

## Women Heads of State and Government

*Farida Jalalzai*

### INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on actors that have received relatively scant attention in the gender and politics scholarship—women heads of states and governments. While quantities of women executives have noticeably increased globally, academic focus primarily assesses women in parliaments (Alexander et al. 2016; Franceschet et al. 2012). Work examining women executives is growing but more prone to analyze cabinet ministers (Barnes and Taylor-Robinson 2017; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009; Franceschet and Thomas 2015). Though women’s incorporation in parliaments and cabinets is important, examining women’s attainment of additional political posts, including presidencies and prime ministerships, paints a more comprehensive picture of empowerment through formal office holding. Moreover, some women presidents and prime ministers exert substantial political influence domestically and globally, ultimately empowering women in societies at large.

Globally, women still face obstacles to achieving political empowerment, defined here as “the enhancement of assets, capabilities, and

---

F. Jalalzai (✉)  
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK, USA

achievements of women to gain equality to men in influencing and exercising political authority worldwide” (Alexander et al., Introduction). Through measuring women’s positional empowerment, or the degree to which women hold formal political posts wielding real power and influence, I focus on women prime ministers and presidents worldwide.

This chapter first provides a rationale for focusing more on women presidents and prime ministers given the current state of the gender and politics literature. It then presents trends related to women’s executive office holding such as the quantities of women leaders, paths and positions. An assessment of the potential impacts women presidents and prime ministers exert on women as a group follows. I argue that women executives further women’s political empowerment within the society as a whole and even on a global scale, through mechanisms related to their roles as policy makers, selectors, and symbols. I conclude by highlighting a number of opportunities for future research on measuring the political empowerment hastened by women executives.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATING WOMEN PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS

### *The State of the Literature*

Why does the gender and politics’ literature need to focus more on women executives generally and women presidents and prime ministers specifically? Most scholarship focusing on women in politics is research on women in parliaments (Alexander 2012, 2015; Celis et al. 2008; Franceschet et al. 2012; Hughes 2013). The focus on legislatures may be driven by greater quantities of cases of women in these institutions, availability of databases tracking the numbers of women legislators, and the closer connections scholars and practitioners tend to draw between democratic representation and legislative office (see Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012). When scholars consider women in executive positions, most often this is as cabinet ministers rather than as heads of state and government (Annesley 2015; Barnes and O’Brien 2017; Barnes and Taylor-Robinson, Chapter 10; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009; Franceschet and Thomas 2015). Studies center on factors explaining higher percentages of women in the cabinet but also the types of portfolios women gain.

Research on women prime ministers and presidents is growing. This literature offers either cross-national comparisons of women's backgrounds and their ascension stories (Liswood 2007; Opfell 1992; Jalalzai 2004; Jensen 2008; Skard 2014) or case studies of the behavior of individual women once in power (Saint-Germain 2013; King 2002; Clemens 2006; Franceschet 2016; Hendersen 2013; Jalalzai and dos Santos 2015; Peña et al. 2012; Stevenson 2012; Staab 2016; Thomas 2016; Waylen 2016). Scholars often fail to connect individual paths and powers to broader comparative and regional dynamics and do not sufficiently unpack the political influence offered through these positions both domestically and internationally. My research agenda has attempted to fill this gap and views this exercise as critical to measuring women's political empowerment on a global scale.

### *My Contributions to the Literature*

My contributions to the scholarship explore how women's rise or failure to ascend to executive power interacts with the larger institutional, structural, and cultural backdrops of their countries (Jalalzai 2008). Other research dissects the gendered nature of powers women exercise (Jalalzai 2010; Jalalzai 2013) and if and how women utilize these authorities to represent women (Alexander and Jalalzai 2016; Jalalzai 2016; Jalalzai and dos Santos 2015). I attempt to measure women's incorporation in executive office but, more critically, the powers women executives wield and their ultimate influence on women in society. Positional empowerment is the extent to which political posts afford real power and influence. To accurately assess whether women have achieved positional empowerment requires an analysis of whether more women are gaining executive offices, but also the circumstances hastening their ascensions (popular vote, appointment, succession, personal backgrounds, other country details), the types of positions held in terms of power (within and outside a country), and autonomy and security afforded. More broadly, women's political empowerment may be achieved when women executives use their influence and political authority to generate numerous effects that enhance women's assets, capabilities, and achievements with their male counterparts within the larger society and worldwide. This intellectual pursuit requires a global focus—analyzing contexts more amenable to women's executive leadership, others more resistant and some falling somewhere in between. Examining only where women have managed to crack the

executive glass ceiling leaves out a majority of countries that have failed to bring women to power. This agenda also necessitates engaging comparisons to men, a group that has long been overrepresented in presidential and prime ministerial posts. All of these aspects mentioned are measurable though some more challenging in this regard than others.

## MEASURING WOMEN'S GLOBAL POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT THROUGH EXECUTIVE OFFICE HOLDING

### *Case Selection*

This section provides an overview of myriad issues regarding the case selection process in relation to the executive positions analyzed. Executive positions vary depending on context, and titles do not always capture the essence of a post. The German Chancellor essentially performs the same functions of a prime minister while the prime minister of Peru does not.<sup>1</sup> Other women including monarchs and governors generally hold visible executive posts but lack roles and authorities that are equivalent to that of prime ministers and presidents. Some utilize collective presidencies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina where a different executive represents one of three main ethnic groups or San Marino which is led by two Co-Captain Regents.<sup>2</sup> I tend not to analyze monarchs, governors general, and non-traditional executives in favor of prime ministers and presidents.<sup>3</sup>


Case selection also requires a consideration of larger systemic variances including level of democracy and political autonomy. Positions within military dictatorships/juntas, one-party communist states, and hereditary monarchies present particular challenges to scholars since these executive offices are essentially closed to contestation. Countries lacking full independence, including Taiwan, prove problematic to deal with since power ultimately lies with another state. While scholars differ on the positions and countries they analyze, these choices shape a first step of measuring women's political empowerment worldwide—tracking quantities—and resulting conclusions about the extent to which women have made inroads into executive office.<sup>4</sup>

When tracking quantities of women executives, I analyze only presidencies and prime ministerships in autonomous countries since 1960 when Sirimavo Bandaranaike first cracked through the executive glass ceiling in Sri Lanka. As of April of 2017,<sup>5</sup> 114 different women have served as

**Table 12.1** Where women have led

<i>Number of different women</i>	<i>Number of countries</i>	<i>Examples</i>
1	45	Chile, Estonia, Liberia, Pakistan
2	21	Iceland, Ireland, Philippines, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom
3	6	Finland, Lithuania, Norway, Peru, Poland, S. Korea
4	1	Haiti
5	1	Switzerland
74 countries have had women executives		

**Fig. 12.1** Numbers of women executives over time: 1960–2017. Update April 4, 2017



executives of their countries, 49 have been presidents (43 percent) and 65 have ascended as prime ministers (57 percent) (Table 12.1).

*Where Women Have Led*

Women have governed 74 countries (see Fig. 12.1). Thirty-nine percent of countries where women have governed have seen at least two different women executives take power. These settings vary in levels of democracy and include wide ranging contexts such as Finland, Haiti, Argentina, New Zealand, and Bangladesh. Twenty-six of the 114 women served in the capacities “Acting” or “Provisional” leaders (13 presidents and 13 prime ministers). This leaves 88 of the 114 being non-interim, 52 of whom are prime ministers (59 percent) and 36 (41 percent) of whom are presidents.

That empowerment denotes a process of transformation from a position of no or limited agency to one of greater agentic opportunity and

effectiveness (Introduction, this volume), it is imperative to analyze temporal trends in quantities of women executives. I present these findings next.

### *Numbers of Women Executives Over Time: 1960–2017*

Women executives made fairly limited progress in their executive pursuits until the 1990s when their numbers nearly quadrupled. More than three-quarters of all female presidents and prime ministers entered office in the last 20 years and their quantities have climbed faster since 2010 than any decade. Numbers of women executives, however, still prove woefully sparse. Sixty-one percent of countries throughout the world have not had a woman national executive. Women have yet to crack the executive ceiling in other areas. 118 (61 percent) of 195 autonomous countries have not had a woman leader. This includes the Middle East (with the exception of Israel) and North Africa (that have failed to democratize), and notable countries such as Russia, China, Japan, and the United States (Table 12.2).

### *Women Presidents and Prime Ministers Currently in Power*

The dearth of women executives is even more glaring when examining their quantities at the beginning of 2017 compared to their male counterparts. Currently, only 16 women hold executive posts. Overall, a mere 6 percent of all executives worldwide are women.<sup>6</sup> At the start of 2017, the numbers of women executives is declining rather than growing or holding constant, compared to the previous year.

Analyzing women's political empowerment also necessitates identifying the quality of positions women gain in terms of the powers, autonomy, and security provided within and outside a country as well as the processes facilitating their rise in the first place. If solely focusing on the most powerful presidential positions to gauge women's empowerment through executive office holding, we would be left with a fairly disappointing picture. Few women have ever held power as dominant presidents. Even rarer are those who accomplished these feats through a popular vote and absent blood or marital connections to power. When analyzing heads of state and government, clearly women have not yet achieved political empowerment.

**Table 12.2** Women presidents and prime ministers currently in power

<i>Country</i>	<i>Leader</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Powers</i>	<i>Path</i>	<i>In office</i>
Bangladesh	Sheikh Hasina Wajed	Prime minister	Dominant	Indirect	1996–2001; 2009–
Chile	Michelle Bachelet	President	Dominant	Popular vote	2006–2010; 2012–
Croatia	Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović	President	Powerful	Popular vote	2015–
Estonia	Kersti Kaljulaid	President	Weak	Indirect	2016–
Germany	Angela Merkel	Chancellor (prime minister)	Dominant	Indirect	2005–
Liberia	Ellen Johnson Sirleaf	President	Dominant	Popular vote	2006–
Lithuania	Dalia Grybauskaitė	President	Powerful	Popular vote	2009–
Malta	Marie-Louise Coleiro Preca	President	Weak	Indirect	2014–
Marshall Islands	Hilda Heine	President	Dominant	Indirect	2016–
Mauritius	Ameenah Gurib	President	Weak	Indirect	2015–
Namibia	Saara Kuugongelwa- Amadhila	Prime minister	Weak	Indirect	2015
Nepal	Bidhya Devi Bhandari	President	Weak	Indirect	2015–
Norway	Erna Solberg	Prime minister	Dominant	Indirect	2013–
Poland	Beata Szydło	Prime minister	Dominant	Indirect	2015–
Switzerland	Doris Leuthard	President	Weak	Indirect	2010; 2017
United Kingdom	Theresa May	Prime minister	Dominant	Indirect	2016–

Last updated April 9, 2017

Taiwan's independence is contested, leading to President Tsai's omission

For names and leaders, findings based on author's analysis of data from *Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership* and Zarate's *Political Collections*, as well as various media reports. For powers, author analysis of the *Presidential Power database* (Doyle and Elgie 2016), various scholarly articles including Siaroff (2003) and Jalalzai (2013), media analysis and country constitutions

## ANALYZING PATHS AND POSITIONS

This section analyzes the paths, powers, autonomy, and security of women executives worldwide. In assessing positional empowerment, my research has evaluated powers afforded to executives. Constitutional designs provide a first glimpse into offices and processes. Integrating varied sources such as country reports, media articles, biographies, and academic country studies provides a more comprehensive picture of power. I select powers affording policy significance and abilities to select key officials (see Jalalzai 2010, 2013). Paths, autonomy, security, and global visibility and powers heavily shape whether women executives truly are empowered and if they can empower women as a group.

Women, compared to their male counterparts, more often ascend to relatively weak posts and gain offices through appointment as opposed to popular election (Jalalzai 2013). I assert that these roles provide a lower degree of positional empowerment. Even with high-profile female executives such as Angela Merkel of Germany and Theresa May of the United Kingdom, women still rarely lead more visible and influential countries. As such, women are seldom visible as important political actors worldwide in contrast to male leaders who remain the norm.

Research reinforces the importance of political institutions. Women disproportionately govern in dual executive systems, with both a president and prime minister (Jalalzai 2008, 2013). Power imbalances often relegate women to weaker positions. Presidents exercising authority within a unified executive system (where the president is the sole national executive) and others governing in dual executive systems with a powerful or weak prime minister are particularly influential.

Few women secure presidencies where they do not share power with a prime minister; those operating in systems where a president dominates almost always occupy the much weaker prime ministerial role (Jalalzai 2010, 2013). Women also disproportionately govern in parliamentary systems (Thames and Williams 2013). Women's tendencies to govern as prime ministers is not a result of there being more of these positions available for contestation as presidential positions are more plentiful. Since they routinely possess fewer powers than presidents, women's greater likelihood of being prime ministers presents important consequences. While a larger segment of women prime ministers hold dominate authority in their systems, they face significant vulnerabilities, namely being ousted from office, and exercising power collaboratively. Several female prime ministers,



particularly those in Africa, hold very weak positions. A major liability facing nearly all of these weak prime ministers is that they can be dismissed by both parliament and the president.

Primaries present hurdles to women's candidacies not necessarily because they cannot win public votes; rather they hesitate to self-nominate and run for office (Hinojosa 2012; Lawless and Fox 2010). Self-nomination strengthens the influence of local power monopolies and clientelism (Hinojosa 2012, 61). Political machines recruiting candidates are closed to women (Bruhn 2003; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). More centralized and selective processes alleviate the problems of self-nomination and limited access to local networks and women typically fare better under these arrangements (Hinojosa 2012).

The extent to which the public vote determines presidential election outcomes in particular also varies. Presidents, especially ceremonial ones, may be indirectly selected by political elites such as legislators. Some countries require that a candidate attain a majority popular vote, particularly in multiparty systems. If not, the top two candidates advance to a second round (Nunez and Theis 2013, 2). Political minorities may consolidate broader support in the next stage when they appear more viable having finished near the top but absent a majority or even a plurality vote in the first round (Carey 2003).

Structural conditions render mixed findings in explaining women's rise to power. Women executives govern in many contexts where women in the general public trail behind men in levels of educational and professional attainment (Jalalzai 2008, 2013; Thames and Williams 2013). One of the ways this puzzle is explained centers on family connections to power. Between 1960 and 2010, nearly one quarter of women executives hailed from political families (Jalalzai 2013, 92). This path has proved especially important in Asia and Latin America. Political transition facilitates women's inclusion (see Montecinos 2017). Major electoral defeats or scandals also open up political space to women (Campus 2013) who can use gender stereotypes of being healers, unifiers, or reformers, when the window of opportunity opens in post-conflict societies (Thomas 2002).

Even in more stable and democratic countries, women leaders benefit from chance openings. Former prime minister of the UK Margaret Thatcher is often identified as an "accidental leader" largely promoted because of the weaknesses of others, rather than her own strengths (King 2002). Angela Merkel's rise has been attributed to auspicious circumstances as a woman who stood outside the inner circle of men undone by

a scandal that left a vacuum she could fill (Thomas and Lennartz 2006). Theresa May is used as an example of the glass cliff phenomenon—women reaching high positions during perilous times, perhaps set up for failure (McGregor 2016). For both women with family ties (who tend now to be highly politically credentialed) and others that benefit from openings to power, their political savvy, qualifications, experience, and agency are devalued.<sup>7</sup>

To date, only 17 (15 percent of the total number of women executives) women have ever held power as dominant presidents. Of these, only ten women initially gained power through a popular vote and a mere four did so absent blood or marital connections to either a former prime minister or president or a major opposition figure. All told, only 4 percent of the 114 female executives have entered office as dominant presidents of their countries absent family connections to power and through a popular vote. Of these, nine are presidents but less than half of them were elected by popular vote. Moreover, only two exercise dominant authority in their capacities. While we see women gaining ground around the world in obtaining executive office, they still struggle to amass power and have fairly restricted paths when they do. Having examined numbers, powers, paths, autonomy, and security, women have not achieved positional empowerment on a global scale.

### MEASURING WOMEN'S POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN THE LARGER SOCIETY

This section examines positive impacts beyond the positional empowerment that women executives demonstrate by their potential inclusion as presidents and prime ministers. The election or appointment of a woman executive facilitates women's political empowerment more broadly. Potentially, women leaders can help implement important policies, appoint key officials, and positively shape views that the public has of women's leadership and political participation. As such, women executives affect women's empowerment in two ways:

1. It signifies women's political gains by virtue of their institutional inclusion (positional empowerment).
2. Their placement in these posts, particularly those that are more influential within that country and on the world stage, creates positive changes to women's status in the larger society (women's political empowerment more generally).

### *Empowerment Through Policy Making*

Women leaders' abilities to propose or implement policies related to women's equality can empower women in the very societies they govern. While we must consider several additional factors such as partisanship, legislative party dynamics, as well as executive authorities to propose and advance legislation, women executives may be particularly poised to facilitate women's empowerment through policy making. While their male colleagues may also empower women through their policy, women executives may be more prone to do so. Their shared status as women hastens their greater awareness of the inequities women face in society at large. As such, women executives may be more likely to promote policies advancing women's equality, addressing women's special needs, or issues central to women's traditional roles as caregivers (see Swers 2002).

Very little research connects women's empowerment through policy making to women heads of state and government. The exceptions usually take the form of case studies of individual women leaders, rather than comparative analysis. Findings suggest mixed tendencies (see Genovese and Steckenrider 2013; Montecinos 2017) for women leaders to promote policies empowering women. Norway's Gro Harlem Brundtland passed family friendly legislation including generous paid family leaves for women and men (Hendersen 2013). Angela Merkel has advocated both funding kindergartens and legislation explicitly promoting equal rights for women in Germany (Wiliarty 2010). Numerous studies suggest Chile's President Bachelet has empowered women through advancing several policies including ones creating legislative quotas, greater access to reproductive rights and promoting pay equity (Peña et al. 2012; Stevenson 2012; Staab 2016; Thomas 2016; Waylen 2016). Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff also used her authorities to expand and reframe existing programs targeting the poor to specifically help women. She did not attempt policy change on some issues, including abortion, placing her at odds with feminist groups (Jalalzai and dos Santos 2015; Jalalzai 2016). President Laura Chinchilla (Costa Rica) tended to advance policies that reinforced women's traditional roles as mothers rather than transcending gender boundaries (Jalalzai 2016). Liberia's President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf struggled to gain legislative support for policies including stronger domestic violence legislation that would positively impact women (Adams 2017). Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi (India) and Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom) did not even attempt to empower women through their policy-making authorities (Everett 2013; Genovese 2013).

More research should explore whether women executives empower women through their policy making. Of particular significance would be studies that compare the advantages prime ministers or presidents have in leading policy change within specific institutional settings. Prime ministers may benefit in policy implementation given the fusion of executive and legislative powers in parliamentary systems. Yet, presidents exercise significant legislative authorities in some regions, including Latin America and Africa; this may provide them a high degree of policy latitude, sometimes empowering women. Coalition dynamics further complicate the picture since this constrains executive actions. The extent to which governing processes transpire through democratic procedures must be understood as they will shape executive, legislative, and judicial relations. Finally, we also need to more closely analyze the extent to which women executives in particular face demands from their female constituencies to promote specific policies. Together these and many other factors affect the policy-making context and ultimately women's empowerment in the larger society.

More research could analyze women's use of specific powers including public declarations (Jalalzai and dos Santos 2015), executive orders, or decrees (Shair-Rosenfield and Stoyan 2016). Scholars can also examine different influences related to policy design including legislative, cabinet, party, coalition, and constituency demands in relation to executive policy making. Opportunities abound in similarly scrutinizing male executives regarding whether they empower women through policy making. More research analyzes women executives' policy making compared to their male predecessors or successors (Jalalzai 2016) and this literature could be further expanded. The policies of male presidents (even in countries that have not yet been led by a woman) must also be investigated if we want to truly understand the extent to which women in society are empowered (Chhabria 2016).

### *Empowerment Through Appointment*

This segment scrutinizes another way women executives can empower women—through their appointments of key office holders. Women executives appear especially positioned to advance OTHER women to power compared to their female legislative and ministerial counterparts. Moreover, while their male colleagues may also empower women through appointment, women may be more apt to appoint women to positions of power.<sup>8</sup> This expectation stems from women's greater cognizance of women's exclusion from the political realm (Krook and O'Brien 2012). Women also tend to operate within the same networks as other women. This increased exposure

results in women executives' greater ability to identify potential female appointees (Franceschet 2016; Krook and O'Brien 2012; Reyes-Housholder 2016). Another possibility is that the public expects (or demands) that women executives promote gender diversity. Women candidates pledging to select more women for cabinet positions may fuel this anticipation as well.

Even if seemingly committed to diversifying their cabinets, myriad factors shape an executive's ability to follow through on this goal once in power. Formal rules guide cabinet selection which affects both the supply and demand for women. Some executives select nominees while other actors or institutions formally accept or reject these candidates.<sup>9</sup> Countries may also formally constrict the eligibility pool. In parliamentary systems, the pool of eligibles often consists of current legislators (Annesley 2015). Women positioned in the legislative pipeline shape the supply of women considered for cabinet appointments; smaller quantities of women legislators are statistically associated with fewer women ministerial appointments (Krook and O'Brien 2012; Reyes-Housholder 2016).<sup>10</sup> If the party governs with a legislative coalition, typically they will allocate a certain number of ministerial posts to their partners (Altman 2008).<sup>11</sup> In their global analysis, Krook and O'Brien (2012) find more women ministers associated with unified cabinets. While party exerts an important influence on cabinet structure, we must also assess party ideology. Executives hailing from leftist parties might be more inspired to promote women to cabinets since they may operate with a more egalitarian view of gender roles. Globally, leftist governments tend to integrate more women (Krook and O'Brien 2012). Within Latin America, presidents representing the extreme left have a significantly higher percentage of female cabinet ministers (Reyes-Housholder 2016).

While all of the conditions analyzed thus far shape cabinet appointments, very little research has directly engaged whether the gender of the executive influences subsequent appointments. Studies utilizing statistical analysis prove especially rare though several exceptions now exist. In their global analysis of cabinet appointments, Krook and O'Brien (2012) failed to find a relationship between the proportions of women in the cabinet and executive sex. Focusing on 13 advanced parliamentary democracies, nearly all Western European, O'Brien et al. (2015) find that women prime ministers or coalitions led by women have fewer female cabinet ministers. This is particularly true when analyzing them in reference to leftist governments led by their male counterparts. Moreover, women do not appear to select other women to portfolios providing higher prestige. While these findings are instructive, their focus on mainly Western European contexts sheds little light on these dynamics on a global scale. Barnes and O'Brien (2017) confirm that women

executives worldwide are more likely to appoint women to defense portfolios. This connection, however, is driven by self-appointments to these posts.

Women presidents of Latin American countries have tended to appoint more women to cabinet positions than their male counterparts (Jalalzai 2016; Reyes-Housholder 2016). They have diverged in their tendencies to appoint more women to more prestigious positions, however (Jalalzai 2016). Many appointments tend to be in stereotypically “feminine” portfolios (Reyes-Housholder 2016). Michelle Bachelet’s first cabinet was comprised of equal numbers of men and women. She implemented a “no second helpings” policy, a criterion that fresh faces should comprise the new government (Weeks and Borzutzky 2013). Women were underrepresented as high-ranking players within the coalition, and Bachelet had to challenge some coalition party choices (Staab and Waylen 2014, 6). In the end, parity decreased throughout her first term (Jalalzai 2016; Reyes-Housholder 2016). The objective of cabinet parity did not shape the formation of her cabinet during her second term (Franceschet 2016) and she also tended to place women in more feminine positions (Jalalzai 2016). During her first term, Dilma Rousseff appointed more women to her cabinet than her male predecessors, many of whom served in key posts. In her second term, her appointments of women declined and they held less prestigious positions. With her presidency ending prematurely due to impeachment, her replacement, Michel Temer, did not appoint a single woman to his cabinet. This event signaled the importance of having a woman president at the helm of power in relation to promoting other women to high office. Finally, Johnson Sirleaf appointed far greater quantities of women to her cabinet than her male counterparts (Adams 2017).

Women executives may not always be motivated to empower women through their appointments but some evidence exists that they are. Even when women leaders appoint women to positions of power, this may dissipate. Moreover, any empowerment women gain may be undone upon women’s descent. More research on a global scale must be conducted, however, to reach decisive conclusions. Elite interviews tracing appointment decisions (see Jalalzai 2016) and assessing the powers and prestige of positions specific to administrations and how gender shapes women’s inclusion and placement would be useful.

### *Empowerment Through Symbolizing*

This section analyzes the empowerment women executives generate through symbolizing women. Their presence as women in the highest

political offices can increase women's political agency in society. Women presidents and prime ministers shape attitudinal and behavioral responses among the public as members of excluded groups holding power (Mansbridge 1999; Simien 2016). Members of marginalized groups can "bask in the glory" as they witness people like them pursuing the highest offices (Simien 2016, 3). The visibility offered by the positions analyzed here, presidencies and prime ministerships, may give way to potentially larger impacts than available to other actors that govern within larger institutions such as parliaments or cabinets. Perceptions of presidencies and prime ministerships being synonymous with men may be challenged as women make strides into executive office. Seeing women at the helm of the most "masculine" of domains sends important messages about women belonging in the political sphere. Their examples may also send broader positive cues, signaling that politics is more democratic and even enhance levels of political engagement among the public.

Very little literature specifically analyzes the symbolic empowerment offered by women executives and these usually take the form of country cases studies (Espírito Santo 2011) or regional analyses (Jalalzai 2016; Reyes-Houholder and Schwindt-Bayer 2016). Analyzing public opinion data in Latin America, Reyes-Houholder and Schwindt-Bayer scrutinize whether having a woman president affects political activity and support for women in power. They find that women presidents are positively associated with women's intentions to vote, their involvement in political campaigns, and participation in local meetings. Respondents are also more supportive of women's political role when they have a female president (2016, 105). The authors do not present evidence, however, that the public is more efficacious, interested in politics, increasingly likely to follow the news or believe that the government is more responsive under female presidents (Reyes-Houholder and Schwindt-Bayer 2016, 116).

I offered varied evidence regarding whether women presidents in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Costa Rica positively affect views and participation among the general public (Jalalzai 2016). Analyzing surveys, Rouseff's presidency in Brazil offered more consistent, albeit minor, positive shifts, while Bachelet's in Chile showed little stable or significant effects. In interviews, however, respondents easily identified positive influences Rouseff's and Bachelet's presidencies offered. In contrast, survey results and interviews regarding Chinchilla of Costa Rica and Fernández in Argentina tended to confirm negative effects linked to their presidencies (Jalalzai 2016, 210). Espírito Santo (2011) analyzes whether Angela Merkel's rise to power as Chancellor of Germany affects political interest over time. Examining results

from a panel study during a time frame predating and during Merkel's premiership, she finds that women sharing partisanship with Merkel tend to have increased levels of political interest. The effect, however, is limited to only 1 year after Merkel gained power (Espírito Santo 2011, 146).

To date, only two global examinations of the symbolic empowerment related to women presidents and prime ministers exist (Alexander and Jalalzai 2016; Carreras 2016). Carreras (2016) assesses candidates for executive office rather than office holders and does not confirm that visible women candidates offer symbolic benefits to women. Specifically, races with more competitive and salient women candidates are not linked to increased political engagement among women (Carreras 2016, 174). He speculates that this might be related to more successful women candidates asserting a more masculine style and distancing themselves from women constituencies and issues. Moreover, these women tend to have greater associations with political families or their male predecessors which might limit their positive influence.

Alexander and Jalalzai (2016) conducted a multilevel analysis to evaluate the effect of the presence of a female executive on individuals' acceptance of female leaders, interest in politics, and level of voting in national and local elections. Results largely support the hypothesis that female heads of state and government hasten empowerment through symbolizing women. Women and men are more supportive of female leaders and demonstrate higher levels of political interest in countries with a female head of state or government. The presence of a female head of state or government has a stronger, positive effect on women in terms of their likelihood to vote in national and local elections (Alexander and Jalalzai 2016).

Much more work needs to be conducted to confirm women executives' tendencies to empower women symbolically, particularly on a global scale. More data collection can test whether women's executive leadership elicits positive changes in attitudes and behaviors among the public. Global public opinion data rarely exists before and after women executives came to power. Large-scale global surveys do not offer panel data, which could best unpack possible effects generated by women leaders (see Alexander and Jalalzai 2016). Experimental designs, particularly those that are more global in scope, may also prove valuable in assessing symbolic empowerment through executive office holding.

## FUTURE RESEARCH ON WOMEN EXECUTIVES

In addition to the topics already mentioned, several fruitful avenues for research on women executives exist. These include more scholarship



developing theory and models linking executives to various effects on society and those examining the gender discrimination and stereotypes that women executives (and candidates) encounter.

### *Developing Theory on Executive Effects*

Scholars need to engage in more debate regarding the application of Pitkin's (1967) model of representation to executives and develop theories specific to prime ministers and presidents. Representation theory primarily references the role of legislators (Pitkin 1967; Runciman and Brito Vieira 2008), though Pitkin notes the role of the executive in symbolic representation (1969, 12): "An idea or a person can be made present, not by a map or portrait, but by a symbol, by being symbolized or represented symbolically...a modern monarch, or indeed any head of state, can be said to 'represent or embody' be a symbol for, 'the unity of the people of the state.'" While representational effects may emanate from executives, perhaps this is clearest when assessing symbolic representation and less so when dealing with descriptive (standing for women) and substantive (acting for women) representation. This chapter's emphasis on women's political empowerment through policy making, appointments, and symbolizing offers an alternative but complementary way to assess the effects of women executives.

Several issues related to measuring effects abound. While examinations of the symbolic effects of women leaders focus on changes among populations within a particular country, we must also learn how to measure the effects offered by women leaders outside of that country. Given their heightened visibility, women's influence likely transcends geographical borders. More survey and experimental research is needed to verify this. Another related opportunity centers on the fleeting aspects of positive effects; benefits may be temporary, occurring when women's participation has not yet become normalized (Espírito Santo 2011; Gilardi 2015). For example, scholars could explore the following questions on global scale: Do women feel less of a need to run for office if women are already present? Are party elites less compelled to ask women to run if women already hold positions (see Gilardi 2015)?

Scholars also do not understand how women's failures as candidates or leaders affect women as a group. Since women are underrepresented as executives, their gender is more salient when generating conclusions about their leadership. Gender, in part, could be identified as contributing to their failures, leading to deteriorations in public perceptions of women's

governance and women's reluctance to throw their hats in the ring. According to Simien (2016), even unsuccessful candidacies provide important benefits for underrepresented groups. Scholars, however, need to scientifically examine the potential disempowerment resulting from failed bids or unsuccessful leaders to draw meaningful conclusions.

### *Gender Discrimination and Stereotypes*

Academics still do not fully understand the extent to which women executive candidates face sexism from the general public. While most research fails to support claims of gender discrimination against women candidates (Dolan 2014; Hayes and Lawless 2016; but see Mo 2015), these studies do not analyze presidential contests and limit their analyses to the United States. Some researchers examining the influence of sexism in national executive races note how women candidates craft specific strategies to troubleshoot for potential discrimination or negative stereotypes (Carroll 2009). Since the public might view women as more honest, women candidates in countries struggling with corruption may highlight their goals of making government more accountable and transparent. Or, given the double bind women regularly face (Jamieson 1995), they might develop more complex strategies by presenting a combination of "masculine" and "feminine" traits and issues (Carroll 2009; Jalalzai 2016). As such, gender remains a relevant factor that shapes women's electoral prospects, though discrimination proves challenging to scientifically observe and measure. Recently, women presidents including Michele Bachelet have encountered plummeting approval, much of which is related to economic travails as well as corruption (Gilbert 2016). Presidents Park of South Korea and Dilma Rousseff of Brazil were even impeached because of corruption claims. Women possibly face greater scrutiny for their lackluster performances or alleged engagement in inappropriate behavior. This, however, remains unknown, and must be grappled with.

While the extent to which gender stereotypes and discrimination affect women's executive pursuits remains contested, less debated is that perceptions of sexism in politics keep women from running for office in the first place (Hayes and Lawless 2016; Lawless and Fox 2010). Though their numbers have grown over time, women executive candidates remain few. Women tend not to run at all in some regions like Northern Africa and the Middle East. While women worldwide have substantially increased their candidacies over the last several years, they rarely secure substantial levels of public support. In fact, the vast majority does not even gain 5 percent

of the vote (Jalalzai 2013). Most victorious women presidential candidates did not garner electoral majorities but were elected through pluralities or majority runoffs. In nearly all cases, triumphant women did not have to spar against incumbents (who remain, almost universally, male). Among candidates elected by the popular vote, women enjoyed a mere 5 percent chance of victory (Jalalzai 2013).

While women waged candidacies in about a quarter of all executive contests (including both presidential and prime ministerial bids) between 2014 and 2016, only five women won their races; all but one of these women were incumbents (Coolidge and Bell 2017). Since that analysis only observed candidates or parties attaining at least 5 percent of the vote, it underestimates women's difficulties at the polls since most women candidates fail to attain this level of support. Women's losses cannot easily be explained by candidate quality as many women lost to less experienced male challengers who ran as "populist" candidates (Coolidge and Bell 2017). While proof that sexism or gender stereotypes drove women's failures remains elusive, these factors likely affect women's presidential candidacies and electoral performance. Again, I call for future research examining these topics on a global scale.

Though studies suggest that women's greater tendency to hold prime ministerships rather than presidencies may relate to their depiction as more consensus-driven players rather than autonomous actors (Jalalzai 2013), no research actually attempts to scientifically verify this claim. Opportunities to investigate this possibility abound and would need to include qualitative and quantitative studies (observations, interviews, surveys, and experimental designs) examining gender stereotypes and how they shape people's (elites and mass) perceptions regarding men and women and types of executive positions worldwide. Existing research (including my own) makes assumptions of political offices in relation to gender stereotypes but many of these remain just that—assumptions. We need to systematically study whether the basis for such claims holds true.

## CONCLUSIONS

Scholars must continue to analyze how women's presence in legislatures and cabinets promotes women's political empowerment. More research, however, must also integrate women presidents and prime ministers. As research has grown on all of these topics, we see women's inclusion in one of the three roles—legislator, cabinet minister and president/prime minister—coincide with greater chances of gaining other positions (Bauer and Tremblay 2011; Jalalzai 2013; Thames and Williams 2013).

Including presidencies and prime ministerships paints a more comprehensive picture of empowerment through formal office holding. Moreover, some women presidents and prime ministers exert substantial political influence domestically, globally, and on behalf of women. Women executives further women's political empowerment within the society as a whole and even on a global scale, through mechanisms related to their roles as policy makers, selectors, and symbols. While we see women gaining ground around the world in obtaining executive office, they still struggle to amass power and have fairly restricted paths when they do. Having examined numbers, powers, paths, autonomy and security, women have not achieved positional empowerment on a global scale. Global analyses systematically analyzing the empowerment women executives offer through their policy making, appointments, and symbolizing reach varied conclusions, but much more data needs to be collected to reach firm conclusions. While I have outlined many difficulties in measuring women's political empowerment through executive office holding, several opportunities exist for doing so in subsequent research.

## NOTES

1. Three women have served as prime minister of Peru (unofficial title), which is officially termed the President of the Council of Ministers, but holds substantially less power since Peru is a presidential system where the president acts as chief of state and head of government. I have tended to include this position in my analyses, but their inclusion raises some questions about comparability.
2. Switzerland's executive structure also appears unique, its president is elected from its seven-person Federal Council to serve a 1-year term. Due to this seemingly unrivaled power of the president, I retain Switzerland as a case. I also analyze interim or acting presidents and prime ministers, though to a lesser extent than women in office serving on a more permanent basis.
3. I do not include women who serve temporarily if they do so in a capacity that does not conform to a traditional executive structure. For example, Ruth Perry of Liberia was part of the Council of State, a six-person collective presidency led by Ruth Perry, governed during a temporary peace agreement. A more recent example is Acting Head of State Doris Bures of Austria who was Head of the Joint Acting Presidency with two vice-presidents between July 2016 and January 2017 after the second round presidential elections needed to be held again when the Constitutional Court annulled the results.

4. Incorporating nonautonomous states' nontraditional executive positions would noticeably increase the numbers of women executives while integrating military dictatorships/juntas, one-party communist states, and hereditary monarchies would do just the opposite.
5. Of course women like Argentine First Lady Eva Peron lacked formal executive authority, but exerted tremendous influence on politics, particularly women (Weir 2013). Aung Suu Kyi of Myanmar, placed under house arrest throughout two decades, was officially barred from holding the prime ministership upon her release but essentially plays a head of government role. She was disqualified because her deceased husband and their children are foreign citizens, a stipulation specifically adopted to keep her from holding the prime ministership. If we were able to measure the influence of unofficial executive leaders, however, I argue that we would see an even greater entrenchment of men on balance.
6. About 134 presidencies and 118 prime ministerships exist. About 236 men occupied these posts in 2016, while only 16 women did.
7. One could argue, however, that not only do women have to obtain the same credentials as their male counterparts (or more), they usually have to come from important political families to clinch the strongest of executive positions. In this way, the family path can be viewed as an additional burden on women.
8. For example, former Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez, President François Hollande of France, and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada have appointed "parity" cabinets.
9. Actors could include other executives in the case of dual executive systems and institutions include the legislature.
10. Annesley suggests (2015) the pool depends on the particular country. In Germany, only legislators from the lower house are eligible to hold executive portfolios. In the United Kingdom, ministers hail from either the House of Commons or House of Lords (Annesley 2015).
11. According to Annesley (2015), coalitions rarely surface in Westminster parliamentary systems, affording the prime minister greater authority over his or her cabinet choices.

## REFERENCES

- Adams, M. (2017). Assessing Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's Presidency: Effects on Substantive Representation in Liberia. In V. Montecinos (Ed.), *Women Presidents and Prime Ministers in Post-Transition Democracies* (pp. 183–204). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Alexander, A. C. (2012). Change in Women's Descriptive Representation and the Belief in Women's Ability to Govern: A Virtuous Cycle. *Politics and Gender*, 8, 437–464.

- Alexander, A. C. (2015). Big Jumps in Women's Presence in Parliaments: Are These Sufficient for Improving Beliefs in Women's Ability to Govern? *Advancing Women in Leadership Journal*, 35, 82–97.
- Alexander, A. C., & Jalalzai, F. (2016). The Symbolic Effects of Female Heads of State and Government. In J. M. Martin & M. Borrelli (Eds.), *The Gendered Executive: A Comparative Analysis of Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Chief Executives* (pp. 25–43). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Alexander, A. C., Bolzendahl, C., & Jalalzai, F. (2016). Defining Women's Global Political Empowerment: Theories and Evidence. *Sociology Compass*, 10, 432–441.
- Altman, D. (2008). Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Chile (1990–2003): The Executive Branch. In P. M. Siavelis & S. Morgenstern (Eds.), *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America* (pp. 241–270). State College: Penn State University Press.
- Annesley, C. (2015). Rules of Ministerial Recruitment. *Politics & Gender*, 11(4), 618–642.
- Barnes, T. D., & O'Brien D. Z. (2017). Defending the Realm: The Appointment of Female Defense Ministers Worldwide. *American Journal of Political Science*. [Forthcoming].
- Bauer, G., & Tremblay, M. (Eds.). (2011). *Women in Executive Power*. London: Routledge.
- Bruhn, K. (2003). Whores and Lesbians: Political Activism, Party Strategies, and Gender Quotas in Mexico. *Electoral Studies*, 22(1), 101–119.
- Campus, D. (2013). *Women Political Leaders and the Media*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Carey, J. M. (2003). The Reelection Debate in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 45, 119–133.
- Carreras, M. (2016). High-profile Female Executive Candidates and the Political Engagement of Women: A Multilevel Analysis. *Political Research Quarterly*. doi:10.1177/1065912916680034.
- Carroll, S. J. (2009). Reflections on Gender and Hillary Clinton's Presidential Campaign: The Good, the Bad, and the Misogynic. *Politics & Gender*, 5(1), 1–20.
- Celis, K., Childs, S., Kantola, J., & Krook, M. L. (2008). Rethinking Women's Substantive Representation. *Representation*, 44(2), 99–110.
- Chhabria, S. (2016). India's Prime Minister: Narendra Modi, Gender and Governance. In J. M. Martin & M. Borrelli (Eds.), *The Gendered Executive: A Comparative Analysis of Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Chief Executives* (pp. 64–80). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Clemens, C. (2006). From the Outside in: Angela Merkel as Opposition Leader, 2002–2005. *German Politics & Society*, 24(3), 41–81.
- Coolidge, K., & Bell, C. (2017, January 9). The Number of Countries with Female Political Leaders Has Plummeted. *The Monkey Cage*. Retrieved April 10, 2017, from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/>

- [wp/2017/01/09/this-is-whats-behind-the-stunning-decline-in-female-political-leaders/?utm\\_term=.72a10108e274](http://wp/2017/01/09/this-is-whats-behind-the-stunning-decline-in-female-political-leaders/?utm_term=.72a10108e274)
- Dolan, K. (2014). *When Does Gender Matter? Women Candidates and Gender Stereotypes in American Elections*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Doyle, R., & Elgie, R. (2016). Presidential Power Database. [http://presidential-power.com/?page\\_id=2148](http://presidential-power.com/?page_id=2148)
- Escobar-Lemmon, M., & Taylor-Robinson, M. M. (2005). Women Ministers in Latin American Government: When, Where, and Why. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(4), 829–844.
- Escobar-Lemmon, M., & Taylor-Robinson, M. M. (2009). Getting to the Top: Career Paths of Women in Latin American Cabinets. *Political Research Quarterly*, 62(4), 685–699.
- Espírito Santo, A. (2011). The Symbolic Value of Descriptive Representation: The Case of Female Representation. Doctoral Dissertation.
- Everett, J. (2013). Indira Gandhi and the Exercise of Power. In M. Genovese & J. S. Steckenrider (Eds.), *Women as National Leaders: Studies in Gender and Governing* (pp. 103–134). New York: Routledge.
- Franceschet, S. (2016). Disrupting Informal Institutions? Cabinet Formation in Chile in 2006 and 2014. In G. Waylen (Ed.), *Gender, Institutions, and Change in Bachelet's Chile* (pp. 67–94). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Franceschet, S., & Thomas, G. (2015). Resisting Parity: Gender and Cabinet Appointments in Chile and Spain. *Politics & Gender*, 11(4), 643–664.
- Franceschet, S., Krook, M. L., & Piscopo, J. M. (2012). Conceptualizing the Impact of Gender Quotas. In S. Franceschet, M. L. Krook, & J. M. Piscopo (Eds.), *The Impact of Gender Quotas* (pp. 3–26). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Genovese, M. A. (2013). Margaret Thatcher and the Politics of Conviction Leadership. In M. Genovese & J. S. Steckenrider (Eds.), *Women as National Leaders: Studies in Gender and Governing* (pp. 270–305). New York: Routledge.
- Genovese, M. A., & Steckenrider, J. (Eds.). (2013). *Women as National Leaders*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Gilardi, F. (2015). The Temporary Importance of Role Models for Women's Political Representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(4), 957–970.
- Gilbert, J. (2016, May 14). South America's Powerful Women Are Embattled. Is Gender a Factor? *The New York Times*. Retrieved April 10, 2017, from [http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/americas/dilma-rousseff-michelle-bachelet-cristina-fernandez-de-kirchner.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/americas/dilma-rousseff-michelle-bachelet-cristina-fernandez-de-kirchner.html?_r=0)
- Hayes, D., & Lawless, J. L. (2016). *Women on the Run: Gender, Media, and Political Campaigns in a Polarized Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(4), 725–740.



- Hendersen, S. L. (2013). Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway. In M. Genovese & J. S. Steckenrider (Eds.), *Women as National Leaders: Studies in Gender and Governing* (pp. 43–79). New York: Routledge.
- Hinojosa, M. (2012). *Selecting Women, Electing Women: Political Representation and Candidate Selection in Latin America*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Hughes, M. M. (2013). Diversity in Legislatures Around the World. *Sociology Compass*, 7(1), 23–33.
- Jalalzai, F. (2004). Women Political Leaders. *Women & Politics*, 26(3–4), 85–108.
- Jalalzai, F. (2008). Women Rule: Shattering the Executive Glass Ceiling. *Politics & Gender*, 4(02), 205–231.
- Jalalzai, F. (2010). Madam President: Gender, Power, and the Comparative Presidency. *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 31(2), 132–165.
- Jalalzai, F. (2013). *Shattered, Cracked, or Firmly Intact: Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jalalzai, F. (2016). *Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties?* New York: Routledge.
- Jalalzai, F., & dos Santos, P. G. (2015). The Dilma Effect? Women's Representation Under Dilma Rousseff's Presidency. *Politics & Gender*, 11(1), 117–145.
- Jamieson, K. (1995). *Beyond the Double Bind: Women and Leadership*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jensen, J. S. (2008). *Women Political Leaders: Breaking the Highest Glass Ceiling*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- King, A. (2002). The Outsider as Political Leader: The Case of Margaret Thatcher. *The British Journal of Political Science*, 32(3), 435–454.
- Kittilson, M., & Schwindt-Bayer, L. (2012). *The gendered effects of electoral institutions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Krook, M. L., & O'Brien, D. Z. (2012). All the President's Men? The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers Worldwide. *Journal of Politics*, 74, 840–855.
- Lawless, J., & Fox, R. L. (2010). *It Takes a Candidates: Why Women Don't Run for Office*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Liswood, L. A. (2007). *Women World Leaders: Great Politicians Tell Their Stories* (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: The Council Press.
- Mansbridge, J. (1999). Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? *Journal of Politics*, 61(3), 628–657.
- McGregor, J. (2016, July 12). Congratulations Theresa May. Now Mind that Glass Cliff. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved April 10, 2017, from [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/07/12/congratulations-theresa-may-now-mind-that-glass-cliff/?utm\\_term=.d4792a54a383](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/07/12/congratulations-theresa-may-now-mind-that-glass-cliff/?utm_term=.d4792a54a383)
- Mo, C. H. (2015). The Consequences of Explicit and Implicit Gender Attitudes and Candidate Quality in the Calculations of Voters. *Political Behavior*, 37(2), 357–395.



- Montecinos, V. (2017). Introduction. In *Women Presidents and Prime Ministers in Post-Transition Democracies* (pp. 1–36). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nunez, F., & Theis, M.F. (2013). *Inflation or Moderation? Presidential Runoffs, Legislative Party Systems, and Coalitions*. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April 11.
- O'Brien, D. Z., Mendez, M., Peterson, J. C., & Shin, J. (2015). Letting Down the Ladder or Shutting the Door: Female Prime Ministers, Party Leaders, and Cabinet Members. *Politics & Gender*, 11(4), 689–717.
- Opfell, O. S. (1992). *Women Prime Ministers and Presidents*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- Peña, A. B., Cid Aguayo, B. E., & Orellana, C. D. (2012). Ruling the Womb: The Sexual and Reproductive Struggle During the Bachelet Administration. *Latin American Perspectives*, 39(4), 145–162.
- Pitkin, H. (1967). *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pitkin, H. F. (1969). *Representation*. New York: Atherton Press.
- Reyes-Housholder, C. (2016). Presidentas Rise: Consequences for Women in Cabinets? *Latin American Politics & Society*, 58(3), 1–23.
- Reyes-Housholder, C., & Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. (2016). The Impact of *Presidentas* on Political Activity. In J. M. Martin & M. Borrelli (Eds.), *The Gendered Executive: A Comparative Analysis of Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Chief Executives* (pp. 103–122). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Runciman, D., & Brito Vieira, M. (2008). *Representation*. Boston: Polity Press.
- Saint-Germain, M. A. (2013). Women in Power in Nicaragua: Myth and Reality. In M. Genovese & J. S. Steckenrider (Eds.), *Women as National Leaders: Studies in Gender and Governing* (pp. 110–143). New York: Routledge.
- Shair-Rosenfield, S., & Stoyan, A. T. (2016). *When Women Run the Show: Female Executive Authority and Agenda Setting in Latin America*. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) Annual Meeting, April 7–10, 2016. Chicago, IL.
- Siaroff, A. (2003). Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3), 287–312.
- Simien, E. M. (2016). *Historic Firsts: How Symbolic Empowerment Changes U.S. Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Skard, T. (2014). *Women of Power: Half a Century of Female Presidents and Prime Ministers Worldwide*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Staab, S., & Waylen, G. (2014, April). *Gender, Institutions and Change in Bachelet's Chile*. Paper ECPR Joint Sessions, Salamanca, Spain.
- Staab, S. (2016). Opportunities and Constraints on Gender-Egalitarian Policy Change: Michelle Bachelet's Social Protection Agenda (2006–2010). In

- G. Waylen (Ed.), *Gender, Institutions, and Change in Bachelet's Chile* (pp. 121–146). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stevenson, L. (2012). The Bachelet Effect on Gender-Equity Policies. *Latin American Perspectives*, 39(4), 129–144.
- Swers, M. L. (2002). *The Differences Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thames, F. C., & Williams, M. S. (2013). *Contagious Representation: Women's Political Representation in Democracies Around the World*. New York: New York University Press.
- Thomas, G. (2016). Promoting Gender Equality: Michelle Bachelet and Formal and Informal Institutional Change within the Chilean Presidency. In G. Waylen (Ed.), *Gender, Institutions, and Change in Bachelet's Chile* (pp. 95–120). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thomas, M. P. (2002). Female Leadership of Democratic Transitions in Asia. *Pacific Affairs*, 75(4), 535–555.
- Thomas, M. P., & Lennartz, L. (2006). The Making of Chancellor Merkel. *German Politics*, 15(1), 99–110.
- Waylen, G. (Ed.). (2016). *Gender, Institutions, and Change in Bachelet's Chile*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Weeks, G., & Borzutzky, S. (2013). Michelle Bachelet's Government: The Paradoxes of a Chilean President. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 4(3), 97–121.
- Weir, S. (2013). Peronisma: Isabel Peron and the Politics of Argentina. In M. A. Genovese & J. S. Steckenrider (Eds.), *Women as Political Leaders* (pp. 256–269). London: Sage.
- Wiliarty, S. (2010). *The CDU and the Politics of Gender in Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

**Farida Jalalzai** is Hannah Atkins Endowed Chair and Professor of Political Science at Oklahoma State University. Her research analyzes women and minorities in politics and the role of gender in the political arena. She has authored two books examining women national leaders, as well as several peer-reviewed articles in journals such as *Politics & Gender*, *International Political Science Review*, and *Politics and Religion*.