulana Azad, then president of the Party. The Conference got over this difficulty by agreeing that Pant should report to Azad before committing the Congress. After discussions, Conference agreed that there should be a further meeting between Jinnah and Pant and the result of this meeting would be reported to the Viceroy.²⁴ After about three-quarters of an hour, when it was clear that the League and Congress were not making any headway, Wavell adjourned the session till 29 June to give parties an opportunity for private negotiations.

The Conference had to deal with a complex matter with regard to the strength and composition of the Council and the method by which panels of names were to be submitted to the Viceroy, for his selection.²⁵ The most difficult problem for Wavell was to include a Punjabi Muslim from the Unionist party. He found the attitude of the Congress conciliatory and reasonable. The

Sikh position was to secure one representative on the Council. Wavell's approach was somewhat different. He said he had three obligations to fulfill. Firstly, he would maintain the parity between Muslims and Caste Hindus. Secondly, he would make the selection of names and would not accept names only on the basis of party affiliations. Finally, he had to satisfy himself that the persons selected would function as a team.²⁶ After some discussion, all the parties agreed to the proposal except, Jinnah and Siva Rao.²⁷

According to Ian Talbot, 'Khizr's intervention ensured that nominations would be secret and that Wavell would consult privately with the party leaders, before deciding whether to place his final proposals before the conference.'²⁸ Therefore, Khizr had prepared his list of nominees²⁹ and the Viceroy selected one person amongst from it.³⁰

Jinnah differed from the Viceroy and other leaders. He wrote to the Viceroy on 7 July that the Muslim League should not be asked to submit a list, but that its representatives should be chosen after talks between the Viceroy and himself. He also said that all the Muslim members of the Council should be chosen from the League and that some effective safeguard, other than Viceroy's veto, should be provided to protect Muslim interests from majority decisions of the Council.³¹ Jinnah met Wavell on 8 July and tried to persuade him to accept the principle that all Muslims in the new Council must be his nominees, but he refused to accept it.³² Jinnah advocated that his stand was based on the memorandum of 25 September 1940. According to Lord Linlithgow at that time³³ Jinnah was assured that '...In light of our discussion I am content that selection of representatives while resting with the Governor-General, should be based in the case of the Muslim League (should they so desire of other parties to be represented in my council) not on a panel formally submitted, but on confidential discussion between the leader of the party concerned and myself.'³⁴

But Wavell contested this claim and refused to accept Jinnah's stance. He made it clear that he could not give any assurance to the Muslim League that the Muslim members would be selected exclusively from the League's list, any more than he could give a similar guarantee to other parties.³⁵ He claimed that he was trying to form an Executive Council representative, competent and generally acceptable and his method would ensure it. But Jinnah held that since the required assurances were not forthcoming, his Committee could not furnish any list. He assured Wavell that it had been 'earnest desire of the Committee and myself to assist you in every reasonable way, but it is not possible for us to depart from our fundamental principle.'³⁶

Wavell made his provisional selections, using his own judgment from the lists of names which had meantime been received from the other delegates concerned. He believed that if the selection was acceptable to the different parties, the British Government would also agree to it. On 11 July, he informed Jinnah of the proposed composition and strength of the Council which consisted of sixteen people. Besides the Viceroy and Commander-in Chief, there were five Caste-Hindus (two of whom were not from the Congress), five Muslims³⁷ (four of who were members of the Muslim League and the fifth a nominee of the Punjab Premier), one Sikh, two Scheduled Castes and one Indian Christian.

He did not disclose the names of the four Muslim League Members but did mention Muhammad Nawaz Khan, a Muslim of the Punjab from the Unionist Party.

Jinnah stood by his previous stand and refused even to submit or discuss names unless he was given the absolute right to select all Muslims. He also demanded that the Governor-General's power of veto was reinforced by a special provision that any measure to which the Muslims objected could only be carried by a clear two-thirds majority of the Council.³⁸ But these conditions were unacceptable to Wavell. Jinnah stuck to his earlier arguments. Thus, Wavell had no other option but to announce the failure of the Simla Conference.³⁹

In fact, Wavell believed that League did not represent all the Muslims in India and considered that one section of the Muslims, not only in the Punjab but elsewhere, would be outraged if he did not include one Unionist in the Executive Council. Not only did he have to fulfill his promise to the Punjab Premier but he also thought that he would alienate the Congress, Sikhs and other parties if he conceded the right of Muslim League to nominate all Muslim members. He wished to make his plan a success but was not ready to by-pass the Punjab Unionist Party.⁴⁰ Therefore, he announced the failure of the Conference and took responsibility for its failure.

While Maulana Azad believed that it was the intransigent attitude of Jinnah that caused its failure, the fact is that it was the intricacies in the Punjab politics and the pressure of the Unionist party upon Wavell which brought about its failure. When the Conference broke down, Khizar who was extremely upset about the establishment of new Executive Council, now felt relieved.⁴¹ The breakdown of the Simla Conference enabled him to carry on his government till 1947, though he had lost popular support among a very large majority of the Muslims.

There were a number of factors which led to the failure of the Conference. The Congress first rejected and then accepted the principle of parity with the hope that even then they would command a majority in the Cabinet, for the members of the Sikhs and the Scheduled Caste would always vote in their favour.⁴² But they were not ready to allow Jinnah to nominate all Muslim members, which became a stumbling block. As the League had problems in the Muslim majority provinces, the Congress challenged the League's claim to represent all the Muslims of India.⁴³ However, fact of the matter was that the Pakistan demand had become very popular in the Muslim majority provinces. Wavell could not afford to ignore this reality.

After the failure of 1942 rebellion, the Congress leaders reviewed their policy towards the British Government. According to Penderal Moon, 'After the folly of the 'Quit India' rebellion Congress were in a chastened mood and ready to co-operate.'⁴⁴ In the Wavell Plan, they had a chance to establish a national government of their liking to achieve their goal of independence for India. They did not accept the two-nation theory or the claim of the League to represent the Muslims of India. On the other hand, they were trying to create bitterness and gulf among the Muslims and as such were encouraging the nationalist Muslims

to counterpoise the claim of the League to represent all the Muslims of India.⁴⁵ Wavell wrote to Amery on 9 July that

I have seen an Intelligence report of attempts by Azad to consolidate the minor parties with the Congress against the Muslim League. He is said to have offered Tara Singh full Congress support for the Sikhs in the Executive Council if an agreed Sikh name were sent in through the Congress. This report is confirmed by statement of two Sikhs to my Private Secretary to whom they came for advice. Report goes on to say that Azad's line with the Sikhs was that if the League too was out, the other parties must prevail upon the Viceroy to go ahead and that the Congress intention was to secure the greatest possible control over affairs of Council. He believed that on this basis Jinnah and the League could be broken.⁴⁶

A number of the statements, policies and actions of the Congress during the Conference created distrust in the minds of the Muslim delegates.⁴⁷ Jinnah neither trusted Azad, with whom he even refused to negotiate during the Conference on the Hindu-Muslim problem, nor the Congress. Wavell confirmed it and wrote to Amery that 'Their fear that the Congress by parading its national character and using Muslim dummies will permeate the entire administration of any united India is real, and cannot be dismissed as an obsession of Jinnah and his immediate entourage.'⁴⁸

The Congress had claimed two Muslims and the Unionist Party one man, which virtually would have left it with two seats. Wavell himself revealed to Jinnah that he had not discussed his selection with the Congress which might or might not accept them. Jinnah feared that though it was a temporary settlement but the Congress would make use of it to consolidate its position and gradually to strangle Pakistan.⁴⁹ Smith has recorded that 'Many Congressmen have unrealistically thought of crushing the League or of bye-passing it. Many have been content to hold up the freedom of India until the Muslims should 'come to their senses' and League 'die of stalemate.'⁵⁰ Thus the Conference proved purposeless, for the Hindu-Muslim problem remained unresolved because the question of communal representation in the new Executive Council could not be properly addressed.⁵¹

Despite his earnest desire and untiring efforts, Wavell failed to bring about a rapprochement between the Hindus and Muslims. It happened not because he lacked political will, training and art of dealing with the Indian politicians⁵² but because, like his predecessor, Linlithgow, he considered and declared India a natural unit.⁵³ He called upon two major nations namely Hindus and the Muslims to make arrangements to live together, in spite of differing cultures and religions.⁵⁴ He had visualized that by appointing a Punjabi Unionist Muslim, he would sidetrack the demand for Pakistan. His ideas about the demand for Pakistan and his efforts to maintain the unity of India were not unknown to Jinnah. Though, he promised to use veto power in case of communal

discrimination but Jinnah in the end of the conference refused to trust him either. Jinnah demanded some effective safeguards other than the Viceroy's veto to protect Muslim interest from majority decisions of the Executive Council. Jinnah stated:

Our final examination and analysis of the Wavell Plan, we found it was a snare. There was the combination consisting of Gandhi and Hindu Congress, who stand for India's Hindu national independence as one India, and the latest exponent of geographical unity, Lord Wavell, and Glancy-Khizar, who are bent upon creating disruption among the Muslims in the Punjab, and we were sought to be pushed into this arrangement, which if we had agreed to, as proposed by Lord Wavell, we should have signed our death warrant.⁵⁵

Some critics believed that Wavell should have formed the Interim Government without the League. It is argued that the Congress might have accepted a Unionist Muslim in lieu of their own nomination for two Muslims, for they came to Simla in a mood to conform. Jinnah was not very strong enough to bargain further. The Unionist party was still very strong, and Liaquat Ali Khan favoured a settlement. There were many uncommitted Muslims in the country. Hodson argues, 'It is arguable that if the Viceroy had been as adamant as Mr. Jinnah, the latter would have been obliged himself to give in; that the destruction of the Unionist Party, which paved the way for partition of the Punjab, would have been averted; and that an effective all-community political Government of India would have operated for the rest of the war and perhaps for some time afterwards.'⁵⁶ In fact, if Wavell had gone ahead without the League, the communal problem was likely to become worse.⁵⁷ It might have resulted in bloodshed, chaos and civil war, as it happened later on when Wavell handed over the interim government to the Congress party in August 1946.

According to Menon, 'Lord Wavell was blamed for not following up his initiative by imposing an award of his own. But it must be said in his justification that the war with Japan was still to be won; that His Majesty's Government would not have supported formation of an Executive Council which did not include the Muslim League - those 90 million Muslims who, according to Churchill, had eschewed any such non-cooperative tactics as had been adopted by the Congress and had consistently refrained from doing anything that would tend to thwart the war effort.'⁵⁸ On the contrary it was equally true that war was expected to last one or two more years. Azad had expected the independence of India at the end of war which also had alarmed Wavell who desired 'to disabuse him of this idea.'⁵⁹ In the prosecution of war, a Congress dominated Council was likely to cause a grave embarrassment as its leaders had recently been released from imprisonment⁶⁰ and it was still viewed with considerable suspicion in the British governing circles.⁶¹

Though Jinnah claimed that there must be no Muslim stooges of Congress, like Maulna Abul Kalam Azad, nor possible Muslim 'Quislings', like Khizar or

any other Punjabi Muslim belonging to the Unionist Punjab, he was willing to cooperate with the British government to achieve his goal in a peaceful manner. The League got in touch with Khizar through Sir Yamin, and proposed that if he agreed to the League's claim to nominate all Muslims, Jinnah would nominate a Punjabi Muslim with Khizar's consent; but Khizar did not agree.⁶² Unfortunately Glancy, who guided and supported Khizar, did not support any such idea of agreement between the League and the Unionist party. He said 'Jinnah is apparently nervous: he has approached Unionists through various agents to effect compromise but these advances have been nebulous and unsatisfactory.'⁶³ But Wavell deplored that 'Khizar so far submitted no list and is waiting definite move by Muslim League. He has no effort to reach agreement with the League and said to have refused to advise Sikhs on their list. He has I think lost a considerable opportunity for influencing final decision.'⁶⁴

Wavell had suggested a panel system primarily to ensure the representation of the Unionist Party. It was extremely unacceptable to the League because it became a fundamental question for the League that members of the Executive Council should not only be taken from the Muslim League but also selected by the League president. According to Jinnah, the Conference failed because the Viceroy had reserved the right to select the members himself and to include non-League men among the Muslims. He believed that this panel system affected the character and status of the League.

However, the best solution to break impasse was suggested by Khawaja Nazim-ud-din. He told Casey (Governor of Bengal), that according to him 'Jinnah would accept a Punjabi Muslim who is neither a member of Congress nor of League provided the individual were to be jointly agreed upon by himself and Punjab Premier and provided he were called a 'Punjabi Muslim' and not a 'Punjabi Union member.'⁶⁵ He made it clear that Jinnah would not accept Congress Muslim. But he suggested the name of Firoz Khan Noon as a suitable choice.⁶⁶

Khizar's thinking was totally different. He was expelled from the League, for he showed no willingness to compromise or to bow to Jinnah.⁶⁷ The Unionist Party had begun to disintegrate as there had been since the time of Sikander 'a clique of communal extremists, out of sympathy with Sikander's moderate policies and wholehearted supporters of the demand for Pakistan'⁶⁸ Firoz Khan Noon has recorded, 'the Unionist Party of the Punjab was convinced by some very high up British officials that the British were not quitting and that they would be able to form a Government with Hindu and Sikh support though the Muslims would be only a few.'⁶⁹ Khizar thought that Jinnah would always try to undermine his position and tighten his grip over the Punjab to achieve his goal of Pakistan.⁷⁰ He never thought of rapprochement with Jinnah and therefore during the conference remained in close circle of the Congress party and its allies. He was suspected of negotiating with the Viceroy through the Congress President, Maulana Azad, to be given a seat in the Muslim quota, representing Punjab.⁷¹

Khizar knew that 'the Punjab is only Province which has maintained a popular Government continuously since the beginning of the autonomy and that

too a Government representative of all the main communities of the province.⁷² He also was conscious that it was an exclusive privilege to the province of the Punjab that it had continuously a Punjab Muslim representative in the Executive Council since 1910. He was confident that the province of Punjab had been playing a key role in the affairs of the Central government and the central government also had assured him that it would not ignore his services.⁷³

Khizar held that 'Mr. Jinnah's totalitarian claim to monopolize Muslim seats, so that Muslims who do not belong to the League go unrepresented. I can safely assert that a Punjabi Muslim would be not a whit behind a Muslim drawn from any other source in maintaining the rights and claims of Indian Muslims.'⁷⁴ He insisted that Wavell should fill up Muslim quota at once from elsewhere if Jinnah remained intransigent. He believed that in this way the League and Pakistan would begin to lose their power forthwith.⁷⁵ Besides, Gandhi impressed upon Wavell that 'His Majesty's Government would have to decide sooner or later whether to come down on the side of Hindu or Muslim, of Congress or League, since they could never reconcile them.'⁷⁶

These suggestions impressed Wavell. Fearing the failure of the Conference, Wavell thought of forming the Executive Council without the League, but was not sure of its success.⁷⁷ According to Choudhry Khaliqzaman, 'As the terms were not acceptable either to the Government or the Congress the inclination of the Viceroy was to by-pass the League and form his National Government by choosing Muslim representatives either from other parties or independents.'⁷⁸ However, on 30 June, he sought the advice of His Majesty's Government and all the Governors,⁷⁹ through secret telegrams, on the advisability of going ahead without the League.⁸⁰ The British Government turned down the proposal and it was 'one of the last memorable acts of Mr. Amery before he handed over the charge of his office to Lord Pethic Lawrence ten days later.'⁸¹

Glancy, Governor of Punjab, who had been advocating the Unionist Party stand, said that Jinnah's claim to nominate all Muslims in light of League's meager hold on Muslim-majority Provinces was outrageously unreasonable. He said:

I agree with you that it would be inadvisable if Jinnah maintains his present attitude to attempt forming Council without League representation. This would place Congress in unduly dominating position. Muslim members apart from Unionist and Congress nominees would probably be of dubious value: every individual Muslim representative would be subjected to continued vilification from League-controlled Press and would likely to feel insecure. Jinnah would pose as Islamic hero and though after some interval the falseness and untenability of his position might be appreciated and his power for mischief broken, it seems not unlikely that meanwhile the central machine would collapse.⁸²

Further he said, 'Personally I doubt whether such substitutes for Leaguers perhaps one or two would be strong enough to stand up storm of criticism and

abuse without leaning heavily on Congress support. I still think on the whole it would be better to suspend Conference...⁸³ Therefore, he did not agree with Khizar's suggestion that Executive Council without League should be formed.⁸⁴

Glancy was fully conscious about Khizar's stand that might bring about the failure of the Simla Conference but he was worried about the reputation of Khizar and the future of the province of Punjab. He said that Glancy could not conceal his grudge against Jinnah. He suggested to Wavell that not only the real cause (Khizar's intransigence) of failure of the Conference should not been mentioned but suggested that 'the point could be met by stressing that Jinnah, in spite of being assured of majority of Leaguers among Muslims representatives, still remained intransigent.'⁸⁵

In the light of the aforesaid views of the Governors of India, especially of the Punjab, Wavell dropped the idea of forming a Council without the League. But Khizar Hayat Tiwana conjectures that it was differences between the Muslims and the Hindus which brought about the failure of the Conference. He said,

There is nothing to show that the Congress has abandoned its claim to represent a section of Indian Muslims or its demand that some of the Muslim representation must go to its nominees. Lord Wavell has made it clear that he never showed his complete tentative list of nominations to any one of the leaders. Thus the Conference never reached the state at which I had to press my demand for the inclusion of Punjab Muslim.....But I must repeat that differences between them were the cause of the failure of the Conference - not the allotment to a Punjabi Muslim. The present negotiations failed on account of certain fundamental differences between Mr. Jinnah and the Congress - differences which have been evident during the Cripps negotiation and again during the Gandhi-Jinnah talks - and therefore the failure can in no way be attributed to the claim for the inclusion of a Punjabi Muslim in the Executive Council.

Lord Wavell showed remarkable political insight and will to break political deadlock in India. He managed to convince the British Government about the wisdom of carrying his plan through. He helped Indians to bridge their differences in the Simla Conference. It appeared that Conference would be successful because it gave a hopeful start. However, success of the Wavell Plan became quite obvious when the Congress and the League agreed upon the principle of parity. It became brighter when the Congress got ready to nominate other members save the Muslims. Therefore, the Conference did not fail on the ground of parity between the Congress and the Muslim League.⁸⁶ Nor the differences between the Congress and the League wrecked the Conference. But the real damage was done by the stand of the Unionist Party. It showed no flexibility in its demand that at least one Muslim member from the Unionist Party should be included from the Muslim quota and it was over this issue that the Conference broke down. Wavell's dilemma was that neither he could ignore

the advice of governor of the Punjab nor he could by-pass the Unionist Party. He was now left with no alternative but to announce the failure of the Conference. In the end, Khizar single-handedly brought about failure of the Wavell plan. And also the province of Punjab, due to its religious, social, economic, strategic and political position played a decisive role in determining the future of the Central government of India.

Notes

¹ In the perspective of the late colonial politics of Punjab, considerable light on the subject has been shed by scholars, such as Ian Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana: The Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002); Syed Qalb-i-Abid, *The Muslim Politics in Punjab, 1923-1947* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991) and David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publisher, 1988). Though they have devoted a few lines to the Wavell plan and the Simla Conference however they have overlooked the role of the Punjab premier in bringing about the failure of the Conference.

² Most of the Indian and British historians hold Jinnah responsible for the failure of the Conference. Maulana Azad and Gandhi bitterly criticized the role of Jinnah and declared him uncompromising and intransigent.

³ Rajagopalachari ((1879-1972) was probably the first important Hindu leader who not only realized the genuineness of the League's demand for a separate State for the Muslims but also tried to convince Congress leaders to accept the division of India on the basis of the Lahore Resolution. Jinnah turned down the Rajagopalachari formula as 'it was offering a shadow and husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan.'

⁴ The Gandhi-Jinnah talks commenced on 9 September 1944 and continued till the 27th September. The talks began first on the basis of the Rajagopalachari formula, which Jinnah found not good enough on numerous counts and referred to the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Gandhi did not accept Jinnah's thesis that Muslims were a separate nation and that they had the right to a separate homeland. He said, 'You do not claim to be a separate nation by right of conquest but by reason or acceptance of Islam. Will the two nations become one if the whole of India accepts Islam?' He considered the Lahore Resolution detrimental and would bring nothing but the ruin of the whole India. Gandhi held that India's independence must first be obtained and insisted that the British should transfer power to Congress and then it would allow Muslim majority areas to vote for separation. He proposed that Baluchistan, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province where Muslims constituted a majority and those parts of Bengal, Assam and the Punjab where Muslims were a majority should decide the fate of the Indian union. If their vote was in favour of separation it should be agreed upon that these areas shall form a separate state as soon as possible after India was free. He suggested that the two states would then set up one, unified administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communication,

customs, commerce and the like. For details see: Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase*, vol.1, (Ahmadabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1956), 91; Joint statement of Jinnah and Gandhi released to the Press along with the text of correspondence on 27 September, 1944; Jinnah's Interview to the representative of the *News Chronicle*, London, 4 October, 1944; Jinnah to Gandhi 10 September, 1944, *Jinnah Gandhi Talks*, 32-4. See also *Gandhiji's Correspondence with the Government: 1942-44* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1945), 1-360; Wavell to Gandhi, 22 July, 1944, L/P&J/8/623: f 49.

⁵ Bhulabhai Desai, the leader of the Congress Party in the Central Assembly, brought to the Viceroy a plan on 20 January 1945, which, he claimed, had been discussed with Liaquat Ali Khan, leader of the League assembly party. He also claimed that Mr. Gandhi was in agreement with it, and that Liaquat Ali Khan also had the support of Jinnah on this proposal. The Desai-Liaquat Pact recommended an Interim Government under the existing constitution. It recommended Congress-League parity. No new election in the centre or in the provinces should be held during the war and coalition governments would be formed in the provinces. Jinnah did not know about any such pact and Liaquat Ali Khan also repudiated the pact.

⁶ Wavell used the word 'Caste-Hindus' for those Hindus who belonged to the 'Scheduled Castes'.

⁷ The tasks for the new Executive Council would be: First, to prosecute the war against Japan with the utmost energy till Japan is utterly defeated. Secondly, to carry on the Government of British India, with all the manifold tasks of post-war development in front of it, until a new permanent constitution can be agreed upon and comes into force. Thirdly, to consider, when the Members of the Government think it possible, the means by which agreement among main communities can be achieved.

⁸ The invitations were extended to various leaders and were accepted by all but Gandhi. He said that he did not represent any organization or party or community. A renowned historian B. R. Nanda, quite frankly, admits that 'Gandhi was not a delegate to the Conference, though he was consulted by the Viceroy and the Working Committee.' B.R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi: A Biography* (London: Unwin Books, 1965), 239; Fisher has also recorded that, 'Gandhi made Congress policy behind the Simla scene.' Louis Fisher, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1951), p. 499.

⁹ The same day he released Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru and other leaders who had been in prison since 9 August 1942. The following political leaders of India were invited in their respective capacity to participate in the conference. 1. The leader of the Congress party and the deputy leader of the Muslim League in Central Assembly. 2. The leader of the Muslim League and the Congress party in the Council of State. 3. The leader of the Nationalist party and the European group in the Assembly. 4. Jinnah and Gandhi as the recognized leaders of two main political parties. 5. Rao Bahadur N. Siva Raj to

represent the Scheduled Caste. 6. Master Tara Singh to represent Sikhs. 7. Present premiers of the provinces. 8. All those who lost offices of premiership due to imposition of Section 93.

¹⁰ Wavell, *Viceroy's Journal*, p. 142.

¹¹ Wavell to Amery, 24 June 1945, Telegram, L/PEJ/8/ 522, *Transfer of Power*, vol. v, p. 1151.

¹² Wavell to Amery, 27 June 1945, Telegram, L/PEJ/8/ 524: ff 28-9; *Transfer of Power*, vol. v, p. 1165.

¹³ Wavell to Amery, 27 June 1945, Telegram, L/PEJ/8/ 524: ff 28-9; *Transfer of Power*, vol. v, p. 1165.

¹⁴ Wavell to Amery, 28 June 1945, Telegram, L/PEJ/8/ 522: ff 29-30.

¹⁵ Wavell to Glancy 8 June 1945, Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945, Pt I, p. 222.

¹⁶ V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power* (London:), 197.

¹⁷ According to Jinnah, key portfolios in the new Executive Council were Home, Finance, War and Transport and External Affairs etc. *Transfer of Power*, vol. 5, p. 1154.

¹⁸ Jinnah to Linlithgow 1 July 1940 in Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.) *Quaid's Correspondence* (Rawalpindi: Service Book Club, 1987), pp. 217-18.

¹⁹ Farzana Shaikh, pp. 214-15.

²⁰ Wavell to Amery, 28 June 1945, *Transfer of Power*, vol. v, p. 1170.

²¹ Wavell to Amery, 28 June 1945, *Transfer of Power*, vol. 5, pp. 1170-1.

²² Ibid.

²³ *ibid.*, p. 110.

²⁴ Wavell to Amery, 27 June 1945, Telegram, L/PEJ/8/524: ff 28-9

²⁵ Jinnah suggested that the Conference must face ground realities. According to him, Tara Singh represented the majority of the Sikhs and Siva Raj the majority of the Scheduled Castes; the Congress represented the vast majority of the Hindus and the League the vast majority of the Muslims. He said that the League could not agree to a constitution on any basis other than that giving guarantee for the creation of Pakistan. However, he did not demand Pakistan immediately. He gave the impression that proposals were acceptable to him, provided he had his way on communal parity.

²⁶ Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, *The Final Phase of the Struggle for Pakistan* (Lahore: Publishers United LTD, 1964), p. 8.

²⁷ They maintained that they could not submit their lists of the names without consulting their respective Working Committees. It was agreed that those who agreed to submit their list, including the Congress, would do within a week. Then the Conference was adjourned for a fortnight. *Wavell Papers*, Mss. Eur. D. 977/5.

²⁸ Ian Talbot, p. 148.

²⁹ Mohammad Khan Nawaz Khan of Kot Fetah Khan, Nawab Sir Jamal Khan Leghari, Sheikh Faiz Mohammad Khan (Private Secretary to PM) and Ghias-ud-din.

³⁰ Khizar's list contained the nominations for the executive council were: Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Nawab Sir Jamal Khan Leghari, K.B. Shaikh Faiz Muhammad Khan, Ghias-ud-din. Wavell also earmarked the Agriculture and Food Portfolio for the Unionist nominee. See: Ian Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana and the Unionist*, p. 138-39.

³¹ The Muslim Working Committee met on 6 July to discuss the situation from day to day from 6 July to 14 July at Simla. Jinnah on 7 July informed the decision of the Working Committee. Jinnah to Wavell, 7 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt II, pp. 81-82.

³² On Jinnah's refusal to go ahead with Wavell's proposals, the Viceroy thought of making a shadow Government and tried to get approval of this shadow council from His Majesty's Government and the Provincial Governors.

³³ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.) *Quaid's Correspondence* (Rawalpindi: Service Book Club, 1987), pp. 217-18.

³⁴ Waheed Ahmed, *Jinnah - Linlithgow Correspondence* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1978), pp. 116-7.

³⁵ Wavell to Jinnah, 9 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt II, pp. 87-8.

³⁶ Jinnah to Wavell, 9 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt II, p. 88.

³⁷ Wavell had five Muslims in his mind. Those were Liaquat Ali Khan, Khaliq-uz-Zaman, Sir Nazim-ud-din, Essak Sait (Leaguer) Nawaz Khan (Unionist). Wavell to Amery, 9 July 1945, Telegram, L/P&J/8/524: ff 33-4.

³⁸ Wavell to all Governors, 11 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt II, pp. 97-8.

³⁹ Wavell told Governors he would announce the failure of the Conference on 14th July. He would give brief review of proceedings and state in general terms the reasons for the failure. Wavell to all Governors, 11 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt II, pp. 97-8.

⁴⁰ The final session of the Simla Conference took place on 14 July, Maulana Azad, Rajagopalachari and Khizar Hayat exhorted the Viceroy to form a government without the League, which he declined.

⁴¹ Penderal Moon, (ed.) *Wavell: the Viceroy's Journal* (London: 1973), p. 144.

⁴² Rajagopalachari, Bhulabhai Desai and Tej Bahadur Sapru had acknowledged this principle of parity before the start of the Conference and even Gandhi accepted it in the Simla Conference. If they had been sincere to accommodate Muslim League or to reach an acceptable and reasonable agreement with it, they could have gone one step forward and could have accepted the exclusive right of the Muslim League to represent the Muslims of India.

⁴³ Maulana Azad pleaded that in the provinces where Muslims were in majority, there was no League ministry. In the N.W.F.P. there was a Congress Ministry; in the Punjab it was a Unionist Ministry; in Sind, Ghulam Hussain depended on Congress's support and the same was the position in Assam. Thus was a large bloc of the Muslims who had nothing to do with the League. But it is also true

that this situation did not reflect the growing popularity of League in the Muslim-Majority provinces. It was an outcome of internal dissension and personal jealousies of some members of the Muslim Leaguer which had brought these changes.

The hard facts were different from the aforesaid assumptions. Ram Gopal in his book, *Indian Muslims*, correctly remarked that 'this seemingly somber picture was no index of the tremendous popularity the League had gained among the Muslims, who were flocking to it as Hindus flocked to the Congress.' In the Punjab, the Unionist party was loosing its ground. Several well-known Punjab Muslims of Unionist and Congress party had announced their support for the League. In Bengal Fazal-ul-Haq, the Premier since 1937 had dared to defy the authority of the Muslim League High Command. As a result, he was overthrown in 1943 by Khawaja Nazim-ud-din, a whole-hearted Leaguer. Though Governor Raj had been introduced in Bengal, popularity of the League and of the Pakistan demand had been increasing day by day. Congress and its allies, despite the support of Fazlul Haq were never in a position to form a government. In Sind and Assam, the Muslim League had formed governments. Even in the North-West Frontier Province, the solitary Muslim province attached to the Congress, a League's Ministry had been working during the absence of the Congress allies, the Red Shirts, who remained in jail during (1943-45). In the by-elections for 61 Muslim seats in the various provincial assemblies that took place from 1937 to 1943 the League won 47; independent Muslim 4 and the Congress captured only 2. By 1943, in the by-elections to Muslim seats, League had won 8, independent Muslims 3 and Congress none. Moreover, Muslim League won all the four by-elections to the Muslim seats in the Central Legislature. Thus, the League was able to prove that it had gained a heavy mandate from the Muslim masses for its goal - the achievement of Pakistan. The League was the most popular party of the Muslims, and Rajagopalachari, Gandhi and others had recognized Jinnah as one and the only undisputed leader of the Muslims of India. Jinnah was not wrong in claiming that the League was the sole representative and authoritative organization of over 90 per cent of the Muslims of India.

⁴⁴ Penderal Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London: Chatto & Widus Ltd, 1961), pp. 40-1.

⁴⁵ Choudhry Khaliqzaman and Sir Nazimuddin met Sir Mudie on 16 July and expressed their views on the Simla Conference. They said that the Muslim League Working Committee fully supported Jinnah in his stand on the right of the League to nominate all Muslim members of Council. They resented Azad's attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Congress Working Committee by sending for Husain Ahmad Madni and other Nationalist Muslims to Simla. Sir F. Mudie to Jenkins, 16-17 July 1945, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. V, pp. 1269-70.

⁴⁶ Wavell to Amery, 9 July 1945, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. V, pp. 1210-11.

⁴⁷ Wavell noted that 'Azad summoned to Simla the leaders of various Nationalist Muslim organizations who are much disliked by the Muslim League,

and it was, I think, generally known that he was attempting to consolidate all the minor parties with the Congress against the League. He certainly initiated discussions with the Sikhs and probably with the Scheduled Castes also.' Wavell to Amery on 15 July 1945, L/PEJ/524: ff 22-4.

⁴⁸ Wavell to Amery on 15 July 1945, L/PEJ/524: ff 22-4.

⁴⁹ Wavell observed that 'The failure of any political move narrows the field for future negotiations and now that Jinnah has rejected a move with the present Constitution based on parity between the Caste Hindus and Muslim it is not clear what he would be prepared to accept short of Pakistan.' Wavell to Amery 15 July 1945, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. V, p. 1263.

⁵⁰ W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India, A Social Analysis* (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, ed. II, 1947), p. 350.

⁵¹ Maulana Azad issued a statement from Simla on 17 July 1945. He said that 'So far the Congress is concerned it has repeatedly declared its readiness to take up the responsibility of administration. If the British Government were really anxious to settle the issue they should have foreseen and realized the communal and other difficulties and should have not given the right of veto to any particular group to hold up the progress of the country.' *India Annual Register*, Vol. II, p. 1945.

⁵² Wavell suggested holding meetings and tried to form a committee to find out some solution but all his efforts went in vain as he found no change of spirit among the leaders. Wavell as a third party could facilitate the dialogue. He could not interfere in their communal dispute.

⁵³ Qazi Saeed-ud-Din, 'Is India Geographically one', Rafique Afzal, ed., *The Case for Pakistan*, (Islamabad, 1988), pp. 67-76.

⁵⁴ Wavell, *Viceroy's Journal*, p. 157.

⁵⁵ Statement at a press conference, Simla 14 July 1945, in Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusufi, ed., *Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam*, vol. III (Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1996), pp. 2025-28.

⁵⁶ H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide-Britain-India-Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 125.

⁵⁷ Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1989), pp. 75-76.

⁵⁸ V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power*, p. 215.

⁵⁹ Azad said that 'the qualification we have sought in each case has been the greatest ability available, the common factor being the independence as the immediate objective after the war.' Azad to Wavell, 7 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt II, pp. 77-80.

⁶⁰ Wavell announced to release the members of the Congress party before the opening of the Simla Conference.

⁶¹ Therefore, it was highly undesirable to take a risk of allowing the Congress to form a new Executive Council, as the confidence of the British Government on the Congress had not been restored completely. Congress still was planning to

repeat the 1942 rebellion, the goodwill created by Azad's attitude, seemed dissipated.

⁶² S. Qalb-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics in Punjab, 1921-1947* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 1992), p. 289.

⁶³ Sir B. Glancy to Wavell, 3 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt. II, pp. 74-5.

⁶⁴ Wavell to Amery, 9 July 1945, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. V., pp. 1210-11.

⁶⁵ Casey to Wavell, 3 July 1945, Telegram, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, pt. II, p. 75.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*; *Transfer of Power*, vol. 5, pp. 1196-7.

⁶⁷ Jinnah placed three demands before Khizar in April 1944: that every member of the Muslim League Party in the Punjab Assembly should declare that he owes allegiance solely to the Muslim League Party in the Assembly and not to the Unionist Party or other any party; that the present label of the coalition, namely the Unionist party should be dropped; and that the name of the proposed coalition should be the Muslim coalition Party. On refusal to accept these demands, Khizar was expelled by Jinnah from the Muslim League Party on 27 April 1944. See, K. C. Yadav, 'The Partition of India: A Study of the Muslim Politics in Punjab, 1849-1947', *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. XVII-I, Serial No. 331 (Patiala: Department of Punjab Historical Studies, Patiala University, April 1983) 36-37; and Ian Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, pp. 111-124.

⁶⁸ Penderal Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), p. 39.

⁶⁹ Firoz Khan Noon, *From Memory* (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1966), p. 188.

⁷⁰ Gilmartin has recorded that League's influence rapidly increased in 1944-45, due to number of factors. The Unionist party was losing its basis and ideology and suffered from factions. David, Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam*, pp. 199-223.

⁷¹ Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 328.

⁷² Press statement of Malik Khizar Hayat Khan at Simla on 15 July 1945, *India Annual Register 1945*, Vol. II, ed., H. N. Mitra and N.N. Mitra, (New Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1990), pp. 136-7.

⁷³ Wavell said: 'I certainly wish to avoid any political upheaval in the Punjab, where the Unionist Ministry is still doing well, thanks mainly to Khizar himself.' Wavell to Amery, 25 June 1945, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. V, p. 1157.

⁷⁴ Press statement of Malik Khizar Hayat Khan at Simla on 15 July 1945, *India Annual Register 1945*, Vol. II, ed., H. N. Mitra and N.N. Mitra, (New Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1990), pp. 136-7.

⁷⁵ Sir B. Glancy, Punjab Governor) to Wavell, 7 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt. II, 74-5; *Transfer of Power*, vol. v, p. 1201.

⁷⁶ Wavell to Amery 15 July 1945, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. V, p. 1263.

⁷⁷ The Governors of the important Muslim provinces of Bengal and the Punjab stated that it would be extremely unwise to form the government without the League, for a concession to the Congress was likely to drive the Muslims to rally solidly behind Jinnah. Moreover, Casey, the Governor of Bengal, pointed

out that to form an Executive Council comprising members of the Congress and non-League Muslims was not workable. He informed the Viceroy that the Bengal Muslims would support Jinnah whatever would be the result of his stand. He suggested announcing general election to determine the credibility of each party. He further pointed out that elections could decide whether Congress can secure a sufficient percentage of Muslim seats to justify a claim to nominate a Congress Muslim out of the Muslim quota of seats on the Executive Council. It could also clarify the League's claim to be the sole body representative of the Muslims to the exclusion of both the Congress and other political parties.

⁷⁸ Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore: Brothers Publishers, 1993), p. 328.

⁷⁹ Wavell to all Governors, 30 June, 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, part II, pp. 63-64.

⁸⁰ Casey to Wavell, 3 July 1945, Telegram, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, pt. II, p. 75.

⁸¹ Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, 328.

⁸² Sir B. Glancy to Wavell, 6 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt. II, p. 76.

⁸³ Sir B. Glancy to Wavell, 6 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt. II, p. 76.

⁸⁴ Sir B. Glancy to Wavell, 3 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt. II, pp. 74-5.

⁸⁵ Sir B. Glancy to Wavell, 11 July 1945, *Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944-July 1945*, Pt. II, p. 97.

⁸⁶ H. M. Seervai, *Partition of India, Legend and Reality* (Rawalpindi: Service Book Club, 1989), p. 27.